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In 2004, Ofcom launched a strategic review of the telecommunications market. This 
established that the expectation of non-price discrimination by the incumbent 
operator, BT, against its smaller rivals was a significant concern holding back 
investment in market entry via local loop unbundling (LLU). To address this problem, 
Ofcom and BT agreed a set of Undertakings in lieu of a reference to the Competition 
Commission. BT agreed to a new form of non-discrimination remedy referred to as 
Equivalence of Input (EoI) and to a set of organisational changes known as 
functional separation. Under EoI, BT’s retail division had to use the same inputs 
under the same terms and conditions as its rivals. Functional separation referred to 
the creation of a separate access services division that would supply services in 
markets where BT was dominant. 
 
This thesis discusses the economic principles of network industries and why 
discrimination can be a particular problem. It makes three specific contributions to 
knowledge of the subject. First, a historical record of the actions and issues that led 
to the Undertakings. Secondly, a breakeven analysis to determine how effective the 
Undertakings, and other regulations imposed by Ofcom, were at correcting the 
problem of non-price discrimination. The breakeven analysis establishes the location 
of “marginal exchange” before and after the regulatory changes. Finally, an 
assessment of the longer-term consequences by employing a discrete choice model 
to determine whether the presence of entrants using LLU or Virgin Media had a 
stronger effect on where BT installed fibre. 
 
The thesis concludes that the Undertakings did affect the location of the marginal 
exchange by up to 950 exchanges covering 31% of customer premises. LLU price 
cuts imposed by Ofcom moved the marginal exchange by a further 796 exchanges: 
11% of premises. The thesis also finds that up till the end of 2012, the presence of 
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Broadband access to the Internet has been at the centre of European and 
national telecommunications policy for nearly fifteen years. Policy makers regard 
widespread, indeed ubiquitous, access to the Internet as essential to economic 
competitiveness and social inclusion. However, the economics of building fixed 
telecommunications networks means that the access network, the “last mile” 
connection between the customer premises and the telephone exchange, has the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly. Throughout Europe, this bottleneck facility, 
known as the local loop, is owned by a vertically integrated incumbent operator. 
To ensure a competitive retail broadband market the incumbents’ rivals need 
access to the local loop.  
 
European regulation of the sector has required the incumbent to unbundle the 
local loop and make it available to competitors since 2000. However, by mid-
2005 BT’s competitors in the UK had taken advantage of local loop unbundling in 
just 321 of the 5,581 exchanges in the UK and just 85,000 broadband lines were 
provided using Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) out of a total of eight million 
broadband subscriptions. By comparison, in France at the same time over two 
million broadband connections were provided using LLU. 
 
To correct this situation, Ofcom, the sector regulator, took three specific actions 
in 2005. First it agreed a set of voluntary Undertakings (Ofcom, 2005) with BT 
under which BT agreed to a set of behavioural and organisational changes 
designed to deter, and remove the incentives for, non-price discrimination by BT 
against its rivals1. Secondly, Ofcom imposed a price control on BT that cut the 
price it could charge to entrants for unbundled local loops by 85%. Thirdly, it 
created an industry body, the Office of Telecoms Adjudication (OTA), whose job 
was to make the process for renting unbundled local loops “fit for purpose”.  
 
Ten years after signing the Undertakings, Ofcom’s actions continue to be the 
subject of intense argument amongst academics, industry participants and policy 
makers. The organisational changes within BT, known as ‘functional separation’, 
have been especially debated. Often, however, functional separation has not 
been placed in the wider context of Ofcom’s three actions and has been 
confused with structural, or ownership, separation. Further, much of the debate 
has not examined the short- and long-run effects of these actions on decisions by 
entrants about where to enter the market and their technology choices.  
 
This thesis seeks to address the gaps in the debate by: 
 
1. Examining the actions taken by Ofcom holistically, i.e. not exploring just 
one action, but all three and the relationship between them (Chapter 4). 
2. Measuring the short-term, static efficiency effects on the UK broadband 
market structure at the wholesale level, and in particular the entry choices 
                                                
1 It will be shown later that competitors regarded non-price discrimination as a major roadblock to 
investment. 
2 A position equivalent to dominance in the relevant market. 
 2 
made by BT’s rivals. It also seeks to separate the effects of the 
Undertakings from those of the price cut (Chapter 5). 
3. Measuring the long-term, dynamic efficiency effects by exploring how BT 
responded to competitors’ actions through its choice of where to upgrade 
the existing copper access network to fibre, allowing much higher speed of 
access to the Internet (Chapter 6). 
 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 set the context. Chapter 2 describes the economics of 
dominance, the abuse of dominance in general and the remedies available to 
competition authorities under EU and UK law. Chapter 3 introduces the structure 
of the electronic communications sector and discusses the economic principles in 
the context of the sector. In particular, the chapter examines how the local 
access network (the “local loop”) is an economic bottleneck with natural 
monopoly characteristics. Downstream of the local loop, in retailing activities, 
competition is economically feasible provided that entrants can access the local 
loop on fair and reasonable terms. However, in the absence of effective 
regulation the incumbent has no incentive to provide such access. In fact, the 
incumbent has the incentive to foreclose competition by denying access with the 
intent of extending its monopoly power from the upstream to the downstream 
segment of the market (Rey and Tirole, 2007).  
 
Chapter 4 presents a historical record of the actions taken by Ofcom to address 
the perceived level of foreclosure affected by BT against its rivals. In 2004, 
Ofcom launched its Strategic Review of Telecommunications to examine the 
competitiveness of the telecoms market (Ofcom, 2004, 2004B, 2005). Many 
respondents argued that perceived discrimination by BT was the key issue 
preventing further investment in LLU and therefore a more competitive 
broadband market. Ofcom agreed with these submissions and stated in the 
second phase consultation document that BT’s rivals had “experienced twenty 
years of: 
• slow product development; 
• inferior quality wholesale products; 
• poor transactional processes; and 
• a general lack of transparency.” (Ofcom, 2004B, para. 1.19) 
 
Ofcom determined that the “no undue discrimination” obligation that had been 
imposed on BT as a result of its Significant Market Power (SMP)2 had been 
insufficient to deter discrimination. This was because the obligation only required 
“equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances” and Oftel, Ofcom’s 
predecessor, allowed BT to design wholesale products used by other 
communications providers that were different to products used by BT’s own retail 
divisions. Any underlying cost differences between these products were 
                                                
2 A position equivalent to dominance in the relevant market. 
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considered by Oftel to be justifiable reasons for different treatment (Oftel, 2002). 
Ofcom’s response to the problem of discrimination was to agree with BT a set of 
Undertakings in lieu of a reference to the Competition Commission that 
introduced two major changes to BT’s behaviour and organisation:  
 
1) Equivalence of Input (EoI), by which BT had to use the same upstream 
inputs as its rivals under the same terms and conditions; and 
2) “Functional Separation”: a reorganisation of BT so that natural monopoly 
assets were provided by a separate Access Services division to BT’s own 
retail divisions and its rivals. The objective of functional separation was to 
remove the incentive for BT to discriminate and to make any 
discriminatory behaviour more visible to Ofcom. 
 
At the same time, Ofcom also reduced, by 85%, the price that BT was allowed to 
charge for unbundled local loops from one very much above the EU average to at 
or below that average, dependent on the type of unbundled loop.  
 
This part of the thesis also critically examines the debate about Ofcom’s actions 
and presents brief case studies of similar actions taken by regulators in other 
countries and in other sectors. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 explore the effects of the changes introduced by Ofcom in 
2005. Chapter 5 sets up two metrics by which the effectiveness of these changes 
can be measured: the ratio of unbundled local loops to all forms of competitive 
copper access (LLU:CCA), and the location of the marginal exchange, i.e. the 
exchange at which an entrant is indifferent between investing in LLU and using a 
form of reselling BT’s broadband product. The thesis proposes that the greater 
the LLU:CCA ratio and fewer the total number of premises in the marginal 
exchange, the more successful Ofcom has been in reducing discrimination. The 
thesis then analyses the take up of LLU and locates the marginal exchange to 
determine the relative effects of the Undertakings and the price cut on the 
broadband market structure. The chapter concludes that it is not possible to 
untangle the effects of the Undertakings from the price cut when measuring the 
LLU:CCA ratio as a measure of effectiveness. However, it also concludes that 
the Undertakings moved the marginal exchange by between 282 and 951 
exchanges, increasing the number of premises that could be served by LLU by 
between six and 31 percentage points. The price reduction moved the marginal 
exchange by 796 exchanges and increased the number of premises by 11 
percentage points. 
 
Chapter 6 explores BT’s investment in Next Generation Access (NGA) and 
examines the strength of the effect of LLU-based competitors on its choice of 
where to invest in fibre access. It finds that BT was three to ten times more likely 
to invest in fibre broadband access in exchange areas where LLU operators were 
present than where the cable company Virgin Media was present.  
 
Overall, therefore, the thesis concludes that the impact of EoI and functional 
separation was to reduce entrants’ expectations that BT would discriminate 
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against them and that they therefore encouraged increased investment in LLU. 
The increased competition from LLU operators, and the change in the locus of 
competition from broadband access speeds to TV content, encouraged BT to 
invest in NGA to compete with LLU operators rather than cable.  
 
The thesis does not seek to address the effects of Ofcom’s regulatory changes at 
the consumer level. It does not, therefore, examine whether they led to an 
increase in the rate of take up of broadband, the prices consumers paid or the 
quality of services they received. These would all be fruitful areas for further 






2 Economic Principles of Market Power and Non-Price Discrimination 
 
The application of regulation and competition law is based on the concept of 
market power in a relevant market, and the abuse of that position. In sector 
specific regulation, firms that are found to have market power are regulated 
regardless of whether they have abused their dominant position or not. Under 
competition law, however, remedies can only be imposed if an abuse has been 
established. This chapter explores the basic economic principles of market power 
and the remedies available under EU and UK law. 
2.1 Market Power  
Markets, whether for telecommunications services or any other economic good, 
exist on a continuum ranging from perfect competition at one end to a pure 
monopoly at the other3. Towards the monopoly end is the concept of dominance, 
which is a crucial concept in the economics of competition law and economic 
regulation (Motta, 2004). Economically, dominance refers to the ability of a firm to 
raise prices substantially above the competitive level, profitably and is defined in 
European case law as: 
 
“…a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the 
consumers. Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it 
does where there is monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the 
undertaking, which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an 
appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will 
develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such 
conduct does not operate to its detriment.” (emphasis added) 4  
 
Closely related concepts to dominance are “market power” and significant market 
power”. These are sometimes used as interchangeably with dominance and 
sometimes take a slightly different meaning. The fine distinctions between 
“dominance”, “market power” and “significant market power” are not the subject 
of this thesis and so will be used interchangeably. 
 
The definition of dominance used in the USA is rather more economic, in that it 
specifically refers to a firm’s ability to price above the competitive level. However 
is also more restrictive as it is concerned only with price and profit but not other 
aspects of behaviour that can be captured by the European definition, for 
example reduction in quality. The US defines market power as: 
 
                                                
3 More accurately perfect competition and pure monopoly are models of competition and very few 
actual markets exist at either end of the spectrum. 
4 Decision of the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-
LaRoche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461 (“Hoffmann-LaRoche”), 34-5, 118n27, 
499n122.  
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“The ability to price substantially above the competitive level and to 
persist in doing so for a significant period without erosion [of profit] by new 
entry or expansion.”5 
 
The starting point for analysing market power is normally the share of the firm in 
the relevant market. Intuitively, a firm with a larger market share is likely to be 
more powerful within the market. At the extreme, a pure monopoly with 100% 
market share would be expected to have the highest possible market power, 
although even here its power could be reduced if the market is “contestable”6. 
However, a firm can have market power when it is not a monopoly and so 
competition authorities set thresholds below 100% at which a firm may be 
presumed to be dominant.  
 
In the UK, the former Office of Fair Trading7 (OFT) was very specific about the 
thresholds that it would use to measure dominance: a firm with a share above 
50% may be presumed to be dominant, whilst a firm with a share below 40% 
would be presumed not to be dominant (OFT, 2004, para. 2.12). The 
presumption of dominance my be rebutted, and indeed there have been cases, in 
the UK and Europe, where a firm with a market share above 50% has been found 
not be dominant due to other mitigating factors, such as countervailing buyer 
power, discussed below. 
 
However, all competition authorities recognise that market shares alone are not 
sufficient to determine whether a firm has market power or not and that other 
factors need to be taken into account. Two such factors are ease of entry and of 
expansion, and countervailing buyer power. 
 
Ease of entry and expansion refers to the ability of existing or potential rivals to 
enter the market or increase their own capacity in response to a price rise above 
the competitive level by a potentially dominant firm. If barriers to entry and 
expansion are low, then a potentially dominant firm may find it is not possible to 
price above the competitive level for a significant period without erosion of profit.  
 
Countervailing buyer power refers to the ability of buyers credibly to threaten to 
move their business to a rival or to bring production of the good in-house to such 
an extent that the potentially dominant firm’s behaviour would be constrained. It 
would therefore prevent the firm from behaving independently of competitors, 
customers or consumers, or from pricing above the competitive level without the 
erosion of profit. Countervailing buyer power was instrumental in the Enso/Stora 
case, allowing a merger that created a firm with a market share of between 50 – 
70% to proceed because the largest buyer, Tetrapak, bought around 60-80% of 
market output and could constrain the pricing behaviour of the new merged entity 
(Motta, 2004).  
                                                
5 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).  
6 A market is said to be contestable if there are no barriers to entry or exit. In theory, a monopolist’s 
market power could be reduced if it could not exploit that power for fear of entry by rivals.  
7 Now merged with the Competition Commission to form Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). 
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Countervailing buyer power has been regarded as a phenomenon of industrial 
markets. However, with the emergence of social media, consumer groups have 
been able to organise themselves to exert power over suppliers. For example, 
when a mobile operator with a high market share in Greece attempted to raise 
prices for existing consumers, a campaign was launched on Facebook to force 
the operator to reduce prices with the threat that the entire Facebook group 
would leave to a competitor’s network. The mobile operator responded by 
reducing prices because it took the threat seriously8. 
 
Market power may not only be applied in the market in which the firm is 
dominant, but may also be exercised in a closely related market: a concept 
referred to a “leveraged dominance”, which is very similar to foreclosure. Here a 
firm that is dominant in one market restricts or denies its rivals access to an 
essential good that the dominant firm produces or controls and that the rival 
needs so that it can compete in the closely related market. The dominant firm 
thereby leverages its dominance into the closely related market. 
 
Motta (2004, p. 483) explains the concept by way of a simple example. Suppose 
that a firm is a monopolist in Market A but faces competition in Market B where B 
is a complementary product to A. The firm could deny compatibility between A 
and competing versions of B and thereby leverage its monopoly position in 
Market A into Market B. Such leveraged dominance was at the heart of the 
European Microsoft case in which Microsoft denied interoperability between 
Windows PCs and non-Microsoft workgroup servers, as described in Kühn and 
Reenen (2009).  
 
In competition law, the possession of market power is not per se illegal, only the 
abuse of that position by either exploiting consumers or anti-competitively 
harming competitors through practices such as exclusion or discrimination. 
Whether a dominant firm would want to behave in such a manner has been the 
subject of some debate over the years and is discussed below. 
2.2 Why would a firm behave anti-competitively? 
“If an economist finds something – a business practice of one sort or 
another – that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly 
explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of un-
understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on 
monopoly explanation, frequent.” (Coase, 1972, p.67) 
 
In other words, just because we do not understand a firm’s behaviour does not 
mean that the firm is behaving anti-competitively.  
 
                                                
8 This example is taken from a complaint made before the Greek telecoms regulator, the EETT, in 
which the author was involved as advisor to one of the parties.  
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A simplistic, though not necessarily incorrect, assumption is that all firms are 
profit maximising and a firm is best able to achieve this by monopolising a market 
and restricting output, as explained in Figure 1 and accompanying text.  
 
Figure 1: Profit Maximisation of a Monopolist 
 
 
In a perfectly competitive market, producers would be expected to set price (pc) 
where the marginal cost (MC) intersects the demand curve resulting in quantity qc 
being supplied to the market. The resultant consumer welfare would consist of 
the sum of areas A, B and C. A profit maximising monopolist, however, would 
reduce the quantity produced to where the MC curve intersects with the marginal 
revenue (MR) curve, i.e. at qm, resulting in the price being raised to pm. As a 
result, consumer welfare is reduced to area A whilst the monopolist’s profits are 
increased by B. Area C is the deadweight loss of monopoly.  
 
However, few firms are genuine monopolies, and those that are tend to be 
constrained by regulation to prevent profit maximising behaviour. A dominant firm 
facing a competitive fringe can maximise profits through a variety of strategies 
dependent on the market conditions and behaviour of the competitive fringe. Two 
means by which a dominant firm can maximise profits are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
First, the classic Bertrand model of duopoly, in which firms produce 
homogeneous products, compete on price and all consumers buy from the firm 
with the lower price, suggests that each firm would sell at a price equal to its 
marginal costs and therefore the duopoly price is the same as the competitive 
price. This happens because, in the Bertrand model, firms set their prices once 
and simultaneously and so the firm with the lower price wins all the business and 
the firm with the higher price wins none. Firms therefore set prices equal to 
marginal costs and, if the firms had the same marginal costs, then their prices 
would also be the same and neither would earn positive profits. A duopoly would, 
therefore, produce the same results as perfect competition. If the two firms have 
different marginal costs, the firm with the higher costs will exit the market. 
 
It is generally recognised that such behaviour does not reflect what happens in 
reality as perfectly competitive duopolies are rarely observed in practice, and so 
the outcome from the Bertrand model is known as the Bertrand Paradox.  
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One solution to the Bertrand paradox is that at least one of the firms faces 
capacity constraints and can only serve part of the market. If its capacity is less 
than the total demand then a residual demand remains for the other firm. 
Suppose that the capacity constrained firm were the smaller rival to the dominant 
firm. The dominant firm could set a price for the residual demand above the price 
of the rival, and above its own marginal costs, as the rival could not respond, at 
least in the short run, by expanding capacity and increasing sales.  
 
Secondly, in some markets (including telecoms) consumers face switching costs. 
These are the costs that a consumer incurs as a result of changing suppliers, 
brands or products and may be monetary, psychological or time-based switching 
costs. Consumers considering a switch from a large incumbent to a smaller rival 
are likely to do so if, and only if, the additional utility and/or lower price of the rival 
exceeds their switching costs (de Bijl and Peitz, 2002). Thus the dominant firm 
can afford to set a higher price than the smaller rival up to the level of consumers’ 
switching costs, i.e. where: 
 𝑃! =   𝑃! + 𝑧 
 
Where Pd is the price of the dominant firm, Pr is the price of the rival and z 
represents switching costs. If Pd is greater than its marginal costs then the 
dominant firm is able to earn positive profits.  
 
In all these examples, the profits of the dominant firm are likely to be less than 
total industry profits and so it could increase its profits by monopolising the 
market, potentially through anti-competitive action. However, whether a dominant 
firm would always behave anti-competitively has been the subject of considerable 
debate throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. There is not scope here to review 
all the arguments concerning this but, before considering how a firm can behave 
anti-competitively, the principal arguments for and against such an assumption 
are set out. 
 
The Chicago School of antitrust economists, which was in the orthodoxy 
throughout much of the later 20th century, in the US at least, believes that 
markets tend toward efficiency and are self-correcting. Therefore, market 
imperfections, such as dominance or monopoly, are normally transitory and will 
be corrected by entry or expansion by rivals who will reduce the power of the 
dominant firm (Jacobs, 1995). Firms would not individually exploit a dominant 
position as to do so would invite retaliation by rivals and so competition policy 
should not concern itself with unilateral actions. Indeed, Chicagoans would argue 
that competition authorities should be careful not mistakenly to proscribe 
behaviour that promotes consumer welfare (Jacobs, 1995).  
 
Posner gives several examples of Chicago School thinking, such as the extract 
below concerning predatory pricing. 
 
“Selling below cost in order to drive out a competitor is unprofitable even 
in the long run, except in the unlikely case in which the intended victim 
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lacks equal access to capital to finance a price war. The predator loses 
money during the period of predation and, if he tries to recoup it later by 
raising his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price will be bid down 
to the competitive level, and the attempt at recoupment will fail. Most 
alleged instances of below-cost pricing must, therefore, be attributable to 
factors other than a desire to eliminate competition.” (Posner, 1979, 
p.927) 
 
Much of Microsoft’s defence against leveraged dominance rested on the 
Chicagoan view than a monopolist in one market would never have the incentive 
to leverage that dominance into anther market, due to the “one monopoly profit 
theory” (Kühn and Reenen, 2009). This theory suggests that where an upstream 
monopolist sells to a competitive downstream market, the upstream monopolist is 
able to extract all the profit from the market. It could not earn any higher profit 
from excluding rivals in related markets9. Chicagoans also use this theory to 
defend vertical acquisitions by a monopolist. 
 
More recently, a post-Chicago school of thinking has emerged that is, according 
to its advocates, “both more complex and more ambiguous than the Chicago 
School model” (Hovenkamp, 1985, p.225). Both schools accept that competition 
policy should concern itself with efficiency and agree that a neoclassical, 
equilibrium-based research tradition is the appropriate starting point for analysis. 
However, post-Chicagoans are less optimistic about the self-correcting powers of 
the market and believe that market failures may be non-transitory.  
 
One reason why failures may be non-transitory is the presence of high barriers to 
entry: “economic or technical factors which prevent or make it difficult for firms to 
enter a market and compete with existing suppliers”10. Barriers to entry include: 
sizeable initial capital investment that may be a sunk (non-recoverable) cost; 
regulatory factors, such as licences; and switching costs that deter consumers 
from changing suppliers from the incumbent firm.  
 
In the absence of barriers to entry, consumers would quickly punish any 
incumbent firm that sought to behave anti-competitively, for example by raising 
prices above marginal costs, by switching to new entrants. The self-correcting 
market process would therefore deter such anti-competitive behaviour and 
market failures would be transitory. However, if an entrant faces significant 
barriers to entry then it is likely to be less willing to enter, as it would be less 
certain that it could do so profitably. It may consider that its capital would be 
better deployed in a market where it does not face an entrenched incumbent.  
 
Taking the example of switching costs. Suppose that consumers face high costs 
to switch from the incumbent to an entrant. The entrant must entice consumers to 
move by offering lower prices than the incumbent to reward the consumer for her 
risk in moving supplier. If the discount the entrant must offer reduces its price 
                                                
9 See Motta, 2004, p. 374, for a formal description of the one monopoly profit theory. 
10 ‘Penguin Dictionary of Economics’  6th Edition, 1998. 
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below some relevant measure of cost, then the rival is unlikely to enter, leaving 
the incumbent free to price as it sees fit. Even if the entrant does enter, the 
incumbent could respond by lowering its price, thus deterring consumers from 
switching. The self-correcting process of the market is therefore likely to take 
longer to work, if it works at all. 
 
Game theory has a role in post-Chicago analysis: this suggests that an 
incumbent may respond strategically to the threat of entry by choosing a strategy 
to ward off entry. For example, if entry is threatened the incumbent may increase 
output and reduce its prices to signal to the entrant that it has lower costs than it 
in fact has and thus makes the entrant unsure as to whether it can enter the 
market profitably.  
 
This thesis accepts the post-Chicago school of thought. The sizable economies 
of scale and scope in fixed telecoms networks, and the switching costs faced by 
consumers, mean that entry and expansion by potential and actual rivals is 
unlikely in the event of monopolistic behaviour by the incumbent. Market 
imperfections, therefore, tend to be non-transitory and so can be, and indeed are, 
exploited by dominant firms for their own advantage. A firm that is dominant in a 
market characterised by high barriers to entry may abuse that position to cause 
harm to either its competitors or customers, or indeed to both, and it should be 
expected that, in the absence of competition law and/or regulation, it would do 
so. Rivals will not be able to respond to anticompetitive actions in the short run 
due to those barriers to entry. It is possible that the market may be self-correcting 
in the long run, but this would only come about with a change in technology that 
reduces barriers to entry and expansion. Regulatory authorities must, therefore, 
ensure that the dominant firms’ ability to behave in such a manner is constrained 
for the benefit of competition and the consumer. 
2.3 Abuse of a Dominant Position 
There are, broadly, two types of harm: exploitative and exclusionary, and these 
can be imposed via either horizontal or vertical restraints. This thesis is 
concerned with a particular exclusionary harm via a vertical restraint: 
discrimination, which will be discussed in more detail later in this section. Other 
forms of harm are introduced here to place discrimination in the wider context. 
 
Horizontal restraints refer to agreements between firms operating at the same 
level of the value chain that potentially lead to a lessening of competition in the 
market. Such agreements include cartels and mergers that create a dominant 
firm. In both cases the market power of a firm increases, allowing the merged 
entity or the cartel to set prices and output at the monopoly level and/or to 
exclude other competitors from the market.  
 
Vertical restraints refer to agreements and practices between undertakings at 
different levels of the value chain. In this case, contracts are often governed by 
provisions that not only set more general terms of payments, but also include 
terms that limit one party’s decisions or that soften competition (Rey and Vergé, 
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2008). Vertical restraints can be imposed by a firm that operates at only one level 
of the value chain and exerts those restraints on a firm at the next level, or by a 
vertically integrated firm that operates both upstream and downstream against its 
downstream rivals, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Vertical Relationships 
 
 
The upstream and downstream firms on the left hand side of Figure 2 are 
separately owned, whereas on the right hand side, UI and DI are part of the same 
vertically integrated firm and DR is a downstream rival that is dependent on the 
integrated firm for the upstream input.  
 
Whereas horizontal restraints tend to lessen competition in a market directly, in a 
vertical restraint it is likely that competition will only reduced if one of the firms 
already has market power and uses that power to constrain the behaviour of a 
vertically related firm. Of course, under a horizontal constraint once the merged 
entity or cartel has lessened competition and gained more market power, it can 
use that additional power to harm consumers and rivals.  
 
Exploitative behaviour is generally aimed directly at consumers and refers to 
setting prices substantially above an appropriate measure of cost11, and at the 
extreme at the monopoly level, to take advantage of the fact that consumers 
have little or no choice of alternative suppliers. There is some discussion in 
literature on “fair pricing” (Maxwell, 2008) and “excessive pricing” (Fletcher and 
Jardine, 2007). As Fletcher and Jardine point out, assessing what is an 
excessive price is hard: what should the benchmark (non-excessive) price be? If 
the competitive price, what is that level? What should be the allowed magnitude 
of any margin above the competitive price? They also point out that regulating a 
price so that it is not excessive may itself be distorting. Determining what is 
exploitative behaviour, therefore, is something that may sound simple in concept, 
but can prove problematic in practice.  
 
Exclusionary behaviour is generally aimed at competitors of the dominant firm 
with the effect of preventing them from competing effectively in the market. Most 
European cases of abuse of dominance refer to exclusionary conduct. However 
                                                
11 For example, marginal cost of Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC). 
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once a dominant firm successfully excludes a competitor, it can immediately 
exploit consumers (Vickers, 2008). Some forms of exclusionary behaviour are 
discussed briefly below. 
 
Predatory pricing refers to a dominant firm setting its prices below some measure 
of cost with the effect or intention of forcing competitors out of the market. The 
appropriate cost standards were first set out in Areeda and Turner (1975) and a 
similar benchmark was set by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a case 
known as Tetra Pak II: 
 
“First, prices below average variable cost must always be considered 
abusive. In such a case, there is no conceivable economic purpose other 
than the elimination of a competitor, since each item produced and sold 
entails a loss for the undertaking. Secondly, prices below average total 
costs but above average variable costs are only to be considered abusive 
if an intention to eliminate a competitor can be shown.”12 
 
The relevant cost standard has been developed further by the European 
Commission to include the Average Avoidable Cost (AAC). In its guidance on 
Article 82 (now 102), the Commission states that “pricing below AAC will in most 
cases be view by the Commission as a clear indication of [profit] sacrifice” 
(European Commission 2009, para. 64). 
 
Under European law, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the dominant firm 
had any intention or prospect of recouping any loss made during a period of 
predatory pricing. The mere act of pricing below cost to drive out competition is 
sufficient. 
 
A margin squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated dominant firm sets the 
wholesale price for an upstream product, on which the downstream rivals rely, 
and the retail price for its final product such that the margin between them is 
unduly narrow, thereby anti-competitively squeezing rivals downstream. The 
wholesale price may be unduly high relative to the retail price or the retail price 
may be unduly low relative to the wholesale price (Vickers, 2008). The vertically 
integrated firm can choose where it takes it profits (upstream or downstream) 
whereas the rival can only make profits in the downstream business.  
 
Predatory pricing and margin squeeze are examples of price-based exclusionary 
practices. Non-price practices include tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, refusal 
to supply and foreclosure or discrimination13. Brief descriptions of the first four of 
these behaviours are given below and then a longer description of discrimination 
is set out in Section 2.4, as discrimination is the anti-competitive practice of 
concern to this thesis. 
                                                
12 Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951, para. 41. 
13 “Discrimination” and “Foreclosure” are sometimes used interchangeably. However, in this thesis 
the term “discrimination” will be used as it more accurately describes the practice explored here 
of treating internal and external customers differently. “Foreclosure” has a more absolute 
implication as it suggests completely refusing access to a competitor. 
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Tying requires the downstream firm to buy one or more goods from the upstream 
firm over and above that which the downstream firm initially requires or where 
competitive alternatives are available. For example, a publican may wish to rent 
premises from a brewery but can only do so if he or she also agrees to buy beer 
and other drinks as well. In so doing the brewery excludes its competitors from 
the pub.  
 
Although normally considered an exclusionary behaviour, tying can also be 
exploitative when aimed directly at consumers. For example, if the publican 
wanted to rent the pub from an independent property company rather than a 
brewer, the property company may also insist that he or she buys beer and other 
drinks through the company at exploitative prices.  
 
Bundling is similar to tying but requires the downstream firm, or the consumer, to 
purchase products together that it may wish to purchase separately. In many 
cases bundling is efficient and not anti-competitive: a car, for example, is a 
bundle of goods that are rarely if ever sold separately. It can be an anti-
competitive practice, however, if a firm bundles together a product on which it 
has market power with a competitive product and only provides them as a 
bundle. Here the dominant firm is said to be leveraging its dominance from one 
market to another. For example, a telecoms company that provides both fixed 
and mobile communications may be dominant in the former and face competition 
in the latter. By bundling the two together it can leverage its dominance from 
fixed to mobile.  
 
Exclusive dealing at its crudest is simply a dominant firm requiring a downstream 
buyer to purchase all of its requirements of the relevant product or service from 
the dominant firm, thereby excluding all competitors from the market. More subtle 
forms of exclusive dealing include discount and rebate schemes that reward the 
downstream firm for buying from the dominant firm. The Michelin II case14, 
discussed in Motta (2009) is an example of such a scheme. The essence of this 
scheme was that once a distributor had purchased a certain volume of tyres from 
Michelin, the rebate on further purchases meant that the marginal cost of 
additional tyres became negative. Thus the distributor had a strong incentive to 
purchase only from Michelin and not from its rivals.  
 
Refusal to supply is almost self evident: it refers to the blanket refusal by the 
owner of an essential facility to supply goods or services to another firm. Motta 
provides an example.  
 
“Imagine for instance that a shipping company X integrates backwards 
and builds new port installations in a certain town A, located in the “home” 
country. Given the location, using this port’s infrastructure gives firm X a 
great advantage in serving the maritime route from the home country to a 
                                                
14 Case T-203/01, Manufacture francaise de pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission, 2003.  
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certain other foreign country. Company Y now requests use of the port 
and firm X denies it (refusal to supply).” (Motta, 2004, p.67) 
 
A subtler version of refusal to supply is by unduly delaying supply through what 
could be termed “strategic incompetence”. Here the dominant firm places so 
many procedural barriers in the way to supply, for example by claiming a lack of 
capacity, that the purchasing firm’s competitive position is weakened by the time 
it is finally supplied.  
 
The examples of anticompetitive practices discussed above are by no means an 
exhaustive list and, indeed, this section is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather it 
gives a flavour of the behaviours that a dominant firm may exhibit to exploit its 
position and to exclude rivals from entering or expanding within the market. One 
behaviour that has not been discussed above, but is the behaviour of interest to 
this thesis, is a dominant, vertically integrated firm’s different treatment of its own 
retail business and its rivals in the downstream market: discrimination.  
2.4 Discrimination  
2.4.1 The Meaning and History of “Discrimination” 
 
In Europe, discrimination, in a general sense, makes an early post-war 
appearance in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states 
in Article 14: 
 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
 
A more detailed legal interpretation can be traced back to the “Belgian Linguistic” 
case15, the Marckx judgement in 197916 and the Van der Mussele case of 198317. 
In Belgian Linguistics, the European Court of Human Rights held that “the 
principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and 
reasonable justification” (para. 10). In the Marckx judgement the ECHR stated 
that Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights “safeguards 
individuals, placed in similar situations, from any discrimination in the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in those other provisions” (para. 32). In Van 
der Mussele the ECHR said that “Article 14 safeguards individuals, placed in 
analogous situations” (para. 46). 
 
                                                
15 Case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Education in Belgium"  
v. Belgium (Merits) (Application no 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64), 
23rd July 1968. 
16 Marckx v Belgium, European Court of Human Rights 6833/84, 13th June 1979. 
17 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983) EHRR 163, 179 – 180, 23rd November 1983. 
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In a House of Lords judgement from 200518, Lord Hoffman gave as clear a 
definition of discrimination as one is likely to find: 
 
“Discrimination means a failure to treat like cases alike. There is obviously 
no discrimination when the cases are relevantly different. Indeed, it may 
be a breach of article 14 not to recognise the difference.” 
 
A legal bar on discrimination does not mean that all individuals need to be treated 
in exactly the same way. Rather the case law points towards different treatment 
being allowable where the situation is not analogous as such difference in 
treatment is not discriminatory. As Lord Hoffman pointed out, treating people in 
non-analogous situations in the same way could itself be discriminatory. 
 
The economic interpretation of discrimination is consistent with this approach. In 
his seminal article, Kenneth Arrow describes discrimination as some 
characteristic of an employee other than productivity that would account for 
differences in wages for the same job. Arrow considers the case of different 
ethnic groups working in steel production, and writes: 
 
“The black steel worker may be thought of as producing blackness as well 
as steel, both evaluated in the market. We are singling out the former as a 
special subject for analysis because somehow we think it appropriate for 
the steel industry to produce steel and not for it to produce a black or 
white workforce.” (Arrow, 1973, p. 2) 
 
With respect to the production of steel, the black and white worker are alike and 
should therefore be treated in a like manner for one or other not to be 
discriminated against. Any difference in treatment due to skin colour would be 
discriminatory. However, should one or other have a higher productivity and 
therefore be paid more (if the two workers are on performance related pay) then, 
provided such difference in pay is based on their performance rather than colour, 
the pay difference would not be discrimination. The less productive worker would 
have the opportunity to earn more if he/she increased his/her productivity 
regardless of the colour of their skin.  
 
When firms sell products and services, discrimination refers to the provision of 
those goods or services under different conditions even though customers are in 
equivalent circumstances. The opportunity for a dominant firm to behave in this 
way can arise from its market power, affording it the ability to treat equivalent 
customers differently. To adopt Arrow’s language, discriminated against 
customers may be considered to be consuming some sort of difference when it is 
appropriate for them only to be considered as consuming the product or service.  
 
A special case of discrimination, and the one most relevant to this thesis, is when 
a dominant firm behaves in such a manner to extend its position in one market to 
                                                
18 Regina v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent) ex parte Carson (Appellant) 
[2005] UKHL 37. 
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a closely related market where it faces competition. Rey and Tirole provide a 
definition of this behaviour (although they use “foreclosure” instead of 
“discrimination”): 
 
“[F]oreclosure refers to a dominant firm’s denial of proper access to an 
essential good it produces, with the intent of extending monopoly power 
from that segment of the market (the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent 
segment (the potentially competitive segment). Foreclosure can arise 
when the bottleneck good is used as an input (e.g. an infrastructure) by a 
potentially competitive downstream industry, or when it is sold directly to 
customers, who use the good in conjunction with other, perhaps 
complementary goods (e.g. systems goods or after sale service).” (Rey 
and Tirole 2007, p.1)  
 
Discrimination can take two forms: price and non-price. 
 
Price discrimination exists when a firm sells two similar products with the same 
marginal cost at different prices to different customers (Armstrong, 2008). He 
also refers to Stigler’s (1987) definition: discrimination exists when two similar 
products are sold at prices that are in different ratios to their marginal costs. The 
reverse is also true: discrimination would occur if different products, with different 
costs, were sold at the same price. Phlips says that: 
 
“[P]rice discrimination should be defined as implying that two varieties of 
the same commodity are sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at 
different net prices, the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) 
corrected with the cost associated with the product differentiation.” 
(Phlips, 1983, p.6)  
 
Anti-competitive price discrimination was originally made unlawful in the United 
States in the Clayton Act (1914) Section 2, which expressly banned such 
behaviour if its effect was a substantial lessening of competition. The Clayton Act 
prohibited price discrimination, the effect or intent of which "may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce." The Act was directed at predatory price cutting that eliminated 
competition among sellers (Rowe, 1951).  
 
This Section, however, was amended in 1936 and became the Robinson-Patman 
Act, also known as the Anti-Price Discrimination Act. According to Rowe (1951, 
p. 929), chain stores and their ability to obtain lower prices from suppliers than 
their smaller, independent rivals were the original “legislative target” of the Act, 
but it was widened to all industry. The Clayton Act’s focus on competition among 
sellers was considered insufficient to prevent a lessening of competition among 
buyers. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act requires sellers to sell to all 
downstream firms at the same price, and also places an obligation on buyers to 
buy from a seller at the same price as everyone else, provided the buyer has the 
requisite knowledge (Clark, 1998).  
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Armstrong (2008) gives three reasons why competition policy may be concerned 
with price discrimination. First, a dominant firm may exploit final consumers 
resulting in a loss of consumer welfare. Secondly, in the EU context, price 
discrimination may affect the single market if the same product is sold at different 
prices in different member states. Thirdly, price discrimination may be used to 
exclude or weaken actual or potential competition.  
 
It is this third reason that is most relevant to this thesis. Here a vertically 
integrated incumbent that is dominant in the market for the upstream product 
may set an external price for the input that is higher than its internal costs. Thus 
the entrant faces a higher input cost than the incumbent’s own downstream 
business. Armstrong says that assuming the same input cost is the non-
discriminatory cost would be “naïve” and that the actual non-discriminatory price 
should also take account of the opportunity cost to the incumbent of not earning 
the profit on the retail product. Thus the non-discriminatory wholesale price (a) is: 
 𝑎 = 𝑐! + (𝑝 − 𝑐!) 
 
Where c2 is the marginal cost of supplying the input to wholesale customers, c1 is 
the marginal cost of supplying the good to consumers and p is the retail price. 
 
The non-discriminatory price proposed by Armstrong is equivalent to the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), in which the entrant compensates the 
incumbent for the opportunity cost to the incumbent of lost business. This 
ensures that the entrant can only enter the market profitably if it is at least as 
efficient as the incumbent and so resources are not diverted to an inefficient 
producer (Economides and White 1995).  
 
Non-Price Discrimination refers to the provision of different non-price terms, for 
example delivery times, to internal and external customers. Non-price 
discrimination and the remedies imposed by regulators to deter such behaviour 
are the main subject of this thesis. 
 
Non-price discrimination, which is sometimes also referred to as “sabotage” and 
one form of which is “raising rivals’ costs” (RRC), is of particular concern when a 
vertically integrated firm is selling to downstream rivals. Beard, Kaserman and 
Mayo (2001) define sabotage as “a quality reduction that raises the costs of the 
non-integrated downstream producers”, and may take many forms. At one 
extreme, the vertically integrated firm can, in the absence of regulation to prevent 
such behaviour, refuse to supply an essential input over which it has a monopoly, 
thus foreclosing the retail market to any rival. Such outright refusal to supply is 
generally prohibited by the law and in utility sectors the incumbent is placed 
under an obligation to provide access. Even in the presence of such an 
obligation, the vertically integrated incumbent can provide access under different, 
less favourable terms and conditions to its rivals than it does to its downstream 
affiliates or division. Provided such difference in treatment is not objectively 




Among the first papers to explore the issue of raising rivals’ costs (RRC)  through 
non-price means was Salop and Scheffman (1983). In this early contribution, the 
authors demonstrate that a strategy adopted by a dominant firm that raises the 
costs of its rivals is likely to have an advantage over a predatory pricing policy, as 
it is better to compete with a high cost rival, and short term profits do not have to 
be sacrificed. 
  
Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) undertook a thorough analysis of RRC in the 
context of US antitrust law decisions at the time. They identified four such 
strategies that they considered “legitimate” (as opposed to “discredited”): 
 
1. Bottleneck: The purchaser obtains exclusive rights of supply from 
low cost producers such that its rivals are forced to purchase from 
higher cost suppliers; 
2. Real Foreclosure: This is similar to bottleneck, but in this case the 
purchaser deliberately overbuys a crucial input thus denying it to its 
competitors; 
3. Cartel Ringmaster: A purchasing firm persuades suppliers to supply 
other customers on less favourable terms than it receives; 
4. Frankenstein’s Monster: The purchaser of an exclusionary rights 
contract creates a different industry structure that is likely to 
generate a price increase. 
 
A later paper by Scheffman illustrates RRC theories in their simplest form. Figure 
3 depicts a competitive industry with its supply curve made up of three segments: 
I1, I2 and M, and a demand curve DD. The I suppliers are infra-marginal and the 
M suppliers are marginal. The segment I1 is the supply curve for a group of 
producers that have constant average and marginal costs of c1 up to an output of 
Q1, which is the absolute capacity limit for the I1 producers. Similarly, I2 is the 
supply curve for a group of producers that have constant average and marginal 
costs of c2 up to an absolute capacity level of Q2-Q1. Finally, segment M is the 
supply curve for a group of producers who have constant average and marginal 
costs of cm. As drawn, the M producers have no capacity limitations. The 
competitive price, cm, and output, Q*, are depicted in Figure 3. At a price of cm, 
the I1 and 12 firms are inframarginal, i.e., although they are acting competitively, 




Figure 3: Raising Rivals' Costs 
 
(Scheffman, 1992, p. 191) 
 
In this example, the inframarginal firm takes some action to raise the unit costs of 
the M producers to c'm, but leaves the costs of the I1 and I2 producers unchanged. 
The M producers' supply curve is shifted upwards, resulting in an increase in the 
market price to c'm, and a reduction in industry output to Q**. The basic principle 
is that prices in competitive markets are determined by industry marginal costs 
(and demand), so that prices increase with increases in industry marginal costs, 
as long as demand is not highly elastic (Scheffman, 1992, p. 191 – 192).  
 
In Scheffman’s example I1 and I2 are both inframarginal, as the demand and 
supply curves intersect to the right of the vertical line E’Q2. However, if the 
market demand curve was more elastic then I2 could become a marginal 
producer if Q** were to be moved to the left of Q2.  
 
Later on, this thesis will explore, and attempt to calculate, by how much BT was 
able to raise the costs of rivals in the broadband market or, more accurately, by 
how much rivals must have perceived those costs to have been raised and 
restricted their entry accordingly. In the context of Figure 3, BT is I1 and the thesis 
will attempt to determine by how much its rivals, the M producers, had their unit 
costs raised from cm to cm’. 
2.4.2 Incentives to Discriminate 
 
Section 2.2 examined why, in general, a dominant firm might wish to abuse its 
position. This section is more specific and examines the circumstances in which 
a vertically integrated firm that is dominant in the upstream market would have an 
incentives to discriminate against downstream rivals.  
 
This question has been addressed in the literature on discrimination. Beard et al 
(2001) find that the incentive for sabotage by a regulated vertically integrated firm 
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depend upon: (1) the margin between the regulated price and cost at the 
upstream stage, (2) the price-cost margins at the downstream stage, and (3) the 
intensity of competition in the upstream market. However, they also say that the 
existence of an upstream fringe (condition 3) is not necessary to establish the 
profitability of sabotage. 
 
Kondaurova and Weisman (2003) develop a methodology to estimate the 
likelihood that the incentive to discriminate will arise in equilibrium, based on a 
given distribution of firm-specific own and cross-price elasticities. They find that 
the number of cases in which discrimination arises is very sensitive to initial 
market shares and downstream prices. In line with Beard et al, their simulations 
also reveal that when the access price is close to marginal cost, the number of 
discrimination cases remains very large, even if all other parameters are 
conducive to non-discrimination outcomes. Access charge reductions are 
therefore likely to exacerbate the incentive for non-price discrimination in an 
environment in which the regulator’s ability to monitor discrimination is imperfect.  
 
Mandy and Sappington (2007) examine incentives for an integrated firm to 
discriminate against (sabotage) rivals in a downstream market under both 
Cournot and Bertrand competition. They identify two types of sabotage: cost 
increasing and demand reducing, though they do not give examples of specific 
behaviours which might fall into these categories. In their models the integrated 
firm faces a trade-off. If it sabotages its downstream rival such that its demand for 
the wholesale input is reduced, will it be able to off-set those losses by increased 
demand and profits from its own downstream affiliate? 
 
They find unambiguously that the integrated firm’s profits rise under Cournot 
competition using both cost-raising and demand-reducing sabotage. The 
integrated firm is able to raise its profits from its own downstream operations 
sufficiently to off-set any loss from reduced demand by the rival downstream firm. 
However, under Bertrand competition the results are mixed. Cost-raising 
sabotage is profitable, but demand-reducing sabotage may not be. Mandy and 
Sappington find that if the rival’s demand is reduced, it will respond by lowering 
its prices to increase demand which will take revenue away from the affiliate. 
Thus demand-reducing sabotage under Bertrand competition would reduce the 
profit of the integrated firm and so would not be undertaken. 
 
An interesting area of debate in the foreclosure literature is whether the vertically 
integrated firm would still have an incentive to discriminate if the downstream 
rival was more efficient. The more efficient rival could set a lower retail price, 
expand the market and therefore generate more wholesale revenue for the 
integrated firm. That debate is summed up in Mandy: 
 
“Economides (1998, Proposition 3 (p. 281)) concludes that severe 
sabotage will occur, to the point of downstream market foreclosure, even 
if the monopolist's downstream rivals are more efficient than its 
downstream subsidiary. In another model, Weisman (1995) finds that 
there are circumstances which may cause the integrated firm to temper its 
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level of sabotage. Weisman (1999) finds that the incentive to engage in 
sabotage is theoretically ambiguous when the monopolist's downstream 
rivals are more efficient than its downstream subsidiary.” (Mandy, 2000, 
p.158) 
 
Mandy himself concludes: “an upstream monopolist would be ‘killing the 
(downstream) goose that laid the golden egg’ if it conducted sabotage against 
relatively efficient downstream rivals when its upstream margin is high and its 
downstream subsidiary's margin is low” (Mandy, 2000, p.171). It is in the second 
half of this sentence that the answer to the question lies: whether the vertically 
integrated firm would wish to harm a more efficient downstream rival is an 
empirical question. If the profits on the extra sales it earns from accommodating 
the downstream rival outweigh the profits it would earn from excluding the rival 
and taking the profit itself, then it would have no incentive to discriminate. If, on 
the other hand, it could earn more profit from the retail sales then the incentive to 
discriminate is still present.  
 
Under the “one monopoly profit” theory, the vertically integrated firm would have 
no incentive to discriminate against downstream rivals if it were able to set the 
monopoly price for the upstream product. As it could not earn any more profit if it 
were also the downstream monopolist, it would therefore be indifferent between 
retailers in a perfectly competitive retail market, all of whom earned zero profits. 
However, if its upstream profits are constrained in some way, for example 
through price regulation, then it has an incentive to discriminate to earn extra 
profits in the retail or intermediate markets. 
 
Overall, previous literature indicates that the incentives for sabotage are 
dependent upon profitability of the upstream input and the relative efficiency of 
downstream rivals. Below are four conditions of upstream and downstream 
profitability and their effect on the incentive of the integrated firm to discriminate. 
In all four conditions p = retail price, q = quantity, w = wholesale price and c = the 
marginal cost of the upstream product supplied to both internal and external 
retailers. The subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the integrated firm and its downstream 
rival respectively. The integrated firm produces an input at cost c, which it uses 
itself to provide a retail service and which it sells to its downstream rivals at a 
wholesale price, w. In some conditions below w > c and in other w = c. The 
margin between the wholesale price and the marginal cost affects the incentive of 
the integrated firm to discriminate in essence because the higher the proportion 
of profits earned from wholesale sales, the lower the incentive to harm 
downstream rivals who generate profits.  
 
The profits earned by the integrated firm and its downstream rival are as below: 
 𝜋! = 𝑞! 𝑝! − 𝑐 + 𝑞!(𝑤 − 𝑐) 




Condition 1: p1 = p2, q1 = q2 and w = c. 
 
The integrated firm earns zero profits from sales to independent retailers. It can 
therefore only maximise its profits by excluding its rivals from the market and so 
has the maximum incentive to discriminate. 
 
Condition 2: p1 = p2, q1 = q2 and w > c. 
 
The integrated firm earns positive profits in both wholesale and retail markets but 
earns higher profits when it is active at retail level. It therefore still maintains an 
incentive to discriminate but this will be weaker than in condition 1. The strength 
of the incentive depends on the relative margins at the wholesale and retail level. 
 
Condition 3: p1 > p2, q1 < q2, w > c. 𝑞! + 𝑞!∗ > (𝑞! + 𝑞!) 
 
In this condition, the rival is more efficient than the incumbent and so able to set 
a lower retail price and so sell a larger quantity than the incumbent. The greater 
efficiency of the rival extends the market size through a lower price. Whereas 
under conditions 1 and 2 𝑄 = 𝑞! + 𝑞! , now 𝑄 =   𝑞! + 𝑞!∗ , where 𝑞!∗  is the 
increased quantity sold by firm 2 as a result of its lower price. 
 
The integrated firm’s profits from the wholesale are now increased by 𝑞!∗ −𝑞!(𝑤 − 𝑐) . Dependent on the increase in volume and price:cost ratios, the 
integrated firm may earn higher profits from wholesale than retail activities and 
may therefore even wish to exit from the retail market. This is similar to the 
conditions in Sibley and Wiseman (1998) where they found the incumbent’s 
incentive to discriminate disappears once its market share falls below 26%. 
 
Condition 4: At t(0), p1 > p2, q1 < q2, w > c. At t(0+1), p1 = p2, q1 = q2 and w > c. 
 
The vertically integrated firm could respond to the entrant’s greater efficiency in 
one of three ways. First, by becoming more efficient itself in the downstream 
market and the incentives to discriminate therefore revert to Condition 2. At 
t(0+1) market prices are lower and quantities correspondingly higher, dependent 
on the slope of the demand curve. Secondly, it could raise its rivals costs such 
that at t(0+1) p1 = p2  but at the incumbent’s old price leading to a reduction in q2. 
Finally, the incumbent could acquire the more efficient entrant and so internalise 
the increased efficiency, assuming it has the capability to do so.  
 
2.5 Vertical Integration and Separation 
Firms constantly face decisions about how vertically integrated they should be 
(Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003) and the reasons why firms decide to be vertically 
integrated or not has been the subject of extensive academic research since R.H. 
Coase’s seminal article of 1937. Many researchers have taken his thinking 
forward both theoretically and empirically. Among the most influential are 
Williamson (1979, 1985); Grossman and Hart (1986); and Klein, Crawford and 
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Alchian (1978). There have also been a number of articles reviewing the 
literature and the empirical testing of the various theories (Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007; Carter and Hodgson, 2006; Whinston, 2003; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; 
and Carter, 2012). 
 
According to Lafontaine and Slade, the literature has focused on two interrelated 
questions. First, under what circumstances do we observe that an input or 
service is produced in-house? Secondly, what are the consequences of vertical 
integration for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment and 
profits? They then refer to four models which identify the circumstances in which 
firms are likely to integrate.  
 
Under the “moral hazard” model, individual workers choose employment, even 
though they may earn less than if they were freelance, because employment 
provides some insurance. “Moral hazard arguments for firm boundaries thus 
emphasise the trade-off between providing insurance, which firms do well, and 
with effort incentives, which markets do well” (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, 
p.633). 
 
The second set of models reviewed by Lafontaine and Slade are Transaction 
Cost (TC) models, which date back to Coase and have been developed by 
Williamson and by Klein, Crawford and Alchian. TCs are the costs of establishing 
and administering business relationships within and between firms and 
individuals. The fundamental insight of TC models is that parties to a transaction 
often make investments that have greater value inside than outside the 
relationship. Thus, the value of the assets in their intended use is higher than 
their value in an alternative use.  
 
Williamson (1979) draws the distinction between “idiosyncratic” (relationship 
specific) and non-specific investments. He describes the crucial distinction 
between the two as the degree to which transaction-specific (non-marketable) 
expenses are incurred. Unspecialised items cause few hazards since buyers can 
turn to alternative suppliers, and suppliers can find alternative uses or customers 
for their assets. Non-marketability problems arise when the specific identity of the 
parties has important cost-bearing consequences. 
 
Lafontaine and Slade point out that there is a potential problem when asset 
investments are relationship specific. This is that there are likely to be quasi-rents 
and each of the parities has incentives to capture those rents for themselves. 
They are therefore likely to haggle after the investment has been made. The 
buyer, for example, may seek a lower price knowing that the supplier has no 
better alternative use for the asset. This problem is known as the “hold-up 
problem”. 
 
Well-specified contracts may protect each party, but it is unlikely that contracts 




TC theories usually assume that the hold-up problem can be mitigated within the 
firm. Thus the likelihood of integration is likely to increase when relationship 
specific investments are made. By contrast, separation would lead to the hold-up 
problem when investments are relationship specific.  
 
The third model form Lafontaine and Slade discuss is the Property Rights Theory 
(PRT). Although PRT and TC are often thought to be closely related, Whinston 
(2003) points to three differences between the two. First, PRT is more formal 
than TC. Secondly, PRT focuses on distortions in ex ante investments, in 
contrast to the ex post hagglings and maladaption costs of TC. Thirdly, PRT 
assumes that the hazard is present in all organisational forms, including when a 
transaction takes places within a firm. This is so, because investment and trading 
decisions remain decentralised in PRT, regardless of the structure of asset 
ownership. Integrated asset ownership changes incentives, but does not result in 
coordinated investments as it does in TC models.  
 
The fourth set of theories reviewed by Lafontaine and Slade concerns market 
power arising from vertical integration. These include: double marginalisation, 
strategic delegation and collusion, foreclosure and price discrimination. These 
theories provide few unambiguous results. Vertical mergers can be beneficial 
when the motive is to eliminate double marginalisation. However, when a firm 
has market power it can obtain the same results through vertical restraints rather 
than integration. For example, firms can eliminate double marginalisation through 
two-part tariffs, maximum resale prices or quantity forcing. 
 
The alternative to vertical integration is, of course, separation. Martin Cave 
discusses forms of separation and describes “six degrees” between accounting 
separation at one extreme and full ownership separation at the other, shown in 
Figure 4 below (Cave, 2006, p.6). 
 
Figure 4: Six Degrees of Separation 
Ownership separation (in whole or part) 
6 – Legal separation (separate legal entities under the same ownership) 
5 – Business separation with separate governance arrangements 
4 – Business separation with localised incentives 
3 – Business separation (BS) 
2 – Virtual separation 
1 – Creation of a wholesale division 
Accounting separation 
 
Mark Jamison and James Sichter draw on experience from the Computer 
Inquiries, the break up of AT&T and experience of Netcos and RetailCos in 
Rochester (NY) and Pennsylvania to draw lessons on business separation. They 
say that a “primary motive for separating lines of business is to limit the ability of 
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an operator that controls bottleneck facilities to use that control to discriminate 
against rivals in competitive or potentially competitive markets”. (Jamison and 
Sichter, 2010, p.1) .  
 
They distinguish between four forms of vertical separation: ownership 
(divestiture), structural (separate legal entities within the same group 19 ), 
functional or operational separation (competitive market functions operate 
separately from non-competitive functions) and accounting separation (separate 
accounts for the competitive and non-competitive functions).  
 
There have been many articles that discuss separation in the context of the UK 
telecoms market, some of which will be reviewed later in the Section on 
functional separation in the UK.  
2.6 European and UK Remedies  
2.6.1 Law and Interpretation 
 
Anticompetitive practices by firms in the supply of goods and services are 
specifically and explicitly prohibited under the EU treaties. Article 102 TFEU 
(formerly Article 82) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by a dominant 
firm. Part (c) refers to discrimination.  
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; 
(b)  limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d)  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.” 
 
Equivalent legal conditions can be found within the UK competition law, 
specifically the Competition Act 1998, which states at Section 18: 
 
“(1) … any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which 
amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it 
may affect trade within the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                
19 Cave (2006) refers to this form as “legal separation”. 
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“(2) Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in— 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of the contracts.” 
 
Note that Part 2(c) refers to discriminatory behaviour that places trading parties 
at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
In 2009, the European Commission published guidelines on its enforcement 
priorities in relation to what was then Article 82. One such exclusionary practice 
identified by the Commission was foreclosure. The Commission defined anti-
competitive foreclosure as:  
 
“a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to 
supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct 
of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to 
be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of 
consumers.” (European Commission, 2009, para 19) 
 
The use of the phrase “hampered or eliminated” by the Commission appears to 
include both outright refusal to supply (“eliminated”) and discrimination 
(“hampered”) and certainly the Commission has investigated cases of abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 102 that stop short of refusal to supply, for 
example the Telecom Poland case discussed in Section 3.5.  
 
The guidelines list a number of specific forms of abuse that the Commission will 
investigate (Para 32 onwards): 
 
• Exclusive dealing; 
• Tying and bundling; 
• Predation; and 
• Refusal to supply and margin squeeze; 
 
The guidelines say that in applying Article 82 (now 102), the Commission will 
focus on conduct that is most harmful to consumers and that it will “direct its 
enforcement to ensuring that markets function properly and that consumers 
benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition 
between undertakings” (Para 5). 
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The UK Competition Commission (CC), subsequently replaced by the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), also issued guidance on market 
investigations (Competition Commission, 2013). This guidance recognised the 
potential for a vertically integrated firm with upstream dominance to foreclose 
competition downstream (paras. 265-285). However, it also recognised that 
vertical integration may be beneficial to consumers and so stated:  
 
“In reaching a judgement on whether a particular vertical relationship has 
an adverse effect on competition, the CC will evaluate its overall impact 
on competition, taking into account rivalry-enhancing, as well as adverse, 
effects.” (Competition Commission, 2013, para. 273 
2.6.2 Behavioural, Structural, and Quasi-structural Remedies 
 
Remedies and obligations imposed by sector regulators and competition 
authorities can be either behavioural or structural. That is to say, they may either 
seek to restrict a dominant firm’s behaviour directly or change its structure and, 
therefore, its incentives and ability to behave in certain ways that would be 
harmful to competition and to consumer welfare. Massimo Motta clearly 
distinguishes between structural and behavioural remedies: 
 
“Structural remedies modify the allocation of property rights: they include 
divestiture of an entire ongoing business, or partial divestiture. 
Behavioural remedies set constraints on the merged firms’ property rights: 
they consist of engagements by the merging parties not to abuse certain 
assets available to them or to enter into specific contractual 
arrangements.” (Motta, 2004, pp. 265-266) 
 
Behavioural remedies “consist mainly of commitments aimed at guaranteeing 
that competitors enjoy a level playing field in the purchase or use of some key 
assets, inputs or technologies that are owned by the merging parties. Therefore, 
this situation mainly arises when the merged entity is vertically integrated” (Motta, 
Polo and Vasconcelos, 2007, p. 619). The principal behavioural remedies are 
designed to deter foreclosure by the merged entity in downstream markets 
through the granting of access to essential facilities on non-discriminatory terms. 
Motta et al. also refer to the possibility of a “vertical firewalls” remedy in which the 
integrated firm is required to protect competitively sensitive information supplied 
by its rivals to the upstream entity from the downstream entity. 
 
Also in the context of mergers, Parker and Balto (2000) distinguish five 
approaches to curbing anti-competitive mergers: (i) blocking the merger from 
taking place; (ii) divestiture; (iii) partial divestiture; (iv) contractual arrangements 
such as licensing; and (v) a behavioural relief such as non-discrimination. Using 
Motta’s taxonomy, the first three approaches above would be structural remedies 
and the final two are behavioural remedies.  
 
Competition authorities in both the EU and the USA tend to favour structural 
remedies, in particular divestiture, in merger cases. The reason for this 
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preference is that divestiture does not require continuous monitoring by the 
competition authority to ensure compliance. As Motta et al. confirm: “in general 
structural remedies are the best corrective measures for potentially anti-
competitive mergers” (p.610). Divestitures, once implemented, do not require any 
further monitoring measures whereas other types of commitments require 
effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure that their effect is not reduced or 
even eliminated by the parties. Otherwise, such commitments would have to be 
considered as mere declarations of intentions by the parties and would not 
amount to binding obligations (European Commission, 2007, para. 13.) 
 
However, structural remedies are not without their problems. Motta et al. report 
five potential problems when divestiture is applied in merger cases. First, the 
merging parties have a strong incentive to ensure that the purchaser of the 
divested assets will not be a competitive firm. Secondly, the remedy is not good 
at fostering entry. Thirdly, whenever a continuing relationship is required between 
the seller and the buyer of the divested assets, the remedy has not managed to 
restore competition. Motta et al. refer to the Federal Trade Commission study 
(FTC, 1999) in which the FTC found that, in 13 of the 19 cases reviewed where 
such a relationship existed, either the buyer did not manage to operate 
effectively, or there was collusion between the two firms. Fourthly, the buyer is 
likely to follow a soft pricing strategy and tacitly or overtly collude with the seller. 
Fifthly, the risk of collusion increases due to problems of symmetry and multi-
market contacts. 
 
The most relevant of these five problems to vertical separation is probably the 
third as there will certainly be a continuing relationship between the owner of a 
separated access network and the owner of the core network business.  
2.7 Conclusions from Chapter 2 
This chapter has defined what is meant by dominance and shown how a firm that 
is dominant in one market can leverage that dominance into another related 
market. This is particularly the case when the firm is dominant in an upstream 
input that is required by downstream rivals to compete in the retail market. The 
presence of a vertically integrated firm, with a dominant position in the upstream 
market, therefore, places downstream rivals at risk from anticompetitive 
practices, one of which is non-price discrimination. 
 
However, vertical integration has a number of efficiency benefits, in particular 
where there is a high degree of asset specificity, i.e. where the upstream input is 
highly tailored to one downstream customer: what Williamson described as 
“idiosyncratic”. However, the problem of non-price discrimination has led to 
various levels of separation, described by Cave (2006) and ranging from 





3 Application to the Telecommunications Sector 
 
This chapter explores the problem of discrimination specifically within the context 
of the electronic communications market and shows how this problem is not only 
theoretic but has been found in practice in Poland. The chapter starts with a brief 
introduction to the telecommunications industry.  
3.1 Introduction to Telecommunications 
A telecommunications business can be thought of as consisting of three parts: a 
retail operation, an access network and a core or trunk network. In a fixed or 
mobile voice telephony network, access is at both “ends” connecting both the 
caller and receiver to the trunk or core network: this is known as “two way 
access” as each party could be either the caller or the receiver. Broadband 
access networks, whether fixed or mobile, tend to be one way, i.e. the “caller” 
connects to the Internet but not vice versa. One way and two-way access are 
illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: One way and Two way Access 
  
 
Access to the Internet over fixed networks has two levels: the physical 
connection (referred to as the “local loop”), which is generally a copper wire 
between the telephone exchange and the customer premises, and the electronic 
connection that sends a broadband signal over that wire and known as “bitstream 
access”. Further downstream from bitstream is the retail operation. 
 
The local loop has many characteristics of a natural monopoly, at least outside 
the most densely populated areas of a country20. It is usually too expensive for a 
second company to undertake the major civil engineering works required to build 
a competing network when each household normally buys only one connection. 
However, if an entrant can rent the local loop it can add its own electronics and 
so enter the market at the bitstream level. The entrant could also purchase 
bitstream access and operate only as a retailer. This market structure is shown in 
Figure 6 and is typical of the telecoms sector.  
 
                                                
20 There are exceptions. For example, in the UK Virgin Media has a competing local access 
network covering approx. 55% of homes. However, this network was built for cable TV with 
telecoms only added later.     
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Figure 6: Vertical Structure of the Broadband Market 
 
 
To facilitate competition using the incumbent’s local access network, telecoms 
regulators have required dominant firms to provide several complementary 
access services. Figure 7 provides a simplified vision of the three forms of 
wholesale copper access for providing broadband Internet access.  
 
Figure 7: Forms of Wholesale Copper Access 
 
 
On the left is Resale Access (RA). Under this method, the entrant purchases both 
local access and the core network from the incumbent. The only way in which it 
can differentiate its services is through brand and price. The BT version of this 
access method is (was) known as IPStream. 
 
The middle option is Bitstream Access (BSA), marketed by BT as DataStream. 
The entrant rents both the access network and the electronics that convert that 
access line into a broadband connection as a complete package. BT hands over 





Local Loop Unbundling 





telephone exchange building. This option is also sometimes known as “near-end 
handover”. 
 
Finally, on the right, is Local Loop Unbundling (LLU). The entrant using LLU rents 
only the copper access network and must house its own electronics in or near the 
local telephone exchange, and must provide its own backhaul from the exchange 
to its own core network. LLU requires the highest initial investment by the entrant, 
but offers the greatest opportunity for differentiation.  
 
Broadband over copper is provided using a technology known as Asynchronous 
Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) of which there are several variants offering 
access speeds of up to 24Mbps dependent on the technology used and the 
distance from the exchange to the customer premises. This is thought to be the 
maximum speed that can be offered using copper from the exchange to the 
customer premises. ADSL is one form of DSL, which are collectively referred to 
as xDSL. Another form of DSL relevant to this thesis is VDSL (Very high bit rate 
DSL) that is used in conjunction with Fibre to the Cabinet (discussed below) 
 
In many countries, including the UK, broadband access is also provided over the 
cable TV network in at least part of the country. Broadband over cable is 
provided using a technology known as Data Over Cable Service Interface 
Specification (DOCSIS) and offers much higher speeds than ADSL. The latest 
variant (DOCSIS3) offers speeds of up 150Mbps.  
 
Finally, and more recently, fibre optic networks have been developed that offer 
broadband Internet access at much higher speeds than ADSL. Fibre access 
networks can run between the exchange building and several points before the 
premises, as illustrated in Figure 8. The four principal places are: 
 
• Fibre to the Node (FTTN): Fibre is terminated in a street cabinet, possibly 
several kilometres away from the customer premises, with the final 
connections being copper.  
• Fibre to the Cabinet (FTTC): This is very similar to FTTN, but the street 
cabinet is closer to the user's premises, typically within 300m, meaning that 
the distance the signal has to travel over copper is shorter, thereby offering 
higher speeds to the user. The signal over the final few hundred metres is 
sent using the VDSL protocol.  
• Fibre to the Building/Premises (FTTB/P): Fibre reaches the boundary of the 
building, such as the basement in a multi-dwelling unit, with the final 
connection to the individual living space being made via alternative means, 
potentially an internal wired or wireless network. 
• Fibre to the home (FTTH): Fibre reaches the boundary of the living space, 
such as a box on the outside wall of a home. 
Collectively these different approaches are referred to as FTTX. 
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Figure 8: Fibre to the X Options 
 
The main approach taken by BT is FTTC. Other EU countries have tended to 
choose between FTTC and FTTP, with only Finland and Sweden having a 
significant coverage of both technologies, as shown in Figure 9, which shows the 
proportion of premises covered by FTTC and FTTP in 2012. 
 
The speeds available over the options vary from around 50Mbps to almost no 
upper bound for FTTH. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the exact form 
of FTTX or the bandwidth offered are not important, only the fact that BT decides 
to install FTTX in a particular exchange area. 
 
In the UK, BT is the fully vertically integrated operator depicted on the left hand 
side of Figure 6. There are two major competitors to BT, Sky and TalkTalk, that 
rent local loops from BT and so enter at the bitstream level. Various smaller 
operators buy access from either BT or one of its competitors at the bitstream 
level. There is also an independent, fully integrated broadband provider, Virgin 
Media, that offers services over its Hybrid Fibre-Coax (HFC) cable network. In 
the context of Figure 6, Virgin Media is equivalent to BT but does not provide 
wholesale access to its network at any level. Virgin Media is not, and has never 
been, regulated in any part of its business on the basis that it does not have 





Figure 9: Fibre Deployment Choices in EU Countries 
 
      (Point Topic, 2012) 
 
The regulatory authority responsible for the electronic communications sector in 
the UK is Ofcom, which has a statutory duty, under the Communications Act 
2003, to promote the interests of consumers through competition, where 
appropriate21. However, in certain circumstances, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, 
the vertically integrated firm with a monopoly on the most upstream input has a 
strong incentive to leverage that dominance into downstream markets through 
anti-competitive practices, and in particular through discrimination or foreclosure. 
The regulator, therefore, has to impose restrictions on the firm’s ability to behave 
in such a manner and/or change its incentives so that it no longer benefits from 
discrimination.  
                                                
21 Ofcom’s general duties are set out in Section 3.1 of the Communications Act 2003 as:  
“It shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in carrying out their functions— 
(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and 
(b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting 
competition.” 

































3.2 Discrimination in Telecoms and Broadband 
The existing literature on discrimination in general was reviewed in Section 2.4. 
This section reviews two papers that have explored the problem of non-price 
discrimination specifically within the context of telecommunications markets: one 
in the USA and the other in the UK.  
 
Writing in the context of Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) in the USA entering the 
long distance calls market, Sibley and Weisman (1998) developed a model of an 
integrated firm which has a regulated upstream input and which is entering a 
downstream market in which its competitors are also its customers in the access 
market. They ask: does the upstream monopolist have the incentive to raise the 
costs of its downstream rivals? They find that raising rivals’ costs can have two 
opposing effects. First as rivals’ costs increase, the upstream monopolist’s 
downstream profits rise. However, there is also the opposite effect if a decrease 
in downstream output translates into lower demand for the input. This lowers 
profits from the access markets as long as the regulated input price exceeds 
marginal cost. 
 
They model two organisation forms: in the first the monopolist enters downstream 
markets as a fully integrated firm. In the second, the monopolist enters through a 
“fully separate subsidiary” (FSS). Four restrictions apply to the FSS: (a) that 
information flows between parent and subsidiary are severely restricted; (b) the 
subsidiary acquires inputs from the parent company on the same observable 
terms as downstream competitors; (c) the manager of the subsidiary is 
compensated predominantly on the financial performance of the subsidiary; and 
(d) the subsidiary maintains completely separate financial, accounting and net 
income statements22.  
 
The analysis first finds that the regulated price of the input must be above the 
marginal cost of the input to deter the monopolist from raising rivals’ costs. 
Secondly, if the integrated firm has a market share below 26% in the downstream 
market, it still benefits from lowering costs to downstream firms including its 
rivals’ costs. Once the integrated firm’s share rises above 26%, its incentives are 
to raise rivals’ costs. 
 
Thirdly, Sibley and Weisman find that because the (Cournot) quantity choice of 
the FSS is made to maximise its profits with no reference to the efficiency of the 
integrated provider, the monopolist is more inclined to raise rivals’ costs in the 
short run than it would if it acted as a fully integrated firm. In other words, the 
26% market share at which the integrated firm’s incentive changes from reducing 
to increasing rivals’ costs is lowered. 
 
However, they also find that in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with a sufficiently 
large number of firms, the monopolist subject to a FSS requirement will have 
                                                
22 These restrictions are close to characteristics of functional separation as it applies in the case of 
BT in the UK. It is also close to Cave’s (2006) 5th degree of separation. 
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incentives for pro-competitive behaviour. The intuition for this result is that if the 
upstream monopolist is entering the downstream market, it starts with a 
sufficiently small market share that it benefits more from stimulating overall 
market demand than it would do by foreclosing rivals.  
 
In the UK, Cave, Corea and Crocioni (2006) discuss non-price discrimination 
particularly in the light of the  Undertakings. Building on previous literature23, 
Cave et al. draw on empirical evidence from the UK to show that tight upstream 
regulation is likely to strengthen the incentive to discriminate. They show 
evidence from BT’s Regulatory Accounts and Annual Accounts that BT’s profits 
from its downstream divisions and its overall profitability are increasing, “which 
supports the argument that BT might have an incentive to hamper downstream 
rivals”. (Cave et al., 2006, p.399)  
 
Cave et al. consider the relative merits of an integrated operator to indulge in 
both price and non-price discrimination. Like Salop and Scheffman (1983), they 
say that non-price discrimination is the more attractive option, as it does not 
come at the cost of foregoing short-term profits. Even if the probability of 
detection is the same, the firm will prefer non-price discrimination. However, as 
price discrimination is relatively easy to detect24, especially when upstream prices 
are regulated, the firm will have an even greater preference for non-price 
discrimination. To be detectable, such behaviour needs to be observable and 
verifiable. Any inability to detect and verify such behaviour would reduce 
deterrence and therefore strengthen the incentive to engage in non-price 
discrimination. 
3.3 BT’s Incentive to Discriminate 
This raises the question of whether BT in 2005 had an incentive to discriminate 
based on its upstream profitability. BT is required to publish annual Regulatory 
Financial Statements (RFS), which are the separated accounts of its upstream 
businesses where it has SMP. These accounts have been analysed by Frontier 
Economics (2013) in a report for Vodafone plc25. They find that in the year to 
March 2006, the first year of their analysis, BT earned a Return of Average 
Capital Employed (ROACE) of 18% for its regulated services. This rate was 
some 6.5 percentage points above the benchmark Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC). The relative efficiency of BT and its competitors’ retail 
businesses at the time is unknown, but this ROACE would suggest that 
conditions two or three in Section 2.4.2 hold and that, rationally, BT’s incentives 
to discriminate were lower than they would have been had BT made a lower 
ROACE relative to WACC. This does not mean that BT did not discriminate, as 
matters other than a rational analysis of profits may affect behaviour, or that 
entrants did not perceive discrimination.  
                                                
23 In particular Economides (1998) and Beard, Kaserman and Mayo (2001). 
24 A similar point is made by Sand (2004) who says that it is inherently more difficult to regulate 
quality than price. 
25 Frontier Economics’ report was not examining whether BT had an incentive to discriminate, but 
whether it was earning excess profits.  
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By contrast, Cave et al. (2006) found that BT was subject to strong regulatory 
constraints, with the regulated price of some key narrowband (telephone call) 
inputs26 declining by as much as 50% over the period. They conclude that these 
strong constraints provided BT with an incentive to practise non-price 
discrimination. 
 
Direct analysis of BT’s RFS provides little extra clarity. Table 1 below shows the 
consolidated return on capital employed27 (ROCE) for BT’s relevant wholesale 







2004 13.5% 15.6% BT Network Business 
2005 13.5% 12.5% BT Wholesale Markets Consolidated 
2006 11.5% 15.4% BT Wholesale Markets Consolidated 
 
Table 1: BT ROCE Wholesale Business 
 
The “Allowed rate of return” is the regulated cost of capital that BT is permitted to 
earn in its regulated prices. As can be seen from the table, in 2004 and 2006 
BT’s ROCE exceeded the allowed rate, but was less than the allowed rate in 
2005. 
 
The equivalent calculation in its retail division is problematic as, according the 
RFS, BT had a negative capital employed in each of the three years and 
therefore the ROCE cannot be calculated. 
 
In summary, therefore, it is difficult to establish definitively whether BT had an 
incentive to practise non-price discrimination against its rivals from an analysis of 
its profits. However, as shall be discussed later, whether there was such an 
incentive or not may have been less relevant in Ofcom’s later decision making 
process than whether downstream rivals perceived there to have been a problem 
and adjusted their behaviour accordingly.  
3.4 The Regulation of Dominant Firms in Telecoms 
Article 102 TFEU and Section 18 of the Competition Act, discussed above, are 
relevant to all markets and not specific to any one sector of the economy. The 
sector-specific rules governing the electronic communications sector are 
discussed below. 
                                                
26 Wholesale broadband inputs were not analysed in their paper. 
27 Calculated as 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 =    !"#$%$&'  !"#$%"  !"#$%$&#  !"#  !"#"!$%&!"#$%  !""#$"!!"##$%&  !"#$"%"&"'( . 28 BT’s financial year end is March 31st. Thus the 2006 RFS refers to the year ending 31/3/2006 
rather than the calendar year 2006. 
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Under Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, which first opened the UK 
market to competition, both Mercury and BT were awarded Licences to provide 
services. Section 8(d) of the Act required any licensee not to behave in an unduly 
discriminatory manner: it required persons granted a licence: 
 
“[N]ot to show undue preference to, or to exercise undue discrimination 
against, particular persons or persons of any class or description 
(including, in particular, persons in rural areas) as respects any service 
provided, connection made or permission given in pursuance of such 
conditions as are mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs (whether in 
respect of the charges or other terms or conditions applied or 
otherwise).”29 
 
Prior to 2003, the European telecommunications sector was governed by the 
Open Network Provisions (ONP) regulations, which set a blanket market share of 
25% for declaring that a firm had market power, regardless of the specific market 
circumstances. In 1999 the European Commission launched a review of the ONP 
regulation (the 1999 Review), which resulted in a new set of five Directives, 
known as the Common Regulatory Framework (CRF). The European Council 
and Parliament passed four Directives in February and one in July 2002. Member 
States were required to transpose these into national law by July 24th 200330. The 
five Directives were: 
 
• The Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) 
• The Access Directive (2002/19/EC) 
• The Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) 
• The Authorisation Directive (2002/20/EC) 
• The Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (2002/58/EC) 
 
Whereas the ONP framework applied regulation to all activities of dominant firms, 
the CRF was designed to address market failure in relevant markets through a 
competition law-based approach. The main innovation of the CRF was to link 
regulation to the concepts and principles of competition law and therefore to take 
a more economics approach to regulating the sector. It was expected that as 
competition developed in the electronic communications markets, ex ante 
regulation could be phased out and replaced by ex post competition law31. 
 
The Framework Directive (FD) requires National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
to conduct periodic market reviews for markets identified by the European 
Commission as “susceptible to ex ante regulation”. In 2003 the Commission 
                                                
29 Similar clauses can be found in the various Acts privatising other utilities such as electricity and 
gas. 
30 Very few countries achieved this deadline. Germany did not complete the process of 
transposition to national law until 1st July 2004. New Member states were required to transpose 
the CRF by the time of accession. 
31 Prof. Stephen Littlechild, who was instrumental in establishing the regulatory regime in the UK in 
the 1980s is referred to regulation as “holding the fort” until competition developed. 
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published a Recommendation setting out a list of 15 such markets. This list was 
subsequently revised in 2007 down to seven markets and, in 2014, was subject 
to a further revision and reduction to just five markets (European Commission, 
2014).  
 
A recommended market must fulfil three criteria (known as the “three criteria 
test”). It must: 
 
1. Have high and persistent barriers to entry; 
2. Not be tending towards effective competition; and 
3. Competition law alone cannot correct any competition problems. 
 
In a market review, NRAs must define relevant geographic and product markets, 
determine whether any firm(s) has (have) Significant Market Power (SMP) in the 
market and, in the event of having SMP, apply obligations to the(se) firm(s) in 
those markets. Articles 14-16 FD set out the process of market definition and 
market analysis. Art. 14 defines Significant Market Power (SMP) as occurring 
when an undertaking “either individually or jointly with others, enjoys a position 
equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers”.  
 
Article 16(2) FD sets out the market analysis procedure NRAs must follow. 
Obligations32 may only be imposed on firms with SMP in the relevant market and 
may not be imposed if the NRA finds a relevant market to be effectively 
competitive. If a market is found to be competitive, the NRA must withdraw sector 
specific regulation and rely only on competition law.  
 
In markets where one or more firms have SMP, the obligations that can be 
applied are consistent with those that competition authorities can apply ex post, 
however NRAs do not have the power to impose structural remedies such as 
requiring the break-up of a firm with SMP. The obligations NRAs may impose are 
set out in Articles 9-13 of the Access Directive (AD). These are: 
 
• Transparency, specifically the publication of a Reference Offer; 
• Non-Discrimination; 
• Accounting Separation; 
• Access to and use of specific network facilities; and 
• Price control and cost accounting. 
 
Of particular importance to this thesis is the “Obligation of Non-Discrimination” 
(Article 10 AD), which consists of two paragraphs: 
 
                                                
32 Throughout this thesis, the word “obligations” is used in reference to ex ante findings of SMP and 
“remedies” in relation to ex post. This is consistent with the fact that under ex ante regulation 
the NRA is seeking to prevent a behaviour from taking place rather than correct a behaviour 
that has taken place.     
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“1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 8, impose obligations of non-discrimination, in relation to 
interconnection and/or access. 
 
“2. Obligations of non-discrimination shall ensure, in particular, that the 
operator applies equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to 
other undertakings providing equivalent services, and provides services 
and information to others under the same conditions and of the same 
quality as it provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or 
partners.” 
 
It should be noted that a firm that is found to have SMP under the sector specific 
regulations remains subject to competition law provisions regarding the 
behaviour of a dominant firm. Indeed, even a firm without SMP could, in theory, 
be found to be dominant under competition law. In general, the findings of a 
market review under ex ante regulation are not binding on competition authorities 
investigating a potential breach of the competition law. Thus, the competition 
authority could define a different relevant market and find a different firm 
dominant in that market. Perhaps surprisingly, complying with regulatory 
obligations are not a sufficient defence against a complaint of anticompetitive 
action if those obligations are themselves equivalent to an abuse of market 
power. 
 
In Deutsche Telekom33 the European Commission found that, despite the fact 
that Deutsche Telekom was charging the regulated price for local loop access it 
was still in breach of (then) Article 82 as that regulated price resulted in a margin 
squeeze. It was found that Deutsche Telekom had the flexibility under the price 
cap regime in place to set the margin in a manner that did not constitute a margin 
squeeze. 
 
The CRF, was transposed into UK law by the Communications Act 2003, which 
entered into force on July 23rd 2003. The non-discrimination obligation, set out in 
Section 87(6)(a) of the Act, allows the regulator to impose “a condition requiring 
the dominant provider not to discriminate unduly against particular persons, or 
against a particular description of persons, in relation to matters connected with 
network access to the relevant network or with the availability of the relevant 
facilities.” 
 
In neither the EU Directive nor the UK law is discrimination banned outright. The 
AD requires only that the operator “applies equivalent conditions in equivalent 
circumstances” whilst UK law proscribes the dominant provider from “unduly 
discriminating”. 
 
Oftel (2002, Sections 3.4-3.11) gave guidance as to its interpretation of non-
discrimination. Perhaps the most significant paragraph of which is 3.8: 
 
                                                
33 Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 — Deutsche Telekom. 
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“‘Non-discrimination’ does not necessarily mean that there should be no 
differences in treatment between undertakings, rather that any differences 
should be objectively justifiable, for example by: 
a) differences in underlying costs, or  
b) no material adverse effect of competition.” 
 
In Section 3.11 Oftel says that it would find differences in underlying costs to be a 
valid justification for making different products available on different terms to 
different parties. 
 
National telecommunications network were designed and built to carry a signal 
end-to-end on the same network, not for interconnection with other networks that 
either originate or terminate the call. The very act of interconnection creates a 
cost (installing and managing the interconnect) that is not incurred by a call being 
carried only on a single network. Thus, in theory, the incumbent operator could 
charge a cost for an interconnected call which is greater than the cost of that 
portion of a call on its own network without being in breach of a non-
discrimination obligation. This higher price may send economically efficient 
messages to interconnecting parties as they would be expected to pay the cost of 
interconnected traffic rather than on-net traffic.  
 
On 25th November 2009, the European Parliament and Council adopted a new 
Directive amending the CRF34. This amending Directive introduced a new article, 
Article 13a, to the Access Directive (AD)35 empowering NRAs to “impose an 
obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities related to the 
wholesale provision of relevant access products in an independently operating 
business entity”: this is known as “functional separation”.  
 
The new article 13a sets out the conditions under which such a requirement can 
be imposed and the conditions which the NRA must fulfil before it can impose 
functional separation. The NRA may only impose the obligation when it is clear 
that other remedies “have failed to achieve effective competition and that there 
are important and persisting competition problems and/or market failures 
identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product 
markets”. 
 
However, before the NRA can impose functional separation it must submit a 
proposal to the European Commission (EC) setting out: its evidence that other 
remedies have failed; a reasoned assessment that infrastructure competition is 
unlikely to develop; a regulatory impact analysis; and a demonstration that 
functional separation is the most efficient means to correct market failures.  
 
                                                
34 DIRECTIVE 2009/140/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 
November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 
35 Directive 2002/19/EC. 
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The new article also prescribes the contents of any draft measure put forward by 
the NRA, which must specify: the legal status of the separate business entity; the 
assets of the entity; its governance arrangements; rules for ensuring compliance; 
rules for ensuring transparency; and a monitoring programme. 
 
Article 13a does not prescribe the exact form of separation, allowing the NRA to 
specify the legal status of the separate business entity (Sub section 3(a)). 
Therefore, despite naming the form of separation as functional, it is possible that 
the separate entity could be a new subsidiary of the SMP operator, implying legal 
separation. (See Section 2.5 for a discussion on the forms of separation.)  
 
The purpose and expected benefits of functional separation are set out in Recital 
61 of the amending Directive. The Directive states that “functional separation has 
the capacity to improve competition in several relevant markets by significantly 
reducing the incentive for discrimination and by making it easier to verify and 
enforce compliance with non-discrimination obligations”. The Council and 
Parliament are clearly aware of arguments that functional separation could 
damage investment incentives. Recital 61 also states that “it is very important to 
ensure that its imposition preserves the incentives of the concerned undertaking 
to invest in its network and that it does not entail any potential negative effects on 
consumer welfare”. 
 
Finally, Recital 62 says that “the implementation of functional separation should 
not prevent appropriate coordination mechanisms between the different separate 
business entities in order to ensure that the economic and management 
supervision rights of the parent company are protected”. 
 
The amending Directive also sets out a new Article 13b AD covering voluntary 
separation by a vertically integrated undertaking. This requires undertakings with 
SMP, which intend to transfer ownership of the local access network or to 
establish a separate business entity to provide all retail providers, to notify their 
NRA. 
 
The new Articles 13a and 13b AD therefore set out the conditions for mandatory 
and voluntary separation beyond accounting separation. 
 
In November 2013, the European Commission published a Recommendation on 
non-discrimination and cost accounting. The Recommendation stated: 
 
“One of the main obstacles to the development of a true level playing field 
for access seekers to electronic communication networks is the 
preferential treatment of the downstream businesses, for example the 
retail arm, of a vertically integrated operator with significant market power 
(SMP operator) through price and non-price discrimination.” (European 
Commission, 2013A, para. 12) 
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The standard non-discrimination obligation available to NRAs under Article 10 of 
the Access Directive36 (“equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances”) has, 
according to the Commission, been inconsistently applied. It has also proved to 
be insufficient to ensure that the SMP operator provides access in a manner that 
allows entrants to compete on equal terms. For example, entrants and 
incumbents may use different wholesale inputs and processes that put entrants 
at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
The Commission’s Recommendation suggests that, in certain circumstances, 
NRA should impose an obligation of Equivalence of Inputs (EoI): 
  
“[T]he surest way to achieve effective protection from discrimination as 
access seekers will be able to compete with the downstream business of 
the vertically integrated SMP operator using exactly the same set of 
regulated wholesale products, at the same prices and using the same 
transactional processes. In addition, and contrary to an Equivalence of 
Output (EoO)37 concept, EoI is better equipped to deliver transparency 
and address the problem of information asymmetries.” (European 
Commission, 2013A, para. 13) 
 
EoI is a form of non-discrimination specifically designed for an ex ante regulatory 
environment. It will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
 
The Recommendation does not propose EoI should be applied to all products, 
rather only where it is proportionate to do so as EoI is expensive to implement. 
The Commission recommends that EoI should be applied on Next Generation 
Access (NGA) and at the deepest level of the network. Where EoI is applied, the 
Commission also recommends that a price control can be removed provided that 
a proper margin squeeze test is present.  
3.5 Case Study: Telecom Poland 
Discrimination in telecoms market is not merely a theoretical possibility but has 
also been found to have occurred in practice, as a recent case in the Polish 
telecoms sector, described below, demonstrates. 
 
The Polish regulator, UKE (Urząd Komunikacji Elektronicznej) found that 
discrimination problems exist in the market and, in 2008, commissioned a report, 
by a consortium led by the consultancy firm KPMG, into the market situation in 
Poland 38 . That report found that “there exists a persistent barrier to the 
                                                
36  DIRECTIVE 2002/19/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 
March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities (Access Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC. 
37  EoO is equivalent to the standard non-discrimination remedy of “equivalent conditions in 
equivalent circumstances”.  
38 The full version of the report is available only in Polish (KPMG 2008). The references are to a 
brief English summary available at 
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development of the market in the form of Telekomunikacja Polska’s (TP)39 anti-
competition approach, which manifests itself by obstructive actions as far as co-
operation with alternative operators is concerned.” It found that the existing 
regulatory measures had not eliminated barriers to market development and that 
there was a lack of perspective among alternative operators that these barriers 
will be removed. 
 
The consortium recommended that UKE impose functional separation on TP and 
that the Polish regulatory framework be amended to allow the imposition of this 
remedy. As yet this obligation has not been imposed. 
 
In June 2011 the European Commission adopted a decision under Article 102 
TEFU against TP40. The Commission found three relevant product markets that 
existed in a vertical relationship through a single, national, geographic market. 
 
1. The market for wholesale physical network infrastructure access at a 
fixed location (the wholesale market for Local Loop Unbundling 
[LLU]); 
2. The market for wholesale broadband access (Bitstream Access 
[BSA]); and 
3. The retail mass market for broadband access at a fixed location, 
which excluded mobile broadband. 
 
TP was the only provider on a nationwide basis of both LLU and BSA and 
therefore was a pure monopolist in both markets. In the period covered by the 
decision, TP also held a retail market share of between 46 – 57% of revenue and 
40 – 58% of retail access lines.  
 
The Commission found that TP had abused its dominant position in the markets 
for Local Loop Unbundling and Bitstream Access and specifically that TP was  
 
• Proposing unreasonable conditions governing Alternative Operators’ (AO) 
access to wholesale broadband products. The conditions imposed were 
worse than the ones guaranteed by the Reference Offers and the AOs had 
very little bargaining power so were forced either to abandon negotiations, 
accept TP’s proposal or refer to the regulator. 
• Delaying the negotiation process. TP adopted several tactics to delay even 
starting the negotiation process. In an extreme example, one AO received a 
draft contract after 226 days instead of the three days required by 
regulation. 
• Limiting access to its network. TP rejected a number of orders from AOs for 
both BSA and LLU on spurious formal and technical grounds. 
                                                                                                                                 
http://www.en.uke.gov.pl/ukeen/index.jsp?place=Lead02&news_cat_id=61&news_id=731&layo
ut=1&page=text  Downloaded 9/2/2015 .  
39 TP has subsequently been rebranded as Orange. 
40 The full case is available only in Polish. Much of the description included here is taken from 
Kamiński, Rògozińska and Sasinowska (2011) and from European Commission (2011). 
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• Limiting access to subscriber lines. Access to lines was limited also by 
rejecting orders placed by AOs on formal and technical grounds. 
• Refusing to provide. TP did not provide alternative operators with the 
reliable information about their network that they needed to make decisions 
about access to TP’s wholesale products or provided incomplete 
information. 
 
The abuse was found to have started in August 2005 and continued until at least 
October 2009. 
 
The Commission concluded that TP’s abusive conduct was capable of restricting 
competition in the retail market and was likely to reduce the rate of entry and 
expansion of competitors. It further concluded that the differences in treatment 
were not objectively justifiable and therefore were discriminatory. TP was fined 
€127.6 million and ordered to bring an immediate end to the infringement and to 
refrain from practices that would have the same or similar object or effect as 
described in the decision.  
 
The TP case is one of non-price discrimination, with TP providing inferior quality 
to its rivals than it provided to its own downstream retail division, but at the same 
price. To remain competitive with TP, its rivals would need to charge retail 
customers a lower price to make up for the lower quality. As they are paying the 
same price for the wholesale input, being forced to charge a lower price has a 
similar affect to a margin squeeze. Economides (1998) suggests that inferior 
quality can be considered an extra cost borne by the rival. Whereas the 
monopolist earns a profit  
 Π!! = 𝑝 − 𝑠 − 𝑤 𝑞! − 𝐹! 
 
The rival earns a profit 




 Π!! < Π!! 
 
Where: 
p = retail price 
s = wholesale cost of inputs other than access 
w = wholesale cost of access 
r = cost of inferior quality (r>0) 
q = quantity 
 F = Fixed costs. 
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The subscripts 1 and i denote the upstream, integrated monopolist and 
downstream rival respectively and the superscript D refers to the downstream 
market (Economides, 1998). 
 
By providing inferior quality, therefore, TP raises its rivals’ cost by r. Referring 
back to Figure 3, this is akin to TP raising the costs of the marginal producers 
from cm to c’m, with the result that prices in the market are raised and output 
reduced. This outcome is exactly what the Commission found to be the case. In 
January 2010, broadband penetration in Poland was 13.5%, one of the lowest in 
the EU and significantly below the average of 24.9%. Prices in 2009 were the 
second highest in the OECD. 
 
The behaviours described in Section 2.3, therefore, are not merely theoretical, 
but have been found to have been effected in practice by an upstream 
monopolist with the effect of harming both competition and consumers. 
3.6 Conclusion from Chapter 3 
The structure of the telecommunications sector, and the natural monopoly 
characteristics of the local loop, mean that the sector is prone to the vertically 
integrated incumbent discriminating against competitors in downstream markets. 
The European Union has ensured that NRAs have the regulatory tools to address 
discrimination but, even so, at least one operator has been found to have 
behaved anticompetitively by sabotaging its downstream rivals. The Commission 
has recommended that NRAs take advantage of a form of non-discrimination 
obligation designed specifically for ex ante regulation: Equivalence of Input. EoI 
was first developed as a concept in the UK, as will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.  
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4 From “No Undue Discrimination” to “Equivalence of Input” 
 
This section sets a historical record of the regulatory changes imposed by Ofcom 
in the UK broadband market in 2004 and 2005. It also briefly describes similar 
regulatory changes adopted in other countries and in other utility markets.  
 
4.1 The UK Telecommunications Sector Before 2002 
Until 1984, fixed line telecommunications in the UK, in common with other utility 
sectors, was provided by a state-owned monopoly. In all EU countries, except 
Sweden, the monopoly was a legally-mandated monopoly. This consensus was 
first broken in the UK with the part-privatisation of BT (then British Telecom) and 
the introduction of Mercury Communications as a protected competitor in some 
markets, primarily international and long distance calls. At the time of 
privatisation BT was kept as a vertically integrated firm and so Mercury had to 
negotiate access to BT’s network for interconnection on commercial terms. 
Unsurprisingly these negotiations failed and the regulator, Oftel, therefore had to 
adjudicate and set access charges on a cost-oriented basis designed to reflect 
the competitive level (Newberry, 2001, p. 192-3)41. 
 
The duopoly lasted until 1991 when various forms of licensed resellers were 
allowed into the market and cable companies, previously restricted to offering TV 
services, were permitted to offer local telephone access over their cable 
networks. By 1995 there were over 150 operators licensed to compete with BT, 
mostly as resellers and with a strong bias toward international calls. 
 
The European Union Directives that comprise the CRF were transposed into UK 
law via the Communications Act 2003. The Act also established a new regulator 
for the communications industry, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), formed 
by the merger of five individual regulators: 
 
• The Broadcasting Standards Commission,  
• The Independent Television Commission,  
• The Office of Telecommunications (Oftel),  
• The Radio Authority, and  
• The Radiocommunications Agency.  
 
4.2 The Ofcom Telecoms Strategic Review 
4.2.1 The Consultation Phase 
One of Ofcom’s first tasks was to launch a Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications (known as the Telecoms Strategic Review or TSR). This 
                                                
41 Newberry (2001) contrasts the situation with regard to BT with both Gas, where British Gas was 
left vertically integrated and free to foreclose its rivals, and electricity which was vertically 
separated from privatisation.  
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was because, despite progressive waves of liberalisation since 1984, and new 
regulation designed to address market problems using competition law methods 
and remedies, BT remained the dominant firm in most markets in 2003. Prior to 
the establishment of Ofcom, its predecessor, Oftel, and the UK government had 
been subject to extensive lobbying by various industry players to conduct such a 
review42. 
 
The TSR was launched in April 2004 with a first phase consultation document. 
Ofcom described the purpose of the review as to: 
 
“[A]ssess the options for enhancing value and choice in the UK 
telecommunications sector. It will have a particular focus on assessing the 
prospects for maintaining and developing effective competition in the UK 
telecoms markets, while also considering investment and innovation.” 
(Ofcom, 2004, para. 3.2) 
 
Ofcom’s analysis of the sector examined the level of competition at the time and 
how competition was likely to develop together with an analysis of technology 
trends. Stakeholders were asked “five fundamental questions” and 16 more 
detailed questions. The five fundamental questions were: 
 
“Question 1: In relation to the interests of citizen-consumers, what are the 
key attributes of a well-functioning telecoms market? 
Question 2: Where can effective and sustainable competition be achieved 
in the UK telecoms market? 
Question 3: Is there scope for a significant reduction in regulation, or is 
the market power of incumbents too entrenched? 
Question 4: How can Ofcom incentivise efficient and timely investment in 
next generation networks? 
Question 5: At varying times since 1984, the case has been made for 
structural or operational separation of BT, or the delivery of full functional 
equivalence. Are these still relevant questions?” (Ofcom, 2004 para. 1.2)  
 
Responses were received from over 100 interested parties and were wide- 
ranging. However, a central theme to emerge was the problem of discrimination 
and the perceived ineffectiveness of the legal/regulatory regime to prevent such 
behaviour. Some operators went further and argued that both the AD and the UK 
law allowed dominant operators to discriminate by not providing equivalent 
products in equivalent circumstances.  
 
Cable & Wireless (C&W) considered the “no undue discrimination” remedy, as 
defined in the Communications Act and applied by Oftel, to be inadequate. In its 
response to the TSR, which appeared to have a strong influence on Ofcom’s 
later analysis, it stated: 
 
                                                
42 The author had worked for Cable & Wireless to prepare a report on the benefits of separation of 
BT. However, he was not involved in drafting C&W’s response to the TSR. 
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“By far the biggest issue for this review is the problem of discrimination as 
regulating to prevent discrimination remains the key unsolved problem of 
regulation. Although there are existing regulatory rules and structures to 
deal with the problem of discrimination, in practice they have been 
ineffective in preventing BT from favouring its own operations.  
 
“The examples of such discrimination are endless. In the world of 
broadband, BT was allowed to create an LLU product which was 
prohibitively expensive, not industrialised and not fit-for-purpose, which 
meant that it was entirely unsuitable for mass-market take-up. The result 
is that there is currently virtually no competition in broadband based on 
LLU. In the world of narrowband voice, there is a similar story to tell. The 
basic monopoly access network building blocks to narrowband 
competition, such as call origination, carrier pre-selection and wholesale 
line rental have all been made available to BT’s competitors on sub-
standard terms, such that the cost base of competitors, and the maximum 
functionality they can offer to customers, are compromised. Again, the 
result is that BT has been permitted to retain an artificially high market 
share in narrowband voice to the detriment of innovation and of end-
users.” (Cable & Wireless, 2004) 
 
Energis (which has subsequently been acquired by Cable & Wireless, which has 
itself subsequently been acquired by Vodafone) also discussed the problem of 
undue discrimination, and also appears to have been influential on Ofcom. It 
stated: 
 
“Oftel’s approach to equivalence (in common with many regulators in 
telecommunications around the world) took as its starting point a formal 
requirement for equal treatment (or non-discrimination) and then engaged 
in a series of compromises based on equivalence of outcome to produce 
the detail of regulatory decisions.  
 
“The essence of this approach can be seen in the debate over the use of 
the term ‘undue’ discrimination. This approach embedded the concept of 
‘due’ discrimination in the regulatory regime, allowing differences between 
the systems that BT used to supply itself, and competitors, where there 
were ‘objectively justifiable’ differences. The problem with that approach 
is that it assumed that Oftel would be effectively empowered to distinguish 
between ‘due’ and ‘undue’ discrimination. While in many cases this 
approach seems to have worked, in other markets, that hasn’t been the 
case.” (Energis, 2004) 
 
The essence of these responses was that preventing discrimination was not 
enough when discrimination allows justifiably different treatment by the dominant 
firm of its own downstream business and that of its competitors. Such 
discrimination could take both price and non-price forms, though non-price 




Ofcom agreed with the statement by C&W and, in the Phase 2 consultation 
document, it said “We believe that similar stories could be told about carrier pre-
selection, wholesale line rental, partial private circuits and indirect access in their 
early days” (Ofcom, 2004B, para. 6.3). 
 
Referring back to the legal definitions of discrimination, BT could well argue that 
differences between internal and external cost and terms were justified and that 
therefore they were not discriminating under the definition of “undue 
discrimination”. 
 
However, such a defence was unnecessary as no discrimination cases were 
successfully brought against BT: indeed, Ofcom did not find explicit evidence of 
discrimination during its review. What became clear, however, was that 
competing Communications Providers (CPs) lacked confidence in a system that 
allowed BT to “duly discriminate” as evidenced by the paragraphs from the 
responses of Cable & Wireless and Energis, quoted above. The expectation of 
different treatment was enough to change the behaviour of downstream 
competitors. 
 
Unsurprisingly, BT did not mention the concerns of C&W and Energis in its 
response to the Phase 1 consultation. Also unsurprisingly, it argued against 
structural separation, as mentioned in the fifth of Ofcom’s five fundamental 
questions, but did accept that there was scope for greater equivalence of 
treatment by BT Wholesale towards both BT Retail and rival downstream firms 
(Ofcom, 2004B, para. 3.29). 
 
On 18th November 2004, Ofcom issued its Phase 2 consultation document 
(Ofcom, 2004B). This reviewed the comments received from the first phase and 
put forward specific proposals for future regulation of the electronic 
communications market. 
 
Central to Ofcom’s analysis in Phase 2 was the concept of “enduring economic 
bottlenecks” which it described as those areas of the network where “effective, 
infrastructure based competition is unlikely to emerge in the medium term” 
(Ofcom, 2004B, para 1.17). Ofcom considered that Cable & Wireless’s example 
of LLU provided a good example. LLU allows competitive operators to rent the 
copper local loop, which runs between the local exchange and the customer 
premises. The LLU customer needs to install its own equipment in the local 
exchange to allow broadband signals to be sent over the local loop. It can then 
sell that service to consumers. BT did not use LLU as a wholesale input to 
provide broadband access at the time of the TSR, so BT’s retail division was 
using a different wholesale product from its competitors.  
 
In possibly the most damning paragraph in the Phase 2 consultation, Ofcom said 




• Slow product development; 
• Inferior quality wholesale products;  
• Poor transactional process; and 
• A general lack of transparency.” (Ofcom, 2004B, para 1.19) 
 
Ofcom concluded that the non-discrimination remedy by itself had proved 
inadequate to address the competition problems caused by economic 
bottlenecks and that a stronger remedy was needed. In a paragraph that 
reflected Energis’s comments, it partially laid the blame at the door of its 
predecessor, Oftel: 
 
“Oftel’s approach might be characterised as accepting certain differences 
of outcome which arise from the existence of asymmetrical inputs for BT’s 
downstream businesses and those of third parties, provided these were 
not material, or deliberately or perversely created by BT to impede 
competition. Oftel worked to ensure that wholesale products specifically 
designed by BT under regulatory pressure were as close to being fit-for-
purpose as possible. But clearly this approach has not resolved the 
continuing problems of lack of equality of access in a number of areas. 
Firstly, BT faces weak incentives to comply, and as a result the 
achievement of fit-for-purpose products which BT itself has no interest in 
using or selling has required a high degree of regulatory intervention. 
Secondly, the process permits differences between the treatment of BT’s 
wholesale customers and its own retail activities which, while relatively 
insignificant in isolation, constitute significant disadvantage when taken in 
combination.” (Ofcom, 2004B, para. 6.11) 
 
In the last sentence of this quotation, Ofcom discusses what has been referred to 
as “cumulative materiality”. This is the idea that it is possible for there to be many 
minor differences between an internal and an external wholesale product which, 
when each difference is taken alone, appears relatively unimportant but which 
when they have a cumulative impact can result in a significant disadvantage for 
the external customer. 
4.2.2 Ofcom’s Proposals and The Undertakings 
Ofcom’s principal proposal arising from the TSR was to strengthen the non-
discrimination remedy by requiring what it termed “real equality of access” which 
would prevent BT having justifiable reasons for providing different services 
internally and externally. This would require “equivalence” at the product level 
and clear behavioural changes by BT.  
 
At the product level, Ofcom stated that equality of access implies BT’s wholesale 
customers should have access to: 
 
“The same or a similar set of regulated wholesale products as BT’s own 
retail activities; 
At the same prices as BT’s own retail activities; and 
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Using the same or similar transactional processes as BT’s own retail 
activities.” (Ofcom, 2004B, para 1.36) 
 
Ofcom termed these characteristics “equivalence of input”. It also stated that it 
was important that there is equivalence throughout the product development 
process and product life cycle. It implied that BT’s wholesale customers should 
have the same ability as BT’s retail activities to introduce changes or have 
problems addressed. 
 
The final stage of the TSR was the issuing by Ofcom of a “Statement” including a 
set of Undertakings by BT in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 
(Ofcom, 2005, the “Undertakings”). The Undertakings had two main themes: a 
specifically ex ante form of non-discrimination obligations, “Equivalence of Inputs” 
(EoI), and a reorganisation of BT placing those access products over which it had 
SMP into a separate Access Services division. The details for these two themes 
are discussed below. 
4.2.3 Equivalence of Input 
Paragraph 2 (Definitions and Interpretation) of Annex A of the Undertakings sets 
out what is meant by Equivalence of Input: 
 
“‘Equivalence of Inputs’ or ‘EoI’ means that BT provides, in respect of a 
particular product or service, the same product or service to all 
Communications Providers (including BT) on the same timescales, terms 
and conditions (including price and service levels) by means of the same 
systems and processes, and includes the provision to all Communications 
Providers (including BT) of the same Commercial Information about such 
products, services, systems and processes. In particular, it includes the 
use by BT of such systems and processes in the same way as other 
Communications Providers and with the same degree of reliability and 
performance as experienced by other Communications Providers.” 
(Ofcom, 2005, p. 61) 
 
In a helpful qualification, the Undertakings state the “Same means exactly the 
same” However, there are some variations allowed in the definition that may 
mean the same does not mean exactly the same. These are listed in the 
Undertakings as: 
 
"a) trivial differences; 
"b) such other differences as may be agreed by Ofcom in writing; 
"c) differences relating to the following: 
i) credit vetting procedures; 
ii) payment procedures; 
iii) matters of national and crime-related security, physical 
security, security required to protect the operational 
integrity of the network and such other security 
requirements as agreed between BT and Ofcom from time 
to time; 
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iv) provisions relating to the termination of a contract; and 
v) contractual provisions relating to requirements for a safe 
working environment; or 
"d) such other differences as are specified elsewhere in these 
Undertakings, including where Commercial Information is provided in 
accordance with these Undertakings to any of the nominated 
individuals, and individuals occupying the roles and functional areas 
(and their relevant external advisers, subcontractors and agents) listed 
in Annex 2.” (Ofcom, 2005, p.62) 
 
The list of products to which EoI was applied is set out in paragraph 3.1 of the 
Undertakings. These are: 
 
a)  Wholesale Analogue Line Rental; } 
b) Wholesale ISDN2 Line Rental;      }  WLR 
c)  Wholesale ISDN30 Line Rental;    } 
d)  Wholesale Extension Service (WES); 
e)  Shared Metallic Path Facility (SMPF);   
f)  Metallic Path Facility (MPF); 
g)  IPStream; and 
h)  Backhaul Extension Service (BES). 
 
Note MPF and SMPF are specific forms of LLU. 
 
Paragraph 3.1 also commits BT to providing certain, at the time, future services 
on an EoI basis. These are listed as: 
 
a)  Wholesale Extension Service Access Product; 
b)  Wholesale Extension Service Backhaul Product; 
c) Wholesale End-to-End Ethernet Service; 
d)  IP based Bitstream Network Access products that are the 
successors to IPStream or DataStream; and 
e)  A successor product to Wholesale Line Rental if: 
i)  such a product is provided using BT's Next Generation 
Network (NGN), based on Multi-Service Access Node 
(MSAN) access; and 
ii)  BT is determined by Ofcom to have SMP in a Network 
Access market or markets which includes that product. 
 
Ofcom also introduced the concept of “equivalence of outcome” which was more 
akin to non-discrimination and was applied to products which at the time were 
expected to become redundant as they were overtaken by new services such as 
those listed above. 
 
EoI was and remains a radical change from the “no undue discrimination” 
requirement and this is central to an understanding of the Undertakings and their 
impact on the UK telecommunications market. 
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BT, or indeed any other incumbent firm, could legitimately argue that its network 
was built for use by a single integrated firm and was not designed for access by 
other networks. It was designed to carry calls from the calling party to the 
receiving party (end-to-end calling) and not to pick up calls or deliver calls to 
other networks. Therefore, BT could argue that it faced lower costs to deliver a 
call end-to-end on its own network than to carry calls to or from an 
interconnected network. Likewise it could argue that it could provide different 
order processing systems internally and externally.  
 
Therefore, under the definition of non-discrimination adopted by Ofcom, its 
treatment of internal and external customers differently was objectively justifiable 
and therefore not unduly discriminatory. Nevertheless, industry participants and 
Ofcom determined that the competition policy principle of non-discrimination was 
not sufficient to stimulate effective and sustainable competition downstream of 
the economic bottleneck and so a stronger, specifically ex ante remedy was 
required to overcome the incentive to discriminate. As will be discussed in 
Section 4.3 below, some have argued that not allowing BT to take advantage of 
its vertical integration would lead to a loss of efficiency. 
 
Whereas under the old “no undue discrimination” obligation BT could use a 
different set of inputs from those sold to competitors, EoI required BT to use the 
same set of inputs. BT could not provide its own downstream business with 
broadband access based on an internal product specification and MPF or SMPF 
to its rivals. Instead BT has to use SMPF or MPF internally and provide those 
products to other CPs under the same terms and conditions and so forth. The 
word “equivalence” may be a misnomer, as BT was required to use the same 
products as its rivals, and thus “Equality of Inputs” may be a more accurate 
description. 
 
BT is also expected to respond to requests for new services from wholesale 
customers using the same process, i.e. it should not distinguish between a 
request from BT Retail and one from external customers.  
 
There has been no legal testing of equivalence but it would seem unlikely from 
the unequivocal wording of the Undertakings that BT could claim external 
customers were not in an “analogous situation” to their internal customers. 
 
Equivalence of Input can therefore be regarded as a specifically ex ante 
approach to deter discrimination, whereas the “no undue discrimination” 
obligation was an ex post remedy but applied ex ante. 
4.2.4 Functional Separation 
The second major obligation on BT in the Undertakings was what has become 
known as “functional separation”, although the term itself was not used at all in 
the document. Under Section 5 of the Undertakings, BT was obliged to create 
“Access Services’ (AS), the function of which was to provide “SMP Products 
which are predominantly using the Physical Layer and/or Transmission Layer of 
the BT’s Access Network and/or the Physical Layer and/or Transmission Layer of 
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BT’s Backhaul Network” (Ofcom, 2005, Section 5.3). These are the products in 
which there was an enduring economic bottleneck and in which competition was 
not expected to emerge in the medium term.  
 
The Undertakings set out various other obligations on Access Services, 
including: 
 
• It was to be a separate division with BT. Note that AS is not a separate 
subsidiary company. Customers of AS therefore contract with BT plc 
and not with AS. 
• AS was to have its own Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who would 
report “solely and directly” (5.25) to the BT Group plc CEO, but not be 
a member of the BT Group Operating Committee. 
• The Management Board of AS was to manage the division “to secure 
compliance with those sections of these Undertakings applicable to 
AS” (5.27). 
• The CEO was to have delegated authority from the BT Group plc 
Board to authorise capital expenditure of up £75 million per annum. 
• The AS management team was to move to separate accommodation 
from the rest of BT. 
• Remuneration of BT employees working of AS was to “reflect solely the 
objective of AS. AS will operate to a Scorecard which reflects its 
responsibilities to deliver Equivalence of Inputs and fair access to its 
products” (5.36). 
• No employee of BT who does not work for AS should be allowed 
access to Commercial Information of AS. Likewise, BT employees 
working for AS were not allowed to divulge Commercial Information to 
other BT employees (5.38 and 5.39). 
• BT was required to develop a separate brand name for AS that did not 
incorporate BT or British Telecom. The brand used for AS was 
Openreach. The branding could include the words “a BT Group 
business” and the BT logo (5.48). An example of the Openreach brand 
in shown in Figure 10, illustrating how BT was allowed to use the 
various devices discussed above. 
 
Figure 10: An Openreach branded van 
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4.3 The Debate about Functional Separation 
The functional separation of BT was perhaps the more controversial of the two 
primary measures included in the Undertakings. In the wake of their publication 
there was a plethora of articles and consultancy reports published stating the 
case for and, mainly, against separation.  
 
Tropina, Whalley and Curwen provide a good overview of the debate within the 
European Union and the state of play of functional separation at the time of the 
article. Placing functional separation in a wider context, they point out that 
“problems arise when companies in the competitive part of an industry require 
access to the non-competitive part to deliver their own services to their 
customers” (Tropina et al., 2010, p. 232). Whilst competition based on separate 
infrastructure may be preferable, depending on entry costs and economies of 
scale, such competition may take time to emerge. By contrast, service 
competition can emerge relatively quickly but it relies on access to the 
incumbent’s infrastructure; this would be encouraged by functional separation. 
However, they point out that some authors have argued that functional 
separation would reduce the incentives for new entrants to invest in infrastructure 
leading to a delay in the development of infrastructure competition.  
 
Functional separation is in part motivated by a desire to offset the advantages an 
incumbent gains from vertical integration, which “facilitates the efficient allocation 
and coordination of resources between different parts of the incumbent” (Tropina 
et al., 2010, p. 232). They conclude their discussion on the forms and challenges 
of separation by saying: “Regardless of the form [of separation] that is adopted, 
the motive is the same, namely, to resolve the tensions that exist within industries 
characterised by containing both competitive and non-competitive elements” 
(Tropina et al., 2010, p. 233). 
 
In a paper reviewing separation in telecommunications markets, de Bijl (2005) 
summarises the arguments for and against full structural separation. The key 
argument in favour of separation is that it eliminates the incumbent’s incentives to 
raise rivals’ costs by reducing quality or increasing the cost of access. Other 
arguments in favour include removing the scope for leverage of market power 
into related markets and allowing the coordination of investments between all 
service providers and the network operator, rather than only within the integrated 
firm. The arguments against separation include the cost of separating the 
incumbent and deciding where to ‘draw the line’ between the separated entities. 
A further argument against separation is that it eliminates the coordination 
benefits and the economies of scale and scope that come from vertical 
integration.  
 
Critics of separation claim that it would harm investment incentives based on two 
related arguments. First, separation will damage information flow between 
consumers, the downstream and upstream entities making it harder to coordinate 
investment decisions. Vertical integration would internalise information flows and 
so be more efficient than separation (Cave, 2008; Ergas, 2007). Secondly, 
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separation introduces a danger that downstream firms will attempt to earn quasi-
rents by playing strategic games after the upstream firm has made a relationship-
specific investment (the “hold-up problem”) that will reduce investment (Ergas, 
2007; Crandall, Eisenach and Litan, 200943).  
4.3.1 Information Flow 
 
Crandall et al. argue that telecoms networks display a very high degree of asset 
specificity between the upstream access network and downstream retail 
operations and that economic efficiency gains will be greatest in the presence of 
such asset specificity. It is for this reason, they argue, that “market forces” have 
led telecoms companies to become vertically integrated. Telecoms networks 
require high levels of investment and display high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty. “Under these circumstances, the costs of coordinating upstream and 
downstream activities through contracts are likely to be high, and the case for 
vertical integration especially strong” (Crandall et al., 2009, p.505). They 
conclude: 
 
“In sum, economic theory, supported by empirical evidence from a variety 
of industries, suggests that vertical separation in the telecoms sector risks 
creating substantial problems for innovation and investment, especially 
when major new infrastructure investments are involved.” (Crandall et al., 
2009, p.509) 
 
 Waverman and Dasgupta (2007)44 also argue that functional separation will 
create an environment in which entrants and incumbents alike will have lower 
incentives to invest. As a result, functional separation could be a technological 
“cul-de-sac” in which Europe is left with competition at the retail level, but within 
technological constraints imposed mainly by the existing copper-wire 
infrastructure. 
Their argument is that a functionally separated firm considering investment in 
Next Generation Access (NGA) will be required to offer access at cost-reflective 
prices which, in their view, do not reflect all the true economic costs that an 
incumbent firm faces. Few incumbents would find such an investment attractive if 
they have to share the returns on that investment with their downstream 
competitors.  
Entrants too will have less incentive to invest as they will always have the option 
to buy the same infrastructure as the incumbent. They would not make 
investments in their own networks unless the pay-offs were very high. 
Although presented as such, Waverman and Dasgupta’s concerns are not in fact 
specific to functional separation, but are pertinent to any form of price regulation 
in any market structure where there is dominance in the upstream input. In the 
                                                
43 Crandall et al. acknowledge the financial support of Verizon Communications for their paper. 
Verizon, a US company, was strongly opposed to any form of separation. 
44 Although apparently written without the support of any interested party, Waverman has in 
previous papers commented on issues with the financial support of incumbent telecoms 
operators. 
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absence of any effective competition in upstream markets and/or the likely 
emergence of such competition, the dominant upstream firm is always likely to be 
subject to price regulation to prevent it earning monopoly rents and to prevent it 
price discriminating against its downstream competitors.  
Cave (2008) suggests that, in a separated environment, the upstream entity will 
have no direct contact with end-users and so information about demand is only 
available at one remove. He also claims that in a functionally separated 
environment there is a systemic problem. Properly to mimic a structurally 
separated environment, there should be no more contact between the upstream 
and downstream arms than there would be between the upstream arm and an 
external customer.  
This last argument concerning information flows seems particularly misplaced. 
There are many examples of industries where the value chain is not vertically 
integrated within a single firm but where information about demand flows 
between consumers and the upstream manufacturing firms via intermediate 
suppliers and retailers. Separation does not of itself necessarily lead to any 
disruption in the information flow between vertically related, but structurally 
separated, firms. 
4.3.2 The “Hold-Up” Problem 
 
A second problem identified by critics was the “hold-up” problem. Writing in the 
context of the Australian proposal for a functionally separate high-speed 
broadband network, Ergas (2007) reviews four externalities which arise from 
separation, one of which is investment45. He argues that an investment by an 
upstream electronic communications firm is “relationship-specific”, that is to say 
that the investment is tailored to meet the needs of another party and cannot be 
used by a third party. This places the investor at a disadvantage, as the party for 
whom the investment is made can behave opportunistically based on the fact that 
the investor has limited possibilities to utilise the investment for alternative 
purposes.  
Vertical integration between the parties would internalise the gains to be made 
from the investment and so remove the incentive for opportunism between the 
parties. 
In relation to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) Cave (2008)46 suggests that if 
the upstream firm accrues a large investment in sunk costs, the downstream firm 
has the option to neglect new services made available to it, in effect to “hold up” 
the upstream entity’s investment. Cave suggests that contracts could help 
overcome this problem, but whether they would succeed or not depends on 
whether one is a contract optimist or pessimist (p. 21)  
Ergas (2007) also recognises that contracts between parties could prevent them 
from expropriating each other’s investment returns, but says that such 
                                                
45 The others are pricing, service quality and “on-going adaptation to change”.  
46 Both Cave (2008) and Ergas (2007) appear to be written with the financial support of the 
Australian incumbent telecoms provider, Telstra, which at the time was opposed to the 
separation of its business. 
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contractual means are often an incomplete remedy to the hold-up problem. He 
then says that vertical integration internalises the gains from the investment and 
removes the incentive for opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Concern about the “hold-up” problem is, however, also misplaced for two 
reasons: first, in the presence of a competitive downstream market, investments 
by the upstream operator would not be relationship-specific; and secondly, 
internal and external contracting would be sufficient to overcome any “hold-up” 
problem that might exist. These two points are expanded below. 
The “hold-up” problem requires that the investment made by the upstream firm is 
specific to an individual buyer who can, ex post, demand a lower price. However, 
the presence of a competitive downstream market means that investments made 
by the owner of the bottleneck facility are unlikely to be specific to any individual 
customer who cannot then hold up the upstream firm and so demand quasi-rents. 
Williamson (1979) writes: 
“The crucial investment distinction is this: to what degree are transaction-
specific (non-marketable) expenses incurred. Items that are unspecialised 
among users pose few hazards, since buyers in these circumstances can 
easily turn to alternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended 
for one order to other buyers without difficulty. Non-marketability problems 
arise when the specific identity of the parties has important cost-bearing 
consequences. Transactions of this kind will be referred to as 
idiosyncratic.” (Williamson, 1979, p. 239) 
Alternative buyers of idiosyncratic investments are few, meaning that the buyer 
can hold up the seller once the seller has made the investment. This is not the 
case in telecoms markets where there are many downstream buyers of the 
bottleneck asset.  
Suppose that a downstream firm requests an upgraded service from the 
upstream firm and that, after making the investment, the downstream firm 
decides not to take the product at the price offered. The upstream firm is not 
restricted from offering, and may in fact be required by regulation to offer, its 
services to all downstream firms under a non-discrimination regulation. If the 
service is seen as something necessary for competitiveness by the downstream 
business, then that business is unlikely to allow its competitors to have access to 
the service while it waits for the price to fall. In other words, the asset in which the 
upstream firm invests is not relationship-specific and can be sold to other 
operators.  
Even in the absence of such a requirement, rational upstream managers are 
unlikely to make a major relationship-specific investment where they could be 
held up, when they could develop the service in a way that could be used by 
other firms in the downstream market. 
For example, suppose that the upstream firm invests in NGA. It is highly unlikely 
to do so in a way in which only one downstream customer could make use of the 
NGA network. It is far more likely to build its NGA in a way in which any of its 
customers could use it to compete for retail business. Indeed, under the EoI 
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obligation, it would be required to make the investment available to all its 
customers on the same terms. 
In fact, the vertically integrated firm is the stronger position as it can refuse to 
develop a new product, or produce one more suited to its own needs. Even if it 
did produce the new product, in the absence of price controls it could seek to 
charge the monopoly price to its downstream rivals. 
The debate in the literature is between those who consider separation, including 
functional separation, to be harmful to efficiency and those who consider that any 
loss of efficiency is a price worth paying to reduce or eliminate the problems of 
discrimination. We can now refer back to the discussion in Section 2.6.2 on 
behavioural and structural remedies and examine functional separation: is it 
behavioural or functional?  
 
Motta (2004) distinguished a behavioural from a structural remedy by saying that 
a behavioural remedy places a constraint on property rights and a structural 
remedy modified property rights. Functional separation does not modify property 
rights in that Openreach remains a division of BT Group plc. Indeed, as has been 
pointed out above, it is not even a subsidiary of BT Group plc and any company 
that buys from Openreach contracts with BT. Thus BT’s property rights have not 
been modified in any way. 
 
However, its behaviour is constrained by the Undertakings, which set out rules 
and processes by which Openreach and the rest of BT may interact. Annex 2 of 
the Undertakings lists the job functions and individuals within BT Group (including 
Openreach) who may share information. The type of information that may be 
shared is prescribed elsewhere in the Undertakings, for example in Clause 5.39.  
 
The Undertakings specifically allow for investment co-ordination with major 
investment programmes requiring sanctioning by the Board of BT plc. If the critics 
of separation were correct, the £2.5 billion investment BT has made on Next 
Generation Access would be subject to the “hold-up” problem, which occurs 
when relationship specific investments are made. Unless contracts are perfect, 
the specificity of the investment makes the investor susceptible to ex-post 
haggling by the other party. Conscious of such behaviour, the investor is likely to 
under-invest because investors cannot guarantee themselves a sufficient share 
of the return through ex-post bargaining. 
 
However, BT’s investment in NGA is not relationship specific. On the contrary, 
because BT has SMP in the relevant market, it must make access available over 
its NGA network to other operators, for example EE47, Sky and TalkTalk. No 
operator would therefore be in a position to indulge in ex post haggling as the 
other, and BT’s own retail divisions, could gain a competitive edge while that 
haggling proceeds.  
 
                                                
47 At the time of writing this thesis, BT was in exclusive negotiations with EE’s owners (Orange and 
Deutsche Telekom) to acquire EE. 
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The choice between full-blown structural separation, and some more behavioural 
remedy is a trade-off between the efficiency gains from integration and the 
competition gains from separation. Proponents of vertical integration argue that 
the co-ordination advantages arising from integration result in short-run efficiency 
gains that outweigh any competition problems that may exist. At the extreme, 
proponents may reject the notion that competition problems can exist as either 
the “one monopoly profit” theory would prevent profits being earned at more than 
one level of the value chain and, anyway, the self-correcting mechanisms of the 
market would ensure any competition problems are transient. Arguments for 
vertical integration may be seen as against competition rather than against 
separation, if a lack of competition allows firms to be more efficient. 
 
By contrast, proponents of separation start from an assumption that competition 
problems in the monopoly part of the value chain are non-transitory. High barriers 
to entry mean that an economic bottleneck will be present even in the long run 
and it would be better to allow competition in, where the market can support 
multiple firms. Any short-run, static efficiency loss from separation will be 
outweighed by dynamic efficiency gains in the market segments that can support 
competition. The problem of lost co-ordination can be overcome by contracts and 
the hold-up problem won’t exist because the monopoly upstream firm serves 
several downstream firms.  
 
The task of the regulatory or competition authority is to chose between these two 
arguments and set any gains from one against potential losses from the other.  
4.4 Pricing of Local Loop Unbundling in the UK 
At the same time as Ofcom issued its Statement arising from the TSR, it also 
launched reviews of the Wholesale Local Access (WLA) market and of BT’s cost 
of supplying unbundled local loops. The effect of these various reviews was to 
cut the regulated price at which BT supplied both fully unbundled and shared 
access local loops to other communications providers. The price control imposed 
by Ofcom set the maximum price BT could charge for unbundled local loops at a 
rate much lower than was the case before the new charge control.  
 
The review of the Wholesale Local Access Market (WLAM) was launched in May 
2004 (Ofcom, 2004C). The market review followed the standard three-part 
approach of market definition, assessment of Significant Market Power (SMP) 
and imposition of obligations on firms with SMP.  
 
The market was defined as consisting of the metallic path running from the 
Network Termination Point in the customer’s premises to the Main Distribution 
Frame (MDF) located in the nearest telephone exchange building. Ofcom 
conducted the usual Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) to determine if a cable 
connection supplied by, at the time, ntl and Telewest (which later merged to form 
Virgin Media), would belong in the same relevant market. It found that a SSNIP48 
                                                
48 Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price. 
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by a hypothetical monopolist would result in sufficient switching from copper to 
cable to make the SSNIP unprofitable and so concluded that copper and cable 
access belong in the same relevant market. Cable was found to place an indirect 
constraint on a hypothetical monopolist of the copper network rather than a direct 
one. Cable operators did not (and do not) offer a wholesale access product, so a 
wholesale customer of copper access could not switch to cable49. However, if the 
hypothetical copper monopolist attempted to impose a SSNIP then sufficient 
switching would take place at the retail level that the resulting reduction in 
demand for wholesale copper access would make the SSNIP unprofitable.  
 
Other alternative access technologies, such as fibre and fixed wireless, were not 
considered to be in the same market as their networks were too limited at the 
time to place an effective constraint on a hypothetical monopolist.  
 
The geographic market was defined as the whole of the UK, outside the Hull 
area, which was found to be a separate market50.  
 
Ofcom found that BT had SMP in the market on the basis of its market share, the 
ubiquity of its network, and the lack of expected competition from other firms. 
 
Of most relevance to this research is the set of ex ante obligations imposed on 
BT as a result of its SMP in the wholesale local access market. Ofcom required 
BT to provide access on reasonable request to unbundled local loops. It also 
required that BT’s prices for LLU be set on the basis of its Long Run Incremental 
Cost plus a mark-up for the recovery of common costs (“LRIC+”), and including 
an appropriate return on capital employed. Long run incremental costs are the 
costs of investment in the provision of a defined increment of output. Formally, 
the “long run” refers to the period of time in which the quantities of all factors of 
production, including plant and other assets, are variable. The duration of the 
long run is variable depending on the context. LRIC can also be seen as the 
costs that the regulated firm would avoid if it decided not to provide the regulated 
services any longer, taking a long run perspective. The costs per unit of output in 
the increment are the average costs per unit and so LRIC is sometimes referred 
to as Long Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC). However, the “average” is 
implicit in LRIC and so normally dropped from the acronym.  
 
Rather than set a specific price for an unbundled local loop, Ofcom decided to set 
a price ceiling, on the basis that the cost data were largely based on forecasts 
that were “open to interpretation” (Ofcom, 2004D, para. 9.2). Table 9.2 in 
Ofcom’s Statement set out the proposed ceilings and is reproduced below. 
 
                                                
49 Whether a wholesale cable access product could be made available is a moot point. In Belgium, 
for example, the two cable providers are required to provide wholesale access.  
50 For reasons lost in the mists of time, the city of Kingston upon Hull retained, and still retains, a 
separate telecommunications network that is not part of BT but operated by KCOM, formerly 
Kingston Communications. The market conditions and obligations imposed in the Hull area are 
not considered in this thesis. 
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Figure 11: LLU Price Ceilings 2004 
Local Loop Unbundling Service Type of Charge (£) 
 
Shared Metallic Path Facility Rental per annum 12.64 
Shared Metallic Path Facility Connection 37.03 
Metallic Path Facility Transfer Connection 50.70 
Metallic Path Facility New Provide Connection 192.64 
 (Ofcom, 2004D, para. 9.59) 
 
In 2005, Ofcom launched two other consultations that affected the regulated price 
of unbundled local loops: one of BT’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
and one on the valuation of BT’s copper access network.  
 
In the WACC Statement51 (Ofcom, 2005B), Ofcom determined that BT’s financial 
risk associated with its copper access network was lower than the risk for the rest 
of the company. Therefore, Ofcom declared that the cost of capital allowed for in 
the regulated prices of copper access products, including LLU, should be lower 
than for non-copper-based products (e.g. Ethernet services provided over fibre). 
Ofcom’s justification for applying a different, lower WACC was simply that the 
costs and demand conditions for the copper network were better known and 
more stable than for other products and services provided by BT. Therefore BT’s 
risk associated with the copper network was lower. At the heart of this 
consultation was the level of Beta (β) that should be applied in the WACC 
calculation for the whole of BT and for the copper access network. The Beta is a 
variable in the WACC calculation that measures the degree to which the returns 
on a particular financial asset track those of the rest of the market. If β=1, there is 
a strong covariance between the returns on the relevant asset and on the 
benchmark market as a whole. However, if β<1 then the returns on the asset 
fluctuate less than the market as a whole and the investment can be considered 
relatively safe. A β<1 would imply a lower cost of capital and would thus lead to a 
lower price for a regulated asset. 
 
Ofcom found that the value of Beta for the copper network was indeed lower than 
for the rest of BT and that it should be in the region of 0.8 – 0.9 for the copper 
network compared with 1.14 – 1.23 for the rest of BT. The lower WACC led to a 
lower price for LLU and other copper access products.  
 
In the second consultation on the valuation of BT’s copper access network 
(Ofcom, 2005C), Ofcom concluded that its preferred approach was to continue 
with BT’s then-existing method for determining the cost of the copper loop but to 
disallow that element of the over-recovery which had not been crystallised but 
would otherwise do so in the future (Paras. 6.4 – 6.9).  
 
The details of Ofcom’s proposals are not relevant to this thesis. However, the 
effect of Ofcom’s decisions was a reduction in BT’s WACC and a lower valuation 
                                                
51 Ofcom refers to “consultations” even after the consultation is closed. Ofcom publishes one or 
more “Consultation Documents” whilst the consultation is open and a “Statement” at the end of 
the process.    
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of the copper access network. These reductions in turn lowered the prices BT 
could charge for access over the copper network including, crucially, the price for 
LLU. Table 2 shows the impact on the valuation of BT’s copper network 
calculated by Ofcom dependent on the WACC set (Ofcom, 2005C, paras. 7.13 – 
7.16). In essence, dependent on the parameters chosen by Ofcom, the regulated 
prices that BT would be allowed to charge for key products used by other 
communications providers would be very much lower than before. 
 




13.5% -4.8% -14.2% 
10.3% -14.6% -24.1% 
 
Table 2: Reduction in Copper Valuation 
 
Table 3 shows the average monthly charges for LLU in the five largest EU 
countries in 2003 and 2005. These prices include one-off, set-up costs per line 
amortised over three years. As can be clearly seen, prices in the UK were very 
much higher than the other four countries in 2003, but that these had been 
substantially reduced by 2005 once the impact of the consultations discussed 
above had been factored in. The price of fully unbundled local loops had been 
reduced by 56%, whilst the prices of shared access local loops had been 




France Germany Italy Spain UK Average 
October 
2003 
Full LLU 17.10 16.50 11.00 14.00 25.50 16.22 
Shared Access 9.42 11.01 6.51 5.74 22.59 11.05 
October 
2005 
Full LLU  10.90   11.80   9.30   12.00   11.20   11.04  
Shared Access  4.39   3.74   4.14   3.84   3.34   3.89  
(European Commission Implementation Reports. All prices in Euros.)  
Table 3: LLU Prices 2003 - 2005, EU5 
 
In Chapter 5 of this thesis the impact of the price reduction and of the 
implementation of the Undertakings will be assessed in relation to the 
development of the market for broadband using LLU access. 
4.5 The Office of the Telecoms Adjudicator  
A third change introduced by Ofcom was the creation of the Office of the 
Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA), an independent (of both Ofcom and the 
industry) body consisting of BT and Communications Providers. The OTA’s task 
was, and remains, to oversee co-operation between communications providers to 
support the development of a competitive environment. The OTA’s primary task 
is to deal with major issues affecting the rollout and performance of products 
provided by Openreach, in particular LLU.  
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The OTA was needed because one of the main concerns raised in the TSR was 
that the process for implementing LLU was not fit for purpose, and a poor 
process allowed BT greater opportunity for discrimination, whether deliberately or 
otherwise. The OTA’s main function was therefore to bring the industry together 
to agree on a suitable process that would reduce that opportunity. It describes 
itself as having five functions that are within “scope”: 
“ • Product functionality - … the definition, specification (including timing of 
availability) and functionality of In-scope Products and associated facilities 
and activities necessary for In-scope Products, including (but not limited 
to) the publication of key performance indicators and progress against 
plans; 
  • Process specification - … the specification and availability of the 
processes involved through the life-cycle of relevant In-scope Products 
and other process specification which will also include facilitating the 
agreement of reasonable quality levels, service level agreements and 
service level guarantees … ; 
  • Change management - … modifications, enhancements and 
improvements of products and processes; 
  • Implementation plans - … the implementation of new and changed In-
scope Products and processes and will include, [sic] the project plans, 
timescales and reasonable resourcing required to delivery [sic] these 
products and processes; and 
  • Monitoring activities - … necessary on-going activities to monitor 
implementation of non-binding recommendations of the OTA2 – 
[including] the use of appropriate key performance indicators where 
relevant.”52 
“In-scope Products” are Local Loop Unbundling, Wholesale Line Rental, Carrier 
Pre-Selection, Geographic Number Portability and Broadband migration. 
 
One of the key tasks of the OTA is to monitor and publish the performance of 
Openreach against Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that show how well it is 
achieving its targets for provision and quality of service. 
 
The OTA can be considered to be an essential part of the package of reforms 
introduced by Ofcom as, in large part, its role was to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Undertakings by making that the underlying processes 
were fit for purpose.  
                                                
52 Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator (no date) OTA2: Vision. Available at 
http://www.offta.org.uk/vision.htm. (Accessed: 3 February 2015).  
 66 
4.6 Experience in Other Countries 
The United Kingdom is not the only country to have introduced some form of 
separation in the telecoms sector. This part of the thesis reviews the different 
approaches taken in Italy, New Zealand and Sweden where different forms of 
separation have been introduced with the aim of addressing the problem of 
discrimination. This section first reviews features of separation and secondly how 
the terms of non-discrimination compare with the UK’s Equivalence of Input. 
4.6.1 Separation 
 
Table 4 summarises the separation commitments in Italy, New Zealand, Sweden 
and the UK. Each of the features of separation are discussed below the table.  
 
 Italy New Zealand Sweden UK 







Subsidiary  Division 
Separate 
Premises No N/a Yes Yes 














Yes N/a Yes Yes 
Degree of 
Separation 5 8 6 5 
Table 4: Summary of Separation Status in Selected Countries 
 
Legal Status of the Access Services Division 
 
Until 2009, Telecom Italia (TI) was under an obligation of Accounting Separation 
imposed in 2002 by AGCOM, the Italian regulator, under decision 152/02/CONS. 
This decision characterised the activities that had to be classified in its separated 
accounts. More specifically, the decision defined (a) the entity with responsibility 
for a particular regulated service, (b) the way in which profit and loss accounts 
and the balance sheet had to be prepared, and (c) the approach for documenting 
transfer charges within the company (Nucciarelli and Sadowski, 2010). Despite 
the obligation to produce separated accounts, by 2009 accounts had only been 
published for the years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004. Accounts for 2005 and 2006 
had been lodged with the regulator but were still being audited.  
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By 2008, Telecom Italia had been the subject of several investigations for 
breaches of SMP conditions imposed by AGCOM. In 2007 and 2008 four 
breaches were notified relating to non-discrimination. It had already been fined 
for breaches on retail products, in particular Carrier Pre-Selection and Mobile 
Number Portability. To avoid further fines, Telecom Italia presented a set of 
voluntary “Commitments” to AGCOM, in return for which the investigation of the 
breaches was suspended. The Commitments were accepted by AGCOM and 
came into effect on January 1st 2009 under AGCOM Decision no. 
718/08/CONS53.  
 
Under The Commitments, Telecom Italia set up “Open Access” (OA) to provide 
access services to the Retail Commercial Directorate of Telecom Italia and to 
other operators through the National Wholesale Services corporate function. The 
function of Open Access is to manage: 
 
“ • All the activities for the development and maintenance of access 
network technological infrastructures; 
  • The processes for the supply of access services for Telecom Italia 
clients and clients of other operators, with the related technical 
assistance.” (Telecom Italia, 2014A) 
 
OA appears to be more closely integrated with Telecom Italia than Openreach is 
with BT, as it is a business unit within the Technology Division of Telecom Italia. 
The manager of Open Access reports to the manager of the Technology Division 
(Telecom Italia, 2014C) According to Telecom Italia:  
 
“access services are delivered by Open Access to the retail commercial 
functions of Telecom Italia and to other operators through the National 
Wholesale division. The activities of Open Access and National 
Wholesale Services for the production of access services are separate 
and managed autonomously from Telecom Italia Group’s other 
commercial operations.” (Telecom Italia 2014B) 
 
The implications of this arrangement for non-discrimination will be discussed 
later.  
 
New Zealand has taken a very different regulatory approach to that taken in the 
EU, and has now gone further than the UK by separating Telecom New Zealand 
(TCNZ) into two separately owned entities. 
 
New Zealand began to reform its telecoms industry in 1987 with the passing of 
the Telecommunications Act 1987. This ended TCNZ’s statutory monopoly over 
the supply of telecoms services by 1989 and introduced a form of “light touch” 
regulation that was restricted to ex post interventions under the competition law. 
                                                
53 ‘Telecom Italia’s Commitments’ As approved by AGCOM Decision no. 718/08/CONS 15 
December 2008. Non-binding translation. 
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There was no ex ante sector-specific regulation. This meant that most disputes 
between TCNZ and entrants ended in the courts with at least one interconnection 
case being finally decided by the Privy Council in London: the highest court for 
New Zealand.  
 
In December 2001, the New Zealand parliament passed the Telecommunications 
Act 2001, which placed responsibility for the regulation of the telecoms sector on 
the Commerce Commission. Although the Commerce Commission had some ex 
ante powers, there was still a preference for market-based solutions. For 
example, although the Commerce Commission ruled that TCNZ did not need to 
introduce LLU, TCNZ itself agreed with the government that it would deliver 
250,000 more broadband lines by 2005, one third of which would be wholesale 
through other providers. This market solution was seen as preferable to a 
regulatory approach (Bleisch and Marcus, 2010). 
 
A review of the 2001 Act in 2006 (the “Stocktake”) led to various amendments to 
the Act that in turn led to a set of Undertakings by TCNZ to the Minister of 
Communications in March 2008 that were later varied in June 2009 (TCNZ, 
2009). In common with the BT/Ofcom Undertakings of 2005, TCNZ’s 
Undertakings addressed both the organisation structure of TCNZ and introduced 
Equivalence of Input. 
 
The New Zealand Undertakings, in contrast to the UK equivalent, specified three 
business units54: Access Network Services, Wholesale and Retail, illustrated in 
Figure 12. The ANS division was branded as Chorus.  
 
In September 2009, the New Zealand government announced its plan to fund 
and develop a nationwide fibre broadband network in partnership with private 
capital and that it had established Crown Fibre Holdings Ltd as its investment 
vehicle. The government’s plan is that 75% of New Zealanders will be connected 
to ultra-fast broadband by 2020. The government defines Ultra-Fast Broadband 
as downlink speeds of at least 100 Mbps, and uplink speeds of at least 50 Mbps. 
The government is contributing NZ$1.35 billion (£660 million) to the initiative with 
“significant amounts of private co-investment” being contributed by the 
government’s Ultra-fast Broadband partners.  
 
 
                                                
54 This arrangement is sometimes referred to the “three box solution”. The three boxes being ANS, 
Wholesale and Retail.  
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Figure 12: Organisation of TCNZ 2009 
 
(Bleisch and Marcus, 2010) 
 
 
Crown Fibre Holdings monitors Ultra-Fast Broadband deployment and the 
contracts with “local fibre companies” (the companies that will roll out the new 
network in partnership with the government). One of the restrictions placed on 
local fibre companies was that they could not be involved in retailing services, 
which would exclude Chorus from bidding to be a partner in the UFB project.  
 
In the summer of 2010, TCNZ announced that it was considering structurally 
separating Chorus from the rest of the company to create two separate 
companies. Chorus2, as it was referred to, would operate the copper access 
network and would undertake any investment in fibre. A key policy objective for 
the government arising from separation was to require business restrictions on 
Chorus2 to bar it from participating in markets where “it would have an undue 
advantage arising from its market power in upstream access network service 
markets” (Ministry of Economic Development, 2010). 
 
Following structural separation, Chorus2 would provide both LLU and bitstream 
services. As LLU is an upstream input to bitstream, Chorus2 would still have an 
incentive to deter competitive supply of bitstream by firms that buy LLU from 
Chorus2 and then wish to supply bitstream in competition with it. The Ministry 
therefore came to the view that the EoI obligation in the New Zealand 
Undertakings should remain in force for Chorus2 such that Chorus2 supplied LLU 
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internally and to third party access seekers under the same terms and conditions 
and so forth. However, the Ministry thought that it would be disproportionate to 
require Chorus2 to operate as two business units. 
 
The possibility for Chorus2 to continue to discriminate was therefore not entirely 
eliminated by the structural separation of TCNZ. So long as Chorus2 was 
vertically integrated and had upstream market power, it could still harm the 
market without the continuing requirement to offer downstream services on an 
EoI basis. 
 
In December 2011, the structural separation of TCNZ took place with Chorus’ 
shares floated on the New Zealand stock exchange. TCNZ has more recently 
been rebranded as “Spark”. 
 
The Swedish NRA, Post & Telestyrelsen (PTS), published a report in 2007 on 
how competition in the broadband market could be improved (PTS, 2007). The 
report found that there were long-term structural problems in the market that 
neither sector-specific regulation nor competition law had been able to remedy. 
At the time, TeliaSonera’s retail market share in Sweden was around 40%, but its 
wholesale market share was 70%. The report concluded that a new regulatory 
tool was need to rectify the situation and that this tool should be functional 
separation. 
 
PTS identified two “positive qualities” of functional separation: first it is 
proportionate in that it “rectifies the problems of equality of access that need to 
be resolved” and secondly it has been “tested and shown to function in the 
United Kingdom” (PTS, 2007, p. 10).  
 
The report stated that the opportunity to impose functional separation would arise 
in the next market review and a decision regarding Significant Market Power. 
However, PTS also proposed that powers should be introduced into the 
Electronic Communications Act (LEK) to allow it to accept voluntary commitments 
to bypass the formal regulatory route.  
 
On 1st January 2008, TeliaSonera, the Swedish incumbent operator, voluntarily 
set up a separate subsidiary, Skanova AB, to provide copper related 
infrastructure on the same commercial terms to all operators in Sweden. 
Skanova also now provides dark fibre access in around 100 towns in Sweden55. 
 
The legal separation of TeliaSonera was implemented voluntarily by the firm. 
However, the government did make the necessary legal changes that would have 
allowed it to impose functional separation had it not happened voluntarily. (Such 
pre-emptive behaviour by the incumbent was predicted in de Bijl (2005) in the 
form of a game between the regulator and the incumbent). The law, however, 
came into effect some six months after the creation of Skanova. 
 
                                                
55 From Skanova’s website www.skanova.se Accessed December 2014 
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The timing of actions by TeliaSonera, PTS and the government are set out in 
Teppayayon and Bohlin (2010), reproduced in Figure 13. 
 
 





The physical separation of BT and Openreach management and staff was a 
specific requirement of the UK Undertakings. The Italian Commitments are silent 
on the need for separate premises, except that the Supervisory Board should be 
located separately. 
 
Chorus2 is a separate company from Spark and is located in separate buildings. 
 
Skanova’s head office address is different from that of TeliaSonera Sweden, but 




Open Access does not have a separate brand or identity from the rest of 
Telecom Italia, whereas Chorus, Skanova and Openreach all have separate 
identities. The Skanova brand is more distinct from its parent than the Openreach 
brand, as there is no indication from the branding that it is part of TeliaSonera, as 
can be seen in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: A Skanova Van 
  
 
Separate Management Incentives 
 
The UK Undertakings make it clear that Openreach management and staff are 
only to be remunerated on the basis of the performance of Openreach and not 
the rest of BT.  
 
The Italian Commitments introduced a new incentive system, but these are not 
related to the financial performance of Open Access, but to non-financial targets 
such as the satisfaction of the Operators purchasing services from Open Access, 
and the quality, security and efficiency of the fixed access network (Telecom 
Italia, 2008, para. 2.1). 
 
It is not known whether Skanova has separate financial incentives. However, as it 





Although it remains an operating division of Telecom Italia, rather than a 
subsidiary, Open Access has a separate Supervisory Board. A new three-man 
Board took office in 2012. Members of the Board are: Prof. Antonio Sassano 
(appointed by the Board of Directors of Telecom Italia), Prof. Marco Lamandini 
(selected by the Authority) and Prof. Michele Polo (selected by Telecom Italia).  
 
The function of the Supervisory Board is to “(i) supervise the proper 
implementation of the Commitments; (ii) verify compliance of the KPIs referred to 
in Groups of Commitments 3 and 4 with the principles of equal treatment and the 
quality objectives for the fixed network access services” (Telecom Italia, 2008, 
paras. 7.1 – 7. 26).  
 
The Supervisory Board publishes an annual report and a quarterly newsletter 




TeliaSonera has established an “Equality of Access Board” for Skanova “to retain 
a strong confidence in the principle of equal treatment” 56 , but no further 
information is available concerning this Board. This is most likely because 
Skanova was established voluntarily by TeliaSonera and not as a result of 
“Undertakings” agreed with the regulator. 
 
As an independent company, Chorus naturally has completely separate 
governance arrangements to those of Spark.  
4.6.2 Equivalence of Input 
 
The UK Undertakings define EoI as BT providing the same product or service, on 
the same timescales, terms and conditions, by means of the same systems and 
processes and including the same Commercial Information (Ofcom, 2005, p. 61). 
This section of the thesis examines how other countries’ approach differs from 
that taken by BT and Ofcom. The approach taken by the countries is summarised 
below. 
 





Yes. Yes. Unknown Yes, although BT 
uses Shared Metallic 
Path Facility and 
Wholesale Line 
Rental whilst other 



















No. Unknown but 
assumed so. 
Unknown. Yes. 
Table 5: Equivalence of Input International Comparison 
 
Same products and services 
 
Telecom Italia is not under an obligation of Equivalence of Input, and the 
Commitments do not purport to require EoI. Rather, Telecom Italia is required 
only to meet the obligations of Equivalence of Output, which it considers 
sufficient to ensure a competitive market. 
 
                                                
56 Taken from http://www.teliasonera.com/about-us/markets-and-brands/sweden/ 5/1/2015  
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The Italian Commitments do not specifically state that Open Access should 
provide the same product and services to Telecom Italia and other “Operators”. 
However, they do define a number of “SMP Services” (for example WLR and 
LLU) and then state that the new single delivery process “shall manage 
activation, termination, variation and migration of SMP Services, with no 
distinction between orders coming from the Operators and from Telecom’s 
commercial functions” (Telecom Italia, 2008, para. 1.1). The implication is that 
the same products and services are provided, and informal discussions with 
Operators in Italy have suggested this is the case.  
 
Before the structural separation of Chorus, it also operated under a set of 
Undertakings between TCNZ and the regulator in which Equivalence of Input was 
defined in almost the same manner as in the UK Undertakings, including the 
qualification that “the same means exactly the same!” (TCNZ, 2009, Clause 1.2). 
Now that Chorus is a separate company, it has a defined product set that is 
available to all wholesale customers meaning that TCNZ and other customers 
have access to the same products. 
 
Skanova is positioned as a separate infrastructure company that provides 
services “on the same commercial terms to both TeliaSonera's own end-
customer business in Sweden and to other operators”57 but it is unclear if the 
same products and services are used by TeliaSonera and other operators. For 
example, it is unclear if Skanova provides LLU to TeliaSonera or whether a 
different (internal) product is provided. 
 
Openreach tends to comply with the objective of providing the same product. 
However, there is one caveat. BT’s competitors (for example Sky and TalkTalk) 
tend to use fully unbundled local loops (known as Metallic Path Facility (MPF)). 
BT, however, uses a combination of Shared MPF (SMPF) and WLR for largely 
historic reasons. Therefore BT and its competitors do not use exactly the same 
input but it is generally considered that BT gains no competitive advantage from 
this distinction and its competitors do therefore not consider it a problem. Further, 
although competitors do not use SMPF and WLR, both products are available to 
them should that combination be more efficient than MPF in a particular 
exchange. 
 
Same timescales, terms and conditions 
 
Paragraph 1.1 from the 2008 Italian Commitments suggests that products would 
be delivered to all operators on the same timescales and under the same terms 
and conditions However, as will be discussed later, the processes used for 
delivery to Telecom Italia and its competitors are different and therefore it is 
highly likely that these feature of EoI are not met. In particular, costs appear to be 
allocated differently, which could result in different prices. 
 
No information is available on whether these conditions are met in Sweden. 
                                                
57 ibid 
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Same processes and systems 
 
The main area in which the Italian Commitments vary from EoI is the systems 
and processes that OA uses for providing access services to its retail divisions 
are different from the systems and processes used for providing services to its 
competitors, as illustrated in Figure 15. Specifically, whilst Telecom Italia’s own 
retail operations interface directly with Open Access, its competitors first must 
place orders, etc., through Telecom Italia Wholesale. 
 
Figure 15: Wholesale access provision for TI Retail and competitor service 
orders 
 
(Telecom Italia, 2009) 
 
(Note: OLO is an acronym for “Other Licensed Operator”, meaning a telecoms 
company other than Telecom Italia. An OLO is referred to in this thesis as an 
entrant.) 
 
According to Nucciarelli and Sadowski (2010, p.388), the fact that competitors 
ask for services through Wholesale “implies that the degree of cost transparency 
provided by Open Access is lower than that guaranteed by Decision 
152/02/CONS”. This happens because OA not only provides copper lines that 
are subject to natural monopoly, but also the active services based on those 
copper lines and the additional costs of these active elements can be allocated to 
OA.  
 
Nucciarelli and Sadowski also make the point that competitors pay the entire cost 
of the wholesale division. TI Retail interacts directly with OA and so does not pick 
up any costs of Wholesale. However, OA’s costs are attributed to both Retail and 
Wholesale. Thus competitors’ costs are raised above those of TI Retail. If they 
are correct in this analysis, then this implies that entrants are likely to pay a 




The structure also allows OA to distinguish and, therefore, discriminate between 
the orders coming from TI retail and its competitors. For example, TI has, 
allegedly, repeatedly refused to activate wholesale access services to Operators 
by rejecting the orders because of technical reasons - the so called “KO” 
(Antitrust proceeding A 428 - still proceeding).  
Further, the access services are not provided to competitors and to TI on the 
same timescale. Whereas TI retail directly interacts with Open Access for 
technical/commercial provision of the access services, competitors have to 
interact with TI wholesale first which, in turn, interacts with OA, as indicated in 
Figure 15. The result is that process lead-time is longer for competitors’ requests, 
whose orders have to be processed by TI Wholesale first before being sent to OA 
for delivery process. This affords TI the opportunity to discriminate in favour of its 
own retail customers.  
 
For example, Antitrust proceeding A 426, closed in June 2012 with the 
acceptance of a set of commitments from TI, concerned Different Service Level 
Agreements between TI and Other Licensed Operators (OLOs). The level of 
assurance provided to TI Retail was found to be more favourable than the level 
provided to OLOs. 
 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Commitments concern establishing a performance 
monitoring system and transparency of the monitoring system respectively. 
According to paragraphs 3.2.2, 4.8 and 4.9, Telecom Italia must analyse the 
performance for internal and external access seekers separately and must 
publish the data on a quarterly and annual basis on a website dedicated to 
Operators58 
 
However, TI Retail and Operators follow different processes in their interaction 
with OA, meaning that the KPIs provided by Telecom Italia compare different 
processes. Whilst it may still be possible to compare outcomes, this does mean 
that the only equivalence is that of outcomes not inputs.  
 
There is no information available concerning the processes used by either 
Skanova or Chorus and whether these are the same for all customers.  
4.6.3 Outcomes 
 
Data are not available to compare the outcomes of the various approaches to 
separation and EoI on the same basis as will later be done for the UK. However, 
it is possible to track the development of market shares at retail level and, for 
some countries, at wholesale level. 
 
In Italy, Telecom Italia remains the largest broadband provider at retail level. 
According to the European Commission, at the end of 2013 its market share 
stood at 51.4%, down from 60% in 2008 but still some nine percentage points 
                                                
58 www.wholesale-telecomitalia.it 
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above the average of an incumbent operator in the EU (European Commission, 
2013B). The number of LLU lines has increased from 2 million in 2007 to 5.3 
million at the end of 2013, respectively 20% and 38% of the total number of 
broadband lines. 
 
Overall, the Commitments have not been as effective at preventing discriminatory 
behaviour as they may appear to be in principle. In June 2010 the Italian 
Competition Authority (AGCM) launched an investigation concerning Telecom 
Italia’s discriminatory behaviour. The complaint concerned the high number of 
rejections of rivals’ requests for activations of wholesale access lines to provide 
services to end users, referred to as “technical boycotting”.  
 
AGCM found that between 2009 and 2011 TI had unfairly rejected a number of 
requests for activation of wholesale services. It had also discriminated against 
requests coming from other operators by obstructing competitors' access to its 
infrastructure and making service access activations significantly more difficult. 
As a result the AGCM imposed a fine of €88.2m on TI. 
 
TCNZ’s share of the retail broadband market has declined substantially since 
2007, from 70% to 49%, but has flattened off since 2011, as shown in Figure 16. 
There are insufficient data to attempt to determine any causal link between the 
operation and then structural separation of TCNZ and market shares, however, it 
should be noted that the decline in the market share of TCNZ had begun before 
the New Zealand Undertakings came into effect. 
 
Figure 16: TCNZ Broadband Market Share 2007 - 2013 
 
      (Commerce Commission, 2014 and earlier versions) 
 
The number of unbundled local loops has increased massively since 2008, as 
shown in Figure 17. However, at 120,000 lines this represents less than 10% of 
broadband lines, which compares poorly with EU countries such as France and 
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Figure 17: Unbundled Local Loops in New Zealand 
 
        (Commerce Commission, 2013) 
 
In Sweden, TeliaSonera’s share of the retail market has remained static at 
around 39% since 2009 (PTS, 2014, fig. 20). Copper-based broadband access 
using DSL accounts for just 44% of all broadband lines in Sweden, well below the 
EU average of 72%. Of the three million DSL lines, around 400,000 are LLU 
lines.59  
4.6.4 Summary on Other Countries 
 
In two of the three cases of business separation reviewed above, the firm 
remains intact with the upstream monopoly business unit remaining an operating 
division or, in the case of Skanova, a subsidiary within the group. The separation 
terms impose various constraints on the regulated firm, for example management 
incentives based only on the performance of the upstream business and 
restricted communication between the functionally separate entities. However, as 
it does not “modify the allocation of property rights” it is more properly considered 
a behavioural remedy. In only one case, New Zealand did the firm structurally 
separate and then voluntarily, rather than as a regulatory requirement. 
 
Further, functional separation is a means to an end and not an end in itself 
(Cadman, 2010; Howell, 2010; Krämer and Schnurr, 2014). The end it is trying to 
achieve is deterrence of price and non-price discrimination by the vertically 
integrated firm, and thereby creation of the conditions for effective competition in 
retail markets. Open Access, Skanova and Openreach are all under various non-
discrimination obligations in an attempt to achieve this aim by changing 
incentives to a greater or lesser extent. This obligation also does not affect 
property rights and so is very clearly a behavioural remedy. 
 
By contrast TCNZ decided to create separate companies so that the upstream 
company, Chorus, could participate in the UFB project, which it would not have 
                                                
59 Based on European Commission Data in “Broadband Indicators” available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/fast-and-ultra-fast-internet-access-analysis-and-data. 
Downloaded 9 January 2015.  
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been able to do had it remained a part of TCNZ and so integrated with a retail 
business. 
4.7 Other Sectors 
The electronic communications sector is not the only one that has faced the 
problem of discrimination by a vertically integrated firm with market power 
upstream. In this subsection, the approach taken in the UK gas market and the 
electricity supply market in England and Wales are examined. 
4.7.1 British Gas 
 
Until 1982 the British Gas Corporation (BGC), a nationalised industry, had a 
statutory monopoly on the purchase of gas from the North Sea basin, although 
the gas fields themselves were developed by private sector businesses. BGC 
retained that right until 1982 when it was ended by the Oil and Gas Enterprise 
Act (Weir, 1999). The 1982 Act also introduced potential competition to retail gas, 
although this was limited to large industrial and commercial users.  
 
Gas supply was privatised under the Gas Act 1986. BGC, which became British 
Gas plc, was privatised as a fully vertically integrated company involved in the 
extraction, storage, distribution and supply of gas. British Gas remained a 
licensed monopoly except for customers using more than 25,000 therms per 
year, reduced to 2,500 therms by 1990. However, competitive access was left to 
entrants to negotiate with British Gas, although they could appeal to the sector 
regulator, Ofgas. Between 1982 and 1990 there were ten attempts to secure 
access, all unsuccessful (Newbery, 2001). 
 
In 1987 the OFT referred the supply of gas through pipes to non-tariff customers 
to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). These were customers 
using more than 25,000 therms per annum and were therefore industrial users. 
The MMC found “extensive discrimination by BG in the pricing and supply of gas 
to contract customers” which it attributed to “the existence of a monopoly 
situation and operates or may be expected to operate against the public interest 
in a number of respects (MMC, 1988, 1.3). The MMC identified three specific 
ways in which BG was able to harm consumers and the broader public interest. 
First, price discrimination imposed a higher cost on users less well placed to use 
alternative fuels. Secondly, “BG’s policy of relating prices to those of alternatives 
available to each customer places it in a position selectively to undercut potential 
competing gas suppliers” (MMC, 1988, 1.3). Such behaviour could, according to 
the MMC, restrict the development of competition in the market. Thirdly, the lack 
of transparency created uncertainty about future prices in the minds of customers 
leading to increased risk. 
 
 
The MMC made a number of specific recommendations. Specifically in relation to 
prices it proposed that BG should: 
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“1) Publish a schedule of prices at which it is prepared to supply gas 
to contract customers and not to discriminate in pricing or supply; 
and 
 2) Publish further information on common carriage terms such that a 
potential customer could make a reasonable estimate of the 
charge that would be sought by BG.” (MMC, 1988, 1.6). 
 
A further reference was made in 1992 requiring the MMC to investigate two 
subjects: the supply of gas through pipes to tariff and non-tariff customers, and 
the conveyance of gas by public gas suppliers.  
 
The MMC reported in 1993 and found that British Gas plc’s ownership of both 
transport and trading led to “an inherent conflict of interest which makes it 
impossible to provide the necessary conditions for self-sustaining competition” 
(MMC, 1993, 1.6). British Gas was found to have used its market power to deter 
entry and competition (Newbery, 2001) and the failure to separate out 
transportation and trading costs made it impossible to treat BG Trading on an 
equal footing with rival traders (Stoppard, 1993). The MMC recommended that 
the trading activity of British Gas should be divested from the rest of the company 
leaving British Gas with just transport and storage to ensure equal access to 
these services by downstream competitors (MMC, 1993, 1.11). However, the 
Department of Trade and Industry rejected this proposal in favour of accounting 
separation. 
 
Competition for domestic customers was first introduced in the southwest in April 
1996, extending to all parts of the country by May 1998 and the UK was the first 
country in the world to introduce competition in gas supply (Hancock and 
Waddams Price, 1996).  
 
In 1997 British Gas voluntarily separated along the lines proposed by the MMC in 
1993. Most of the assets were transferred to BG plc, which owns the onshore 
pipeline and storage systems and Exploration and Production. The trading arm, 
British Gas Trading, became part of the newly formed Centrica plc.  
 
The degree of competitiveness in the gas market is still open to question. Some 
top level numbers would indicate that there has been an increase in competition. 
In 1996, Centrica supplied 19 million domestic customers. By 2000, about 30% of 
customers had switched suppliers saving around 15% on their annual gas bill 
(Newbery, 2001) and by September 2013 Centrica’s market share had fallen 
below 40% (Ofgem, 2014). 
 
However, in June 2014 the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) opened an 
investigation into the energy markets, including gas and electricity supply, 
following a referral by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, the governing 
body of Ofgem. The terms of reference for the investigation state: 
 
“The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a feature or a combination of features of the market or 
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markets for the Supply and Acquisition of Energy in Great Britain 
prevents, restricts or distorts competition.” (CMA, 2014) 
 
The CMA states that there are broad public concerns about prices and quality of 
service in energy markets that justify the market investigation. The CMA is 
scheduled to report its findings in December 2015. Whether the CMA 
investigates vertical relationships remains to be seen.   
 
4.7.2 The English and Welsh Electricity Supply Sector 
 
The English and Welsh electricity supply sector has been the subject of 
substantial regulatory and structural change over the past 25 years. The brief 
review below considers only whether the unbundling of the sector has been 
beneficial. 
 
Electricity supply consists of four activities: generation, high tension transmission, 
local distribution and retail. High tension transmission and local distribution have 
the characteristics of natural monopoly. Until the Electricity Act 1989, generation 
and transmission in England and Wales were operated by the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) and twelve regional Boards acted as local distribution 
and retail monopolies. The CEGB and the 12 Boards were all state-owned.  
 
The 1989 Act divided the CEGB into four separate companies: National Power, 
PowerGen, Nuclear Electric and the National Grid Company (NGC). The 12 
Boards were turned into limited companies and jointly owned NGC. 
NationalPower and PowerGen were floated on the stock market in two tranches: 
the first in March 1991 and the second in March 1995. Competition was gradually 
introduced in the supply market such that by 1998 all households and businesses 
were able to purchase electricity from competing operators.  
 
The original scheme was for an almost completely unbundled industry with no 
vertical integration. However, this strict unbundling has been compromised in 
recent years as generators have entered the retail market. For example RWE 
npower is both a generator and retailer with around 5.4 million business and 
residential customers. The national grid, however, does remain a separate 
business that is not active in generation, distribution or retail.  
 
Pollitt (2008) assesses the benefits of ownership unbundling of energy 
transmission networks. He concludes that the creation of an Independent 
Transmission System Operator (ITSO), the National Grid, was a “highly 
successful reform with competition in generation and a fall of 30% in real 
transmission charges” between 1993 and 2005, although this reduction was also 
promoted by incentive regulation. He also finds there was little evidence that 
investment in transmission was adversely affected by unbundling. Finally, he 
finds that the top six countries ranked by level of switching by small and very 
small household customer all had ITSOs.  
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Paul Joskow is also generally positive about the reform of the electricity sector in 
England and Wales, describing it as “the gold standard for electricity reform” 
However, he also recognises that not everything worked perfectly. He says that 
the decision to create only three generating companies led to significant market 
power problems that persisted for several years. He also describes retail 
competition as only “reasonably successful” and says that the benefits of 
extending competition to retail customers may not have been worth the costs 
(Joskow, 2008, p. 15 - 16). 
 
The overall success of the reforms to the electricity supply market in England and 
Wales are likely to become clearer by the end of 2015. Electricity supply is 
subject to the same market investigation by the CMA as gas, suggesting that 
problems remain in the market, such that it is not working in the interests of 
consumers. 
4.8 Lessons from Other Countries and Sectors 
The approaches to separation taken by the other countries and sectors reviewed 
here were all designed to address the same problem: the ability of the vertically 
integrated firms to harm its rivals through non-price discrimination. However, 
each country and sector has adopted different methods, reflecting specific 
national and sectorial circumstances. Telecom New Zealand went furthest to 
ensure that its separated upstream division could benefit from state funds to 
invest in ultra-fast broadband. At the other extreme, Telecom Italia’s separation 
was minimal and the Open Access division remained part of Technology Division 
rather than becoming a separate business unit. Telia, in Sweden, introduced 
legal separation itself before it was forced to do so by law. The UK electricity 
sector was separated at privatisation, but has since seen some re-integration. 
 
These different approaches make it difficult to draw general conclusions and 
lessons that could be applied elsewhere. A sceptic might suggest that in all cases 
the vertically integrated operator did just enough to avoid more drastic structural 
remedies being imposed on them. Alternatively, it may be that the degree of 
separation simply reflected national circumstances and the place that each firm 
started from. It is also the case that there are many countries that have not seen 
the need for any form of separation, beyond accounting separation. 
Unfortunately, consistent data are not available to compare the outcomes to 
determine whether one approach is better or not.  
 
All one can realistically conclude, therefore, is that each country and sector that 
faces a potential problem of non-price discrimination by a vertically integrated 
operator needs to draw its own conclusion as to the appropriate model of 
separation based on national and sectorial circumstances. There is nothing in the 
evidence here that there is a single “best approach” that could be adopted by any 
country regardless of their starting point. Rather regulators and firms should 
examine how other countries and sectors have approached the problem, but 
should also consider the best approach for their country and sector.  
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4.9 Conclusions from Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 has set out a history of the actions taken by Ofcom to overcome the 
perceived level of non-price discrimination exerted by BT against its rivals in the 
UK broadband market. It has also briefly examined similar actions taken by other 
regulators in the telecoms sector internationally and in other sectors in the UK. 
The chapter has pointed out that it would be wrong to consider functional 
separation as the only change imposed on BT in 2005. It was also subject to the 
specifically ex ante form of non-discrimination known as Equivalence of Input and 
a substantial price cut in LLU. 
 
Ofcom’s actions were more draconian that the equivalent actions taken by other 
EU regulators. Neither Telia nor Telecom Italia were subject to the same level of 
separation nor, and more importantly, to Equivalence of Input. The UK, therefore, 
appears to have taken the strongest actions to deter discrimination and amend 
the incumbent operator’s incentives. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis will explore whether the actions taken by Ofcom 
have been successful. 
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5 Empirical Analysis 1: Market Entry via Local Loop Unbundling  
 
This thesis has explored the economic principles and market structure issues 
behind Ofcom’s decision to impose Equivalence of Inputs (EoI)  and functional 
separation on BT. The objectives of these reforms were to strengthen the non-
discrimination obligation and to reduce the incentives for BT to behave in a 
discriminatory manner, and thus encourage competitive entry lower down the 
value chain. This section considers empirically whether the package of measures 
was successful at reducing the expected costs of non-price discrimination, 
leading to increased entry by service providers using Local Loop Unbundling 
(LLU) as the wholesale input bought from BT. The analysis here concentrates on 
the wholesale market only and does not seek to measure the effects at the 
consumer level60.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. 
 
Section 5.1 sets out two potential methods for measuring the level of 
discrimination in broadband markets. The first proposed measure is the 
proportion of LLU to all forms of competitive copper access (CCA). It suggests 
that the higher the proportion of LLU, the lower the cost of discrimination. The 
second proposed measure is the location of marginal exchange, i.e. the 
exchange where the entrant is indifferent between entry using LLU and using 
BSA. It concludes with two hypotheses: that the regulatory reforms of 2005 (i) 
increased the LLU:CCA ratio and (ii) changed the marginal exchange to one with 
fewer premises than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
Section 5.2 tests the first hypothesis using an induced diffusion model based on 
Davies and Diaz-Rainey (2011). It concludes that a simple graphical 
representation of the timing of the Undertakings, the price cut and the diffusion of 
LLU:CCA suggests a causal link. However, it is not possible using such a model 
to determine such a relationship econometrically, in part because only the UK 
introduced such reforms so there are no countries to compare it with. 
 
Section 5.3 deploys a breakeven model to determine the location of the marginal 
exchange before and after the price cut. This is found to have moved by 847 
exchanges and to have added a further 9% of households to the economically 
viable area to unbundle. The section uses the same model to estimate the cost of 
discrimination before 2005. It locates the marginal exchange by taking the 
characteristics of the actual unbundled exchanges and applying an adjustment to 
exclude smaller exchanges that may have been too small to be unbundled 
economically. The first adjustment places the marginal exchange one standard 
deviation from the mean number of premises and the second assumes the 
marginal exchange is at the 10th percentile from the smallest. These adjustments 
are applied to both 2003 and 2004. With these adjustments the cost of 
discrimination is estimated at between £495 and £1,323 per exchange reducing 
                                                
60 These effects have been addressed elsewhere, for example. Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven 
(2012) and Sidak and Vassallo (2014). 
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the number of exchanges that could be unbundled to between 640 and 1,309. 
This section therefore separates the effect of the Undertakings and the price cut 
on the number of exchanges that could be unbundled economically.  
 
Section 5.4 presents a short comparison with the situation in France where the 
LLU:CCA ratio increased at the same rate as the UK but grew much earlier. 
 
Once the effects of the Undertakings and price reductions on entry by LLU have 
been established, the thesis then goes on to examine in Chapter 6 whether BT’s 
decision to upgrade its network to Next Generation Access (NGA) was affected 
more by the presence of service providers using LLU or by the presence of the 
cable operator, Virgin Media. In this way, the thesis assesses both the short- and 
long-term effects of the Undertakings on the development of the broadband 
market in the UK. 
5.1 Measuring Discrimination in Broadband Markets 
Section 2.4 referred to the theory of raising rivals’ costs (RRC) and how a 
dominant infra-marginal supplier could, through non-price discrimination, seek to 
raise the costs of the marginal supplier above the market price and so attempt to 
exclude marginal suppliers from the market. Arrow described discrimination as 
“some characteristic of an employee other than productivity that would account in 
difference in wages for the same job” (Arrow, 1973). Arrow’s example was black 
and white steel workers. Discrimination in this case would be relatively easy to 
observe and to measure: the difference in wages between black and white 
workers, assuming all other things are equal.  
 
Unfortunately no such observable, much less measurable, indicator of 
discrimination exists in the broadband access market, and in particular there is 
no observable measure of non-price discrimination. This sub-section proposes 
two measures of non-price discrimination: first the ratio of unbundled local loops 
to all copper-based broadband access lines supplied by BT’s competitors and, 
secondly, the location of the marginal exchange. 
5.1.1 LLU as a Proportion of Competitive Copper Access 
 
As has been explained above, LLU is considered superior to bitstream because it 
allows a greater degree of innovation by entrants and the ratio of fixed to variable 
costs allows the entrant to earn higher profits, or offer lower prices, once it 
obtains scale in each exchange. However, there are higher barriers to entry for 
LLU, due to the fixed costs and so the entrant would be less willing to enter via 
LLU if it considered the incumbent would discriminate against it. By contrast, 
bitstream does not allow innovation and has no economies of scale, but barriers 
to entry and exit are lower. The entrant also retains an option to upgrade to LLU if 
realising this option is expected to be more profitable.  
 
The assumption, therefore, is that the entrant would always prefer LLU to 
bitstream provided that it can gain sufficient scale in each exchange area and 
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that there are no market distortions. This is because the entrant’s average costs 
using bitstream are constant, whereas they are constantly falling if it can use LLU 
up to the capacity of their exchange-based equipment61. Once it achieves a 
certain scale, therefore, its average cost of LLU will be lower than for bitstream. 
LLU also provides the opportunity for the entrant to differentiate its service from 
that of the incumbent and its other rivals.  
 
However, in the presence or expectation of discrimination, which raises the 
entrant’s costs, it would be more likely to prefer bitstream. This is because 
discrimination can be considered a cost that raises the economic barrier to entry 
and would require the entrant to sell more lines to recover those fixed costs (Xiao 
and Orazem, 2011). If the entrant is uncertain as to whether those costs can be 
recovered, or indeed what the level of that cost might be, it could take the low risk 
option and not enter via LLU but remain with bitstream. 
 
Entrants’ decisions regarding which input product to use are observable in the 
whole geographic market by the number of LLU and bitstream lines. Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, the proportion of competitive copper access (CCA), i.e. copper 
broadband access lines provided by entrants only, accounted for by LLU is a 
measure of discrimination. The higher the ratio, the lower the level of 
discrimination and vice versa. 
5.1.2 The Location of the Marginal Exchange 
 
There are 5,581 telephone exchanges in the UK of varying sizes, measured by 
total premises connected to the exchange, and varying population densities. The 
total number of premises and the population density can be taken as proxies for 
the potential revenues and costs of entering the exchange. Thus these 
exchanges are heterogeneously profitable. An entrant must decide between 
three methods when choosing whether and how to enter the market: it could build 
its own network (facilities), enter via LLU or via bitstream (services). A fourth 
option would be not to enter the exchange area at all. In principle this decision 
could be made separately in each exchange area, i.e. it could choose its own 
infrastructure at exchange i and bitstream at exchange j. Ranking the exchange 
from the smallest as number 1 to the largest at 5,581, the marginal exchange is 
defined as the exchange at which the entrant is indifferent between one entry 
method and another. 
 
In an undistorted market, a profit-maximising entrant would make the choice 
between facilities- or services-based entry on the basis of expected profits from 
each alternative. Baranes and Bourreau (2005) describe the decision between 
facilities-based entry and services-based entry formally as: 
 
 𝜋! − 𝐹   ≥   𝜋! 𝑟 − 𝑓 ( 1 ) 
 
                                                
61 A firm entering the market via LLU has to place its own equipment in the local exchange to 
provide a broadband service. This exchange equipment has a maximum capacity of lines it can 
support and once that capacity is reached, further equipment needs to be installed. 
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Where πF is the gross profit from facilities-based competition, F is the fixed cost 
of the facility, πS is the gross profit from service competition, r is rental cost of the 
line and f is a fixed fee. Baranes and Bourreau assume that 𝜋! 𝑟  is decreasing 
in r.  
 
The concern of this thesis is the choice between forms of CCA, specifically 
between LLU and bitstream, as it was this form of entry that was the concern of 
Ofcom’s regulatory changes in 2005.  
 
A firm choosing some form of CCA will make the decision regarding which form 
of CCA at the telephone exchange area level. Generally speaking exchange 
areas that have more premises and are more densely populated will be 
unbundled (i.e. the entrant will buy LLU), whilst in exchange areas with fewer 
premises and that are less densely populated the entrant will be more likely to 
enter via bitstream access. This is because an entrant using LLU must invest in 
capital equipment to install at the exchange so that each unbundled line can be 
conditioned to carry a broadband signal. By contrast, bitstream entry has no 
capital cost, but a higher variable, per line, cost.62 
 
Baranes and Bourreau’s inequality can therefore be re-configured to illustrate the 
decision between LLU and BSA on an exchange-by-exchange basis, as 
 
 𝜋!!!"(𝑟!!") − 𝐹! ≥   𝜋!!"# 𝑟!"# − 𝑓!!"# ( 2 ) 
The entrant will invest in LLU at exchange i when the profits from LLU given the 
rental cost of the unbundled local loop minus the fixed costs of LLU are greater 
than the profits less the variable costs of BSA. The marginal exchange, i.e. the 
exchange where the entrant is indifferent between LLU and BSA, is located 
where the inequality becomes an equality. As with equation ( 1 ), 𝜋!!!"(𝑟!!") is 
decreasing in r. 
 
The location of the marginal exchange may be affected by both static and 
dynamic considerations and by the entrant’s experience of the market. 
 
Statically, the marginal exchange would be located where the profits from LLU 
exceed the profits from BSA whilst the end product as used by the consumer 
remains unchanged. The entrant would base its decision on which exchanges to 
unbundle based on the total costs of BSA and LLU given the expected number of 
customers in the exchange area. The choice is based on the average cost of 
serving each customer dependent on the combination of fixed and variable costs 
for LLU and the variable costs of bitstream.  
 
However, as discussed earlier, LLU provides the entrant with the opportunity to 
differentiate its product from competitors, including the incumbent. The entrant 
                                                
62 This expectation was examined by Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2012) who found that “a 
sufficiently large market size is important to recover the fixed costs [of unbundling].” (Nardotto et 
al., 2012, p.16) 
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installs its own equipment in the exchange and so can control the bandwidth offer 
to the customer along with other quality metrics such as contention ratios63. 
Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven examined line speeds available in unbundled and 
non-unbundled exchanges. They conclude “Users who subscribed to an LLU 
operator have a connection speed that is about 18.6% higher than that provided 
by BT” (Nardotto et al., 2012, p. 24).  
 
Nardotto et al’s finding is supported by Figure 18, which shows the correlation 
between the diffusion of LLU as a proportion of CCA and the average broadband 
speed in the UK (Cadman, 2015, p. 199).  
 
An Internet Service Provider (ISP) entering via LLU, at least in some exchanges, 
is therefore likely to consider the higher profits it might earn from providing a 
better service to customers than it could do if it was basing its service on BSA or 
RA. 
 
Finally, entrants learn about the market as they gain experience. They may begin 
with one view of the location of the marginal exchange, but adapt that view over 
time, potentially in both directions, as they learn more about their costs and 
revenues. In other words, they do not begin the process of investment with 
perfect foresight of either their costs or market potential and will adjust their 
investment decisions as they learn more. 
 
Figure 18: Relationship between LLU:CCA and Access Speed in UK 
 
 
Entrants’ choice of LLU versus bitstream may also be affected by the expectation 
of strategic behaviour by the incumbent operator, in particular attempts to 
discriminate. Just as the entrant learns about the market with experience, the 
incumbent also learns how the market responds to competition and may change 
                                                
63 The proportion of total customers that can access the service at the same time. Broadband 
providers would normally assume that not all customers are on-line simultaneously and so 
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its strategic choices with that learning. The costs of strategic behaviour can be 
considered as “sunk costs” in that they cannot be recovered in the event of exit 
from the market by the entrant (Xiao and Orazem, 2011).  
 
Although the incumbent may have the ability and incentive to discriminate against 
entrants on all CCA platforms, the cost of discrimination for the entrant on LLU 
would be greater than on BSA. This would be the case because the entrant faces 
higher barriers to entry when using LLU: it has to invest in its own capital 
equipment at the exchange and therefore needs to obtain a minimum level of 
subscribers per exchange at the market price to recover its investment. Any 
discrimination that made it more difficult to compete against the incumbent would 
therefore have a more detrimental effect and could leave the entrant with assets 
on which it cannot make a reasonable return.  
 
If this is the case, then Baranes and Bourreau’s inequality can be adapted still 
further to incorporate the cost of discrimination (D) as shown below. 
 
 𝜋!!!"(𝑟!!") − 𝐹! +   𝐷!!" ≥   𝜋!!"# 𝑟!"# − (𝑓!!"# + 𝐷!"#) ( 3 ) 
 
The effect of D would be to raise the overall costs of each of LLU and BSA but to 
leave the breakeven quantity the same. The fixed costs of market entry are 
economic barriers to entry64, whereas D is an antitrust barrier to entry, defined as 
“a cost that delays entry and thereby reduces social welfare relative to immediate 
but equally costly entry” (McAfee et al., 2004, p. 463). It should also be noted that 𝑓!!"# could be zero, if there are no fixed costs of BSA, as is the case later in this 
chapter. 
Referring back to Figure 3 from Scheffman (1992), D is the amount by which 
marginal producers’ costs are raised by the strategic behaviour of the dominant 
infra-marginal firm to reduce the number of exchanges the rival enters rather than 
the quantity it produces. In the language of Arrow, it is the difference between the 
wages of white and black steel workers for reasons other than productivity.  
 
The incumbent could discriminate more aggressively against competitors it 
regards as strong and less aggressively against weaker competitors, thus raising 
the costs of strong entrants by more than those of weak entrants. Whilst this 
possibility is recognised, it is not explored empirically in this thesis due to the 
terms on which data have been provided by firms in the market, which require the 
data to be aggregated.  
 
Two hypotheses follow from the preceding analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of CCA accounted by LLU is a measure of the 
effectiveness of non-discrimination policies by the regulator: the higher the 
proportion the more effective the regulator at deterring discrimination. The 2005 
                                                
64 Defined in McAfee et al. (2004) as “a cost that must be incurred by a new entrant and that 
incumbents do not or have not had to incur” (p. 463). 
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reforms led to an increase in the ratio of LLU:CCA. This hypothesis assumes that 
the wholesale price and quality of BSA remain constant. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The location of the marginal exchange for entry by LLU, measured 
by characteristics of the area that is likely to make the exchange more profitable, 
is an indicator of the entrant’s expected costs of discrimination. The size of the 
marginal exchange, measured by the number of premises in the exchange area, 
will have become smaller following the 2005 reforms. 
5.2 LLU as a Proportion of CCA 
This subsection examines hypothesis 1: that the 2005 reforms caused an 
increase in the ratio of LLU:CCA. Figure 19 plots the diffusion of LLU:CCA (right 
hand scale) and the development of LLU prices (left hand scale) over the period 
2003 – 2010 in the UK. The vertical line marks the point at which the 
Undertakings were agreed between BT and Ofcom. 
 
This chart strongly suggests that ISPs responded to the price cut and the 
Undertakings by increasing their use of LLU to service broadband customers, 
replacing their bitstream connections. However, in itself it does not prove a 
causal relationship and it also raises the question of whether ISPs were 
responding to the price cut or the Undertakings, or both.  
 
Figure 19: LLU Price, Undertakings and Diffusion 
 
 
It is also clear from the chart that the rate of change of LLU:CCA follows a form of 
S-shaped diffusion. To attempt to assess whether the development of LLU:CCA 
resulted from Ofcom’s interventions, this thesis now adopts the relatively new 
approach of induced diffusion to assess whether Ofcom’s actions affected the 
rate of diffusion. An alternative explanation for the growth of LLU will be 
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5.2.1 Diffusion and Induced Diffusion of Innovations 
 
The diffusion of innovations has been widely studied (Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 
1962; Bass, 1969; and Davies, 1979). The essence of diffusion is that an 
innovation is adopted by a market at a rate proportionate to the existing number 
of users and the maximum number of potential adopters of the technology. It can 
be simply expressed as: 
 𝑃𝑒𝑛! =    𝑃𝑒𝑛∗1 +   𝑒(! !!!!!! ) 
 
Where Pent is the penetration of an innovation at time t and Pen* is the ceiling or 
equilibrium penetration of the innovation. The coefficient a shifts the diffusion 
curve forwards or backwards without changing its shape and b is the rate of 
change of the slope at a given time. 
 
Geroski (2000) provides a particularly useful review of the literature and refers to 
four types of diffusion model: epidemic, probit, legitimation and competition, and 
information cascades.  
 
The basic premise of the epidemic model, the type most appropriate to this 
thesis, is that information diffusion drives technology diffusion. A small group of 
early adopters of a new technology acquire their information from a central 
source before experience and knowledge of the new technology spreads through 
the rest of potential user population (imitators). At first there is a small proportion 
of the population who adopt the new technology but the number of users 
increases rapidly until information is nearly universal, at which point further 
adoption slows. This pattern of knowledge diffusion leads to the ‘S’ shaped curve. 
 
In the epidemic model, Geroski, like Davies (1979), identifies two diffusion 
functions: type A and type B (Figure 20)65. In the type A function, information 
about the innovation is spread from a central source reaching α% of the 
population of non-users in any time period. The smaller the value of α, the slower 
the rate of diffusion and therefore the longer the time period needed for the 
innovation to be widely adopted. 
 
Type B diffusion relies on some form of information dissemination amongst 
potential users, e.g. word of mouth. Each existing user independently contacts a 
non-user with a probability β. It is this spread of knowledge that leads to the ‘S’ 
shaped curve. However, Geroski points out a serious weakness of this model: it 
cannot explain the diffusion of an innovation from the date it is invented, only 
from the date that the first users have adopted the innovation.  
 
 
                                                
65 Later in this paper we will see that broadband appears to have been adopted at rates that match 
both type A and type B diffusion.  
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Figure 20: Type A and Type B Diffusion Curves 
 
 
A particularly well-known epidemic model was developed by Bass (1969). He 
identifies a “coefficient of innovation” and a “coefficient of imitation”. Innovators, 
in Bass’s terminology, are purchasers who are not influenced in the timing of their 
purchasing decision by the number of people who have already bought the 
product. Imitators, in contrast, are influenced and so “learn’ from those who have 
already purchased. His basic model is:  
 𝑆 𝑇 =   𝑝𝑚 + 𝑞 − 𝑝 𝑌 𝑇 − 𝑞𝑚 𝑌!(𝑇) 
 
Where S = sales, T = Time, p = the coefficient of innovation, q = the coefficient of 
imitation, Y = total sales and m = is the total number purchasing during the period 
for which the density function was constructed. To estimate the parameters, Bass 
employs the analogue: 
 𝑆! = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑌!!! + 𝑐𝑌!!!!  
 
Where St = cumulative sales at T and Yt-1 = cumulative sales through period T-1. 
 
The theory of diffusion has been taken forward by the study of “induced diffusion” 
(Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2002). The principle behind induced diffusion is that 
policy makers wish to see either a higher ceiling, or equilibrium level, of adoption 
of a technology or a more rapid take-up of that technology. Diaz-Rainey defines 
induced diffusion as: 
 
“Any intervention that aims to alter the speed and/or total level of adoption 
of an innovation by directly or indirectly internalising positive and/or 
negative externalities.” (Diaz-Rainey, 2009, p. 6) 
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Interventions aimed at inducing diffusion are usually mandated, or at least 
inspired, by government or independent regulators. Such interventions are aimed 
at changing individuals’ and businesses’ choices by altering the economic 
attractiveness of one option over another (Diaz-Rainey, 2009).  
 
Induced diffusion has particularly been widely researched in the energy sector 
where governments have sought to promote environmentally “friendly” 
technologies, such as wind energy. Davies and Diaz-Rainey (2011) empirically 
examine induced diffusion of wind energy in the OECD countries. They use both 
the logistic and Bass forms of diffusion to determine whether there has been a 
policy effect on the take up of wind energy using equations 4 and 5 for the logistic 
and Bass curves respectively. 
 
 𝑃 𝑡 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑡1 − 𝑃 𝑡 = 𝑏𝑃(𝑡)   ( 4 ) 
 
 𝑃 𝑡 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑡1 − 𝑃 𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃(𝑡) ( 5 ) 
 
The parameter a captures external effects In the Bass equation, and the logistic 
curve is a special case of the Bass curve where a = 0. The parameter P(t) is the 
proportionate percentage penetrate/diffusion relative to some saturation level. 
The constant 1 suggests that the saturation level is 100%, although a lower 
saturation level is used in the empirical part of their paper. 
 
Davies and Diaz-Rainey set out four propositions, the first and third of which are 
relevant to this thesis: 
 
“Proposition 1: Wind energy is a complex and expensive technology that 
ceteris paribus should display a Type B diffusion curve, i.e. symmetric S-
shaped, as described by the logistic or cumulative normal curve. 
 
“Proposition 3: Induced diffusion may alter the exogenous process so as 
to give rise to an asymmetric diffusion curve, better described by the Bass 
model than by the symmetric logistic curve.” (Davies and Diaz-Rainey, 
2011, p. 1231)  
 
If proposition 1 were to hold then a = 0 and if proposition 3 holds than a > 0. They 
find that in all but four countries (Germany, Ireland, Spain and Sweden) a is not 
significantly different, at 10%, to 0 and so induced diffusion only occurs in these 
four countries. 
 
Propositions 1 and 3 have been tested for the LLU:CCA ratio using the 
econometric model employed by Davies and Diaz-Rainey by fitting the logistic 
and Bass models in their first difference form to the data, using the equation: 
 




 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ = 𝑃 𝑡 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑡0.9 − 𝑃 𝑡  
 
Where Switch(t) is the proportion of CCA that is switched from bitstream to LLU 
during time period t.  
 
The assumed saturation level for LLU:CCA has been set at 90%. This is because 
it is unlikely that competitors would enter all exchanges in the UK using LLU and 
so there is always likely to be a residual level of BSA. However, the model has 
been tested using other levels of saturation without any significant difference to 
the outcome. 
 
The result of the equation is shown below, with P values below. 
 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ = 0.02 +     0.15𝑃 
            (0.27)    (0.00) 
 
The first point to note is that the a is not significantly different from 0. Following 
Davies and Diaz-Rainey’s propositions 1 and 3, this suggests that the logistic 
diffusion curve is a better fit and that the diffusion of LLU:CCA was not induced. 
That is to say that the policies did not affect either the rate of diffusion or the 
equilibrium level. However, as is clear from Figure 19, LLU did not begin to be 
used as an alternative to bitstream until 2005, five years after it was first made 
available, and at the time that Ofcom made regulatory and pricing changes.  
 
The coefficient b represents the speed of diffusion and is estimated as 0.15, 
which is similar to that estimated by Davies and Diaz-Rainey in their fixed effects 
model (0.186) and which they describe as “fairly typical of this type of 
international diffusion study” (Davies and Diaz-Rainey, 2011, p. 1234).  
 
However, it should be noted that the R2 for this model is not particularly strong at 
0.42. Full results from Stata 13 are shown below in Annex A, including at different 
levels of saturation. 
 
Given the intuitive interpretation of Figure 19, that the Undertakings and price cut 
affected the initial diffusion of LLU, it would be helpful to find another approach 
that could determine whether this was indeed the case. An approach would be to 
adopt the model used by Gruber and Verboven (2001) in their study of diffusion 
of mobile telecommunications in Europe. They use the basic logistic function and 
specify a as the timing variable, which is calculated as follows: 
 
 𝑎!" = 𝛼!! + 𝛼!𝐷𝐼𝐺!" ( 7 ) 
 
where DIG is a dummy variable indicating whether or not digital technology had 
been introduced at time t. The 𝛼!! are fixed effects for each country i, and capture 
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an adoption lag or lead relative to a base country. In principle a similar equation 
could be used to calculate the lag or lead caused by Ofcom’s regulatory changes 
replacing the dummy variable DIG with one indicating the timing of the 
Undertakings and price cut. However, these were not changes that were 
introduced in any other European country, in the same way that digital mobile 
technology was introduced. Further, data on the number of LLU lines are not 
available on a consistent basis. It is necessary therefore to draw the intuitive 
conclusion from Figure 19 that Ofcom’s changes had an effect on the timing of 
the diffusion of LLU even though that effect cannot be quantified.  
 
Diffusion models appear not to help identify whether there was a causal link 
between Ofcom’s actions and the increase in the rate of LLU:CCA, either within 
the UK or on a comparative basis. Nor do they help identify whether it was the 
effect of the Undertakings or the price cut that resulted in an increase in 
LLU:CCA. The section below adopts a different approach of using a breakeven 
analysis to locate the marginal exchange in a further attempt to measure the 
effect of the regulatory changes. 
 
5.2.2 An Alternative Explanation 
This section briefly considers an alternative explanation for the growth of LLU 
after 2005: that the increase in LLU:CCA followed naturally from the development 
of the retail broadband market. This alternative would suggest that ISPs switched 
from BSA to LLU as they became more confident in the level of demand for 
broadband at the retail level.  
 
This suggestion would be supported by an “Austrian” view of entrepreneurial 
discovery, i.e. that entrepreneurs do not have perfect knowledge at the start of a 
market’s development but learn about demand and supply conditions as they 
gain experience of the market. In this case, as demand and cost conditions 
become clearer so entrepreneurs are better able to make decisions between 
market entry options. Thus, in the early stages of the market, ISPs maintained an 
open option by not committing to LLU and only changed to LLU once they felt 
confident they would be able to recover the fixed costs of entry via LLU. 
 
Whilst such a view cannot be entirely discounted, it is rejected in this thesis for 
two reasons. The first is suggested by Figure 19: the diffusion of LLU:CCA only 
properly began after the price cut and the implementation of the Undertakings. It 
would be an unlikely coincidence if entrepreneurs decided to switch to LLU at this 
time and did so without reference to the regulatory changes introduced at the 
same time.  
 
The second reason is suggested by the comparison with France later in this 
thesis in Section 5.4 and in particular in Figure 28 which shows that the LLU:CCA 
ratio increased much earlier in France that in the UK, despite LLU becoming 
available about six month later in France. Although not shown in any Figure, it is 
also the case that the diffusion rate of retail broadband was almost exactly the 
same in the two countries.  
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Other than the concerns about BT’s potential behaviour and the regulatory 
changes introduced by Ofcom there seems to reason to expect that 
entrepreneurs in France would discover LLU any earlier than their UK 
equivalents. 
5.3 Locating the Marginal Exchange: A Breakeven Analysis  
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
Firms entering the broadband market via LLU do so at each exchange and each 
exchange can be considered a discrete local (geographic) market. Using the 
normal Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT), a user in one exchange area could 
not substitute a line in that area with one connected to another exchange in the 
event of a SSNIP. A hypothetical monopolist could therefore impose a SSNIP 
profitably as there could be no demand side substitutability. Similarly, there is no 
supply-side substitutability as a firm in one exchange area could not enter 
another area using existing assets. 
 
Two factors are likely to affect the choice of exchanges a firm enters via LLU: the 
expected profits and the likely strategic response of its rivals and, in particular, of 
any firm that is already in that local market. In the UK, BT is the incumbent 
operator in all local exchange markets. The decision to enter an exchange can 
therefore be examined using a variation of a classic game of market entry and 
deterrence and the location of the marginal exchange can be established by 
observing how many exchanges (markets) it enters. How much the incumbent is 
able to raise the costs of rivals can be established by observing the difference 
between the number of exchanges that would be entered if there were no actual 
or expected discrimination and the number actually entered. 
 
One approach to locating the marginal exchange would be to use a classic game 
of entry deterrence played at each of the 5,581 exchanges treating each as a 
discrete local market.  
 
Such a game is explained in Dobbs (2000, Section 14-4.2), in which an entrant 
must decide whether to enter a market or stay out in the face of some 
commitment by the incumbent to signal that it will fight entry. The choice of the 
incumbent to fight entry may be taken ignoring the threat of entry but still 
affecting the entrant’s decision (‘blockaded entry”) or taking account of probable 
entry (“deterred entry”). Whether entry is blockaded or deterred does not affect 
the game, in part, at least, because the entrant only observes the action of the 
incumbent and does not see its reasoning.  
 
In the simplest form of the game, where the incumbent firm does not attempt to 
block entry, the entrant chooses to enter or not, and, in the event of entry, the 
incumbent chooses to accommodate the entrant or fight it. There are three pairs 
of pay-offs (incumbent first):  
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a) πm, 0 – the entrant remains out of the market, leaving monopoly 
profits to the incumbent whilst the entrant receives nothing; 
b) πs, πs – both receive equal profits of about πs; 
c) πf, πf – both receive equal profits of πf and where πf < πs 
 
The subscripts s, and f refer to sharing the market and fighting.  
 
Where the incumbent deters entry (deliberately or otherwise), in Dobbs’ example 
by expanding capacity, it incurs cost C > 0, but, through its strategic behaviour, 
adds to its profits an amount Di whilst the entrant’s profits are reduced by De66. 
The pay-off to both parties (incumbent first) if the incumbent commits and fights 
the entrant is: 𝜋! + 𝐷! − 𝐶;𝜋! − 𝐷! 
 
In a normal analysis the game is played once, that is to say there is a single 
market where entry may take place, which would happen if the pay-off for the 
entrant is positive, i.e. 𝜋! − 𝐷! > 0. In the UK broadband market, however, the 
game would be repeated at each of the 5,581 exchanges and entry would incur 
only in exchanges where the entrant expects to earn a profit. The marginal 
exchange would be defined as the exchange where 𝜋! − 𝐷! = 0. 
 
A complicating feature of such a game in regulated markets is that both the 
incumbent and entrant would need to take a view on the strength of the regulator 
and its ability to prevent or deter strategic behaviour by the incumbent. The 
regulated incumbent may be more willing to accommodate entry if it decided that 
the regulator could punish exclusionary behaviour on its part. Likewise the 
entrant’s decision to enter or stay out is likely to be affected by its view of the 
strength of the regulator.   
 
To establish the amount by which entrants perceived their costs to have been 
raised by BT’s potential strategic behaviour (the parameter D in the game), this 
thesis now employs a breakeven analysis before and after the price cut and 
Undertakings and therefore to locate the marginal exchange. 
5.3.2 Data  
 
To establish the location of the marginal exchange, before and after Ofcom 
strengthened the regulation, this thesis employs a breakeven analysis. Data for 
the empirical analysis have been obtained from a number of public and private 
sources. Table 6 shows summary statistics for the variables together with the 
source. Data marked with an asterix (*) have been provided on a confidential 
basis on condition that any presentation of the data does not reveal to which 
company the data belong.  
 
 
                                                
66 It is not clear from Dobbs whether Di – De = 0, i.e. there is a transfer of profit from the entrant to 
the incumbent, or whether Di and De are independent. 
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Variable         Variable Name     Obs Mean Std. Dev. Source/Comments 
Exchange Code ExchangeCode 0   
 
Exchange 
Name ExchangeName 0   
 





PopDensity 5562 10.5 21.8 
UK government data 
based on local 
government ward of 
exchange postcode. 
Median Income Median_Income 5580 30,134 9,769 CACI 
Northern 
Ireland NI 5580 .03 .18 
Whether exchange in 
Northern Ireland 
Scotland SC 5580   Whether the exchange is in Scotland 
Wales WA 5580   Whether the exchange 
is in Wales 
 
Table 6: Data and sources 
 
Data on the exchanges that have been unbundled and the year of unbundling 
have been provided on a confidential basis by Sky and TalkTalk. To respect their 
confidentiality the data for the two companies have been combined to form a 
single variable “Unbundled” indicating an exchange that has been unbundled by 
at least one of these two companies. Where one company has unbundled an 
individual exchange before the other the earlier of the two dates has been used. 
Data on the exchanges covered by Virgin Media and where BT has installed 
FTTX have been obtained from www.samknows.com. 
 
The smallest exchange area (Papa Stour in the Shetland Isles) has just 12 
premises connected and a population density of 0.08 people by square kilometre. 
At the other extreme, Oldham (Lancs.) has 64,500 premises and a population 
density of 58 persons per square kilometre. Summary statistics are shown in 
Table 7 below. However, the mean values do not tell the whole story as both 
Total Premises and Population Density are strongly and positively “skewed”67, as 
is shown in the left hand and right hand sides of Figure 21 respectively. Over 
50% of exchange areas have fewer than 500 premises and over 70% have a 








                                                
67 Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of the distribution of a variable about its mean. 
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness 
Total 
Premises 5,580 4,937 7,206 12 64,501 2.3 
Population 
Density 5,562* 10.5 21.8 0.08 215.4 3.8 
Median 
Income 5,580 30,134 9,770 7,300 76,600 0.6 
* It was not possible to establish the population density for 12 exchanges (0.2% of all 
exchanges). 
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Telephone Exchange Areas 
 
 
Figure 21: Distribution of Demographics of Exchange Areas 
 
 
The total number of premises in an exchange area can be taken as a proxy for 
the potential revenue in that exchange: the higher the number of premises, the 
greater the market potential. The population density can be taken as a proxy for 
costs: higher population density would mean that each premises has a lower cost 
of supply. Thus an exchange area with a high number of premises and a high 
population density is likely to be more profitable than one with a small number of 
premises and a low population density, as illustrated in Figure 22. However, 
whilst the effect of the total premises can be estimated in the breakeven analysis 
that follows, as the proportion of premises ISPs need to earn a profit, the effect of 
population density is unknown. A more densely populated exchange area may 
have lower costs, but the relationship between density and costs is not known. 
The population density has therefore been excluded from the breakeven model. It 
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Unbundling of telephone exchanges in the UK began in 2003, although BT first 
offered LLU in December 2000. Figure 23 plots the number of exchanges 
unbundled per annum (left hand scale) along with the cumulative number of 
unbundled exchanges (right hand scale). The chart clearly shows that very few, a 
total of 231 (about 4%), exchanges were unbundled before the Undertakings 
were signed and that no exchanges were unbundled in 2005. Then, in 2006 and 
2007, 1,367 exchanges were unbundled by Sky, TalkTalk or both (or companies 
they subsequently acquired). So exactly half of the total number of exchanges 
unbundled by the end of 2012 were unbundled in the two years immediately after 
the signing of the Undertakings and the implementation of the price cut. The 
reason why so few exchanges were unbundled in 2008 and 2009 is not known. 
However, informal discussions with Sky and TalkTalk suggest that the pause was 
to allow them time to migrate customers from bitstream to LLU in the exchanges 
where they had invested in LLU.  
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Figure 23: Unbundled Exchanges 
 
 
Table 9 below, provides further information on the demographics of the 









2003 132  19,452   75.1   35,486  
2004 99  23,553   51.5   29,174  
2005 0  -     -     -    
2006 654  15,329   31.8   30,503  
2007 713  9,071   18.3   29,057  
2008 118  5,859   9.9   29,878  
2009 19  11,369   15.0   26,705  
2010 306  4,221   7.4   29,284  
2011 377  3,011   4.4   30,453  
2012 315  2,126   3.0   31,106  
 
Table 8: Unbundled Local Exchanges 2003 - 2012 
 
Some points are immediately apparent from these data: 
 
1) As may be expected, over time the average size of the exchange area, 
counted as total premises in the area, declined, as did the population 
density as unbundlers extended their reach from larger urban exchanges 
to smaller rural ones. 
2) The exceptions to the above were 2004 and 2009 when mean size 
increased. In 2004 the mean size may have increased as unbundlers 
became more experienced about which exchanges to enter. In 2009 this 
was probably due to the small number of unbundled exchanges.  
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3) Similarly, in 2003, the median income in the exchange areas unbundled 
was around £5,000pa more than in any other year. In all other years, the 
median income shows very little variation. 
4) No exchanges were unbundled in 2005 and very few in 2009. There are 
two potential reasons why no exchanges were unbundled in 2005. Either 
ISPs were so badly affected by BT’s perceived strategic behaviour that 
they decided not to invest further, or they were waiting for the outcome of 
the TSR before making further investment decisions. The lower number of 
exchanges unbundled in 2008 and 2009 was discussed above.  
 
Figure 24 shows the total number of premises in the unbundled exchange areas 
as a proportion of all premises. The figure shows how the period covered can be 
divided into three sections: 
 
• Before 2006, when the 231 unbundled exchanges covered approx. 
18% of all premises; 
• The rapid growth between 2006 and 2007 when a further 1,367 
exchanges were unbundled covering an additional 59 percentage 
points of the population; and  
• A period of much slower growth since 2008 when the additional 1,135 
exchanges extended the reach of unbundlers by 15 percentage 
points to 92% of the total premises.  
 





The period of interest in this thesis is around 2005, when unbundlers’ attitudes 
changed such that they became prepared to invest in entering exchanges 
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The Undertakings agreed between BT and Ofcom in 2005 were designed to 
improve the conditions of entry for competitive operators through a specifically ex 
ante form of non-discrimination known as Equivalence of Input. Their objective 
was to remove competitors’ fear that BT could foreclose the market to them 
should they chose to enter an exchange on the basis of LLU. Prima facie, the 
data in Figure 23 and Figure 24 suggest that the Undertakings and price cuts 
were successful in increasing the number of exchanges in which LLU was the 
principal form of CCA to rival BT. However, what this thesis is trying to establish 
is the relative effect of the price cut and Undertakings. In other words, was the 
price cut more important than the Undertakings or vice versa? 
 
5.3.3 The Effect of the Price Cut on the Location of the Marginal Exchange 
 
The location of the marginal exchange before and after the price reduction can 
be established by undertaking a breakeven analysis to locate the exchange 
where the profits from entry via LLU are the same as those via bitstream, 
excluding any costs of discrimination. To know a firm’s profits one of course 
needs to know both revenues and costs. Whilst cost data are available, revenue 
data are not but at the time broadband service providers had a national pricing 
policy such that consumers accessing via LLU or bitstream paid the same price 
regardless of their geographic location68. Thus the breakeven analysis can be run 
just using costs.  
 
 𝑆𝐶!!" + 𝑞𝑐!!" = 𝑞𝑐!!" ( 8 ) 
 
Where 𝑆𝐶!!"!  are the fixed cost of entry via LLU at exchange i, 𝑐!!"  are the 
variable costs of LLU and 𝑐!" are the variable costs of bitstream. The fixed, sunk, 
cost of LLU entry and the costs of bitstream do not change between the periods, 
so to establish the breakeven costs at t and t+1 only 𝑐!!" changes. 
 
To estimate the cost of discrimination the sunk costs can be separated into a 
normal fixed cost of entry (F) and the cost of discrimination (D), where D only 
applies to entry via LLU: 
 
 𝐹!!"! + 𝐷!!"! + 𝑞𝑐!!" = 𝑞𝑐!"#   ( 9 ) 
 
Rearranging this to estimate the bearable cost of discrimination at an exchange 
yields: 
 
 𝐷!!"! = 𝑞(𝑐!" − 𝑐!!") − 𝐹!!"!  ( 10 ) 
 
The variable Di simply becomes the difference between the total costs of LLU 
and bitstream for a given number of lines in each exchange and is thus the 
amount by which the incumbent could raise its rival’s costs allowing the rival to 
                                                
68 Some operators later changed this and charged a premium in areas where they had not entered 
via LLU. 
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breakeven at exchange i. To estimate a value for Di it is necessary to make a 
judgement about the number of lines in the marginal exchange before the 
Undertakings were signed and implemented. This will be done later in the 
Chapter by examining the number and characteristics of those exchanges that 
were unbundled before the Undertakings were signed.  
 
As BT was, and indeed is, the dominant provider of unbundled local loops to third 
parties, Ofcom has direct control of the prices BT may charge for LLU. In 2005, 
Ofcom substantially reduced the regulated price of LLU. Table 9 shows how 
significant that cut was, absolutely and in comparison with the other four largest 




France Germany Italy Spain UK Average 
October 
2003 
Full LLU 17.10 16.50 11.00 14.00 25.50 16.22 
Shared Access 9.42 11.01 6.51 5.74 22.59 11.05 
October 
2005 
Full LLU  10.90   11.80   9.30   12.00   11.20   11.04  
Shared Access  4.39   3.74   4.14   3.84   3.34   3.89  
(European Commission Implementation Reports) 
Table 9:  LLU Prices (€), EU5, 2003 and 2005 
 
Before the price cut, the UK had LLU prices around 50% higher than the next 
most expensive EU5 country and more than twice the price of the cheapest. After 
Ofcom cut BT’s prices, the UK charged around the average price for the EU5, 
following a cut of 56% in Full LLU prices and a massive 85% price cut for shared 
LLU. Other countries also cut LLU prices, but by nothing like the same 
proportions. 
 
Firms are generally cautious about providing information on the cost of 
unbundling an individual exchange. However, in 2006 Opal Networks/Carphone 
Warehouse published a report on the economics of LLU (Opal/CPW, 2006)69. 
This report identified the variable costs of LLU and BSA as shown in Table 10. 
 
In addition, the unbundler needs to install a Multi-Service Access Node (MSAN)70 
at each exchange to convert the copper access line from a “dumb” piece of wire 
into a broadband line. Opal/CPW identify the capital cost (capex) of an MSAN as 
£40,000 for the first 500 lines per exchange and an incremental cost of £20,000 
for the next 500 lines. These prices have probably come down since 2006, but 
are used here as that is the relevant period. Opal/CPW did not provide any 
information in their report about the depreciation period of the MSAN and 
TalkTalk Group’s annual reports only refer to a depreciation policy ranging 
                                                
69 At the time Opal was the network division of CPW. The broadband division of CPW has since 
been separated from CPW and is now named TalkTalk Group Ltd. It is the fourth largest of the 
four main broadband ISPs in the UK. 
70 An MSAN is an integrated broadband system delivering voice, video and data services to 
business and residential users. MSAN line cards provide connectivity to broadband customer 
premises equipment (CPE), aggregating DSL and Passive Optical Network (PON) traffic in a 
single design. 
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between 12.5% and 50%. The breakeven analysis assumes a depreciation rate 
of 20% per annum. 
 
Monthly (£) Wholesale Line 





Customers/exchange N/A 250 500 
Monthly Rental per 
line 16.40 6.70 6.70 
Other Opex 2.50 4.50 3.00 
Total cash costs 18.90 11.20 9.70 
 
Table 10: Variable costs of LLU and BSA 
 
The number of premises and the likely share of such that an ISP can gain are 
major determinants in whether it will enter an exchange area or not. The 
calculation of a breakeven point, i.e. where the ISP is indifferent between entry 
via LLU and entry via BSA is, in part therefore, a function of its expected share of 
exchange lines. At the time of the Undertakings, total household penetration of 
broadband in the UK stood at approximately 32% and independent ISPs (i.e. 
neither BT nor cable companies) had an average penetration rate of less than 
5% of households. For the breakeven analysis this rate of penetration has been 
assumed to be the minimum rate that and individual firm would want to achieve 
and is therefore used as the central estimate. Results have also been calculated 
using 4% and 6% penetration level and are shown in Table 12. 
 
Equation ( 8 ) is used to calculate the breakeven point. 
 
Breakeven occurs where the fixed costs of LLU at exchange i plus the variable 
costs times the number of unbundled lines equals the variable costs of bitstream 
access times the number of lines. The fixed cost of entry at each exchange is the 
cost of the MSAN or MSANs dependent on the number of lines represented by a 
5% share in the exchange area. The variable costs of LLU include the rental of 
the line from BT plus other operating costs as identified by Opal/CPW. The 
entrant is assumed to use BT’s MPF (fully unbundled local loop product). The 
variable cost of bitstream also includes the cost of Wholesale Line Rental (WLR) 
to provide voice telephony services and other operating costs identified by 
Opal/CPW. The costs used in the breakeven calculation are shown in Table 11. 
All figures used in the calculation are sourced from Opal/CPW (2006). 
 
 
                                                
71 Metallic Path Facility (MPF) is the technical name for a fully unbundled local loop. MPF provides 
the CP with both the high and low frequency bands on the copper line allowing the CP to offer 
both voice and broadband. Shared MPF (SMPF) provides only the low frequency band, which 
carries the broadband signal. 
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Fixed Costs Cost (£) 
Capex 1st 500 lines per exchange 40,000 
Capex each additional 500 lines 20,000 
Annual depreciation  20% 
Variable Costs   
 MPF Initial Fee – Pre-discount  88.03 
 MPF Monthly Rental – Pre-discount  10.15 
Total Monthly Charge MPF Pre-Discount  15.60 
 MPF Initial Fee – Post-discount  45.53 
 MPF Monthly Rental – Post-discount  6.99 
Total Monthly Charge MPF Post-Discount  11.25 
Other Opex LLU 4.50 - 3.0072 
Assumed contract period (months) 36 
    
Bitstream + WLR 16.40 
Other Opex Bitstream 2.50 
Total Cost Bitstream + WLR 18.90 
Share of lines in exchange 5% 
 
Table 11: Break Even Analysis Data 
 
The total monthly charge for LLU pre- and post-discount is calculated as: 
 𝑀𝑃𝐹  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 +𝑀𝑃𝐹  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥  𝐿𝐿𝑈   
 
As most exchanges are small, the lower end of the “Other Opex LLU” costs has 
been used. Thus the Total Monthly MPF Pre-Discount cost is: 
 88.0336 + 10.15 + 3.00 = 15.60 
 
and the Total Monthly MPF Post-Discount is 
 45.5336 + 6.99 + 3.00 = 11.2573 
 
As the number of lines in each exchange area is known, and an assumption 
about the proportion of lines that an entrant would have targeted at the time of 
the Undertakings can be made, it is possible to calculate the breakeven quantity 
for each exchange by rearranging the equation as shown below: 
 
 𝑆𝐶!!"! = 𝑞(𝑐!"# − 𝑐!!") ( 11 ) 
                                                
72 Depending on the number of lines.  
73 The totals shown are different from those reported in Table 9 due to a different calculation 
methodology used by the European Commission and the currency used. 
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 𝑆𝐶!!"!𝑐!" − 𝑐!!" = 𝑞! ( 12 ) 
 
The fixed cost of entry via LLU at any given exchange i is dependent on the 
number of lines represented by the target share of lines, in this case 5%. In the 
largest exchanges, a 5% share of lines would require the entrant to invest in 
seven MSANs at a cost, according to the Opal/CPW data of £160,000. In any 
exchange with fewer than 10,000 lines (of which there are more than 4,600) only 
one MSAN is required with a capital cost of £40,000. 
 
An Excel spreadsheet has been created including the costs outlined above to 
calculate the relative cost of LLU and BSA at each exchange. Based on this 
analysis, 1,789 exchanges were economically viable to unbundle before Ofcom 
imposed the price cut, if there were no additional cost of discrimination. These 
1,789 exchanges accounted for 23.3 million premises (84%) of all properties. 
Thus the marginal exchange is the 1,789th largest exchange (Boston Spa). 
 
After the price cut, the marginal exchange moved such that 2,636 exchanges, 
covering some 93% of premises, could be economically unbundled (Churnetside, 
West Midlands). 
 
The price cut imposed by Ofcom had a substantial effect, therefore, but because 
of the asymmetric distribution of premises per exchange the additional 847 
exchanges that became economically viable covered only 9% of households. 
 























2,379 91% 2,636 93% 2,866 94% 
Table 12: Results of Breakeven Analysis (pre and post discount) 
 
5.3.4 The Cost of Discrimination and the Effect of the Undertakings on the 
Marginal Exchange 
 
Estimating the cost of discrimination, and the resultant marginal exchange, is 
substantially more difficult because such a cost is not directly observable and 
must be imputed from other evidence. The only evidence available is the number 
and characteristics of exchanges that were unbundled before 2005, when BT and 
Ofcom signed the Undertakings. 
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Observing these data we see a number of interesting characteristics. First the 
total premises in the unbundled exchanges increased by around 4,000 and the 
smallest exchange unbundled in 2004 was 4.5 times larger than the smallest 
exchange unbundled in 2003. Examining the data in more detail we see that 
whilst the average number of residential premises increased, the average 





Premises Std. Dev. Min Max 
2003 132 19,452 10,958 862 64,501 
2004 99 23,553 9,504 3,853 44,757 
 
Table 13: Mean Total Premises, Unbundled Exchanges 2003 - 04 
 




2003 17,887 1,556 
2004 22,262 1,286 
Table 14: Mean Residential and Business Premises, Unbundled Exchanges 
2003 - 04 
 
This smallest exchange unbundled in 2003 was Wood Street in the City of 
London and so offered access to many business premises. Indeed, most of the 
smaller exchanges unbundled in 2003 were located in city centre business 
districts. This smallest exchange is smaller than would have been rational to 
invest in even after the price cut imposed by Ofcom and suggests that the 
investor was either irrational or, more likely, prepared to invest in such a small 
exchange because it expected broadband access based on LLU to find a more 
profitable market amongst business customer.  
 
In 2004, the smallest exchange entered had 3,853 premises, and was again 
located in the City of London, this time in Moorgate, EC2. The largest exchange 
had declined from 64,501 to 44,757 but this is simply a function of the distribution 
of exchanges: the largest exchange unbundled in 2004 was the 6th largest 
exchange overall and all but two of the larger exchanges had been unbundled in 
2003.  
 
The changing characteristics of the exchanges suggests that ISPs were in a 
process of entrepreneurial discovery about where the most profitable market for 
LLU based broadband could be found. The change in the nature of unbundled 
exchanges between 2003 and 2004 can also be seen in Figure 25, which shows 
scatter plots of the number of residential and business exchanges unbundled in 
the two years. In 2003 the correlation coefficient is low at 0.22, whilst in 2004 in 
increases substantially to 0.62, which is still below the level of all years of 0.84. 
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Figure 25: X-Y Scatter Plots of Residential and Business Premises 
 
Figure 26 shows the distribution of the actual number of exchanges unbundled 
versus the expected number for each telephone exchange region of the UK in 
2003 and 2004. The expected number is calculated as the proportion of 
exchanges unbundled nationally (4.1%) applied to each region. Hence we would 
expect that in London West (LW) where there are 53 exchanges, 2.2 would be 
unbundled. In fact between the two years, 25 LW exchanges were unbundled. 
Unsurprisingly, the areas where the actual unbundled exchange areas exceeded 
the expected numbers are all urban areas: London West, City of London, 
Westminster, South London, Central Midlands, West End and London North. 
 
In 2005, no exchanges were unbundled. This may reflect uncertainty regarding 
the outcome of Ofcom’s strategic review of telecommunications or learning by 





Figure 26: Actual vs. Expected Unbundled Exchanges: 2003 - 2004 
 
(See Annex D for a key to BT exchange region codes.) 
 
As has been discussed at length in this thesis, a general assumption is that ISPs 
were concerned that BT could discriminate against them and raise their cost of 
market entry, but this cost cannot be observed directly. A further assumption for 
the breakeven model is that the equilibrium marginal exchange in the presence of 
discrimination had not been discovered by ISPs in 2004 but that, given the 
changing characteristics of unbundled exchanges between 2003 and 2004, it was 
likely to be a larger exchange than the smallest one unbundled in 2004. Some 
exchanges unbundled in both years were therefore likely to be the smaller than 
would have been rational for ISPs to unbundle had the cost of discrimination 
been directly observable. The next task, therefore, is to estimate where that 
marginal exchange might be found.  
































There is no economic way to make such an estimate. Therefore, two approaches 
are deployed based on the mean and the smallest exchanges. The first approach 
assumes that the marginal exchange is one standard deviation smaller than the 
mean number of total premises in 2004. Given a mean that year of 25,553 and a 
standard deviation of 9,504, the marginal exchange would have 14,049 premises. 
 
The second approach assumes that the smallest 10% of exchanges unbundled 
that year were smaller than the marginal exchange. This would mean that the 
marginal exchange would have 10,823 residential and business premises.  
 
The same approach has been adopted using the exchanges unbundled in 2003 
to provide further sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 15 shows the implied cost of discrimination per exchange for each of 2003 
and 2004 using equation ( 10 ), that is: 
 
 𝐷!!"! = 𝑞(𝑐!" − 𝑐!!") − 𝐹!!"!   
 
 The table also shows the resultant location of the marginal exchange, using the 
two methods discussed above for each year. This calculation suggests that, 
using the standard deviation, in 2003 the cost of discrimination was £786 per 
exchange increasing to £1,323 in 2004. Setting the marginal exchange at the 10th 
percentile implies a cost of £495 and £782 respectively. Of course, the results 
would be different if some other location of the marginal exchange were chosen 
but, despite a degree of arbitrariness, these two locations can be regarded as 
reasonable. 
 













8,794 440 £786 4,485 




14,049 702 £1,323 4,942 
Table 15: Implied Cost of Discrimination 
 
The analysis above has calculated the location of the marginal exchange at three 
points in time: before the implementation of the Undertakings, between the 
Undertakings and the price cut imposed by Ofcom, and after the price cut. This 
allows us to unbundle the effect of the Undertakings and the price cut and the 
proportion of premises that it would have been economic to serve by unbundlers. 
A summary of these results is shown in Table 16 below, using the lowest and 





Undertakings Before Price Cut After Price Cut Lowest Highest 
Marginal Exchange 4,272 4,941 3,793 2,946 
Number of economic 
exchanges  1,309 640 1,789 2,636 
Proportion of 
Premises in economic 
areas 
75% 50% 84% 93% 
 
Table 16: Location of Marginal Exchange over Time 
 
The effect of the Undertakings was to increase the number of economic 
exchanges by between 479 and 1,148 by reducing the implied cost of 
discrimination by a maximum of £1,323. This allowed a further 34% and 9% of 
premises to be economically covered by ISPs using local loop unbundling.  
 
The price cut moved the marginal exchange by a further 847 exchange, but, as 
these exchanges were all much smaller, added only a further 9% of premises.  
 
These results are shown graphically below in Figure 27 using the low and high 
measures of discrimination.  
 
Figure 27: Location of Marginal Exchange 
 
 
In conclusion, Ofcom’s twin action of agreeing the Undertakings with BT and 
imposing a price cut for local loop unbundling increased the economically viable 
market by between 1,030 and 1,700 exchanges covering between 17% and 42% 
of households. Whether the Undertakings had a greater impact than the price cut 
depends on which measure of the marginal exchange before the Undertakings is 
used. 
 
However, the implied cost of discrimination was not as high as may have been 
thought. ISPs could, therefore, have unbundled more exchanges than they did 

















At the time of writing this thesis, TalkTalk had unbundled 2,720 exchanges, which 
is 84 (3%) more exchanges than the breakeven analysis above would suggest.  
 
The short-term effects of the Undertakings and price cut moved the marginal 
exchange towards smaller exchange areas. This has had an effect on 
competition and regulation of the Wholesale Broadband Access (WBA) market74. 
Under the EU common regulatory framework, NRAs are required to conduct 
market reviews every three years and the EC recommends a set of markets that 
are susceptible to ex ante regulation, one of which is the WBA market in which 
bitstream is the principal product over copper access lines.  
 
In its 2007 review, Ofcom first introduced the concept of geographic markets 
based on homogeneous competitive conditions in exchange areas. In 2007 they 
identified three geographic markets (outside the Hull area), which they named 
markets 1, 2 and 3. They found BT to have SMP in markets 1 and 2, but no firm 
to have SMP in market 3. In the 2010 and 2013 Ofcom again found different 
geographic markets, one of which (market 3 in 2010 and market B in 2013) was 
not subject to SMP. What is relevant for this thesis is that the size of the 
competitive market has increased over time. This evolution is shown in Table 17. 
 
 











BT plus three POs and BT 
plus 2 POs but BT’s market 
share less than 50%. 
71.3% 
2014 B BT plus two POs. 89.8% 
 
Table 17: Evolution of Competitive WBA Market 
 
According to Ofcom’s most recent review of the WBA market, nearly 90% of 
premises are in exchange areas where there is sufficient competitive supply at 
the bitstream level that all ex ante regulation can be removed.  
 
5.4 An Alternative Example: France 
The UK was not the only country to introduce local loop unbundling to stimulate 
competitive entry in the broadband market. Table 18 shows the date of 
publication of a reference offer for LLU in the five largest EU Member States 
(EU5) along with the launch date of a retail DSL product.  
 
                                                
74 In October 2014 the EC made a new Recommendation on Relevant Markets and changed the 
name of the WBA market to the Wholesale Central Access market. This thesis refers to the 
WBA market, as the last time Ofcom undertook a market review it was still called WBA. 
 114 
 Full LLU* Shared Access* Retail DSL** 
France 16 July 2001 16 July 2001 November 1999 
Germany 11 April 2000 Not published August 1999 
Italy 5 January 2000 Not published December 1999 
Spain 21 January 2001 21 January 2001 1999 
UK 31 December 2000 31 December 2000 July 2000 
(* European Commission, 2001, Annex 2.1, Table 1 
** OECD, 2001, Table 1) 
Table 18: LLU Reference Offer Implementation Dates 
 
This section of the thesis briefly compares the developments in France with those 
in the UK. France has been chosen for the demographic and economic 
similarities to the UK and the very different pattern of diffusion of LLU:CCA, 
illustrated in Figure 28. Sufficient data are not available to analysis the location of 
marginal exchange. 
 
Figure 28: Diffusion of LLU:CCA in France and UK 
 
 
Figure 28 shows that, whereas LLU remained a tiny proportion of CCA in the UK 
until after the 2005 reforms, it diffused much earlier in France, starting in 2003, 
but then slowed down after 2005. Why might this be? This thesis has examined 
the effect of prices and a change in non-discrimination rules on diffusion in the 
UK, and now looks at whether these two factors have parallels in France, starting 
with prices. 
 
As already shown in Table 9, LLU prices in France were substantially lower than 
they were in the UK in 2003. The regulated prices in the UK for fully and partially 
unbundled local loops were 1.5 and 2.4 times higher respectively than they were 
in France. By 2005 prices for fully unbundled loops were roughly comparable 
whereas shared access loop prices were lower in the UK than France. In the 
meantime, France had also reduced its LLU prices. It is immediately obvious 
from this chart that prices in France were significantly lower than the UK and that 






















































































































the same time as prices in France. This could suggest that there was a pricing 
tipping point, somewhere between €19 and €10 per month at which competitive 
providers were prepared to enter the market using the LLU, although there is 
insufficient evidence available to measure whether this is the case empirically.  
 
Figure 29 below reproduces Figure 19 adding in prices and diffusion for France. 
It is immediately obvious from this chart that prices in France were significantly 
lower than the UK and that diffusion of LLU in the UK only began once prices had 
fallen, which they did at the same time as prices in France. This could suggest 
that there was a pricing tipping point, somewhere between €19 and €10 per 
month at which competitive providers were prepared to enter the market using 
the LLU, although there is insufficient evidence available to measure whether this 
is the case empirically.  
 
Figure 29: LLU Price and Diffusion, France and UK: 2003 - 2010 
 
 
An alternative explanation is that the lower LLU price in France meant that there 
was a greater margin between the wholesale and retail prices and this would 
encourage more entry via LLU. Unfortunately, no historic price data are available 
to test such a hypothesis but in 2012 the median price per megabit of download 
speed in France was approximately twice the level of the UK. If the same were 
the case in period from 2003 – 2005, then LLU entry would be likely to be higher, 
especially given the lower price of LLU. 
 
Equation ( 5 ) has been estimated using data for France. The results were very 
weak, showing a R2 of 0.02 and so these are not reported. 
 
The French regulator, now ARCEP75 but at the time ART76, did not consider it 
necessary to introduce either functional separation or EoI. In fact ART was 
                                                
75 “Autorité de Régulation de Communications Électroniques et des Poste  
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opposed to the idea, considering it not cost effective. If the LLU:CCA ratio is a 
measure of discrimination as proposed above, the higher ratio in France would 
suggest that non-price discrimination was not an issue. Or it could be that the 
available margin between the retail price of broadband and the LLU price was 
sufficient for entrants to earn a high enough return to cover the additional cost of 
discrimination. 
 
It is not possible to draw hard and fast conclusions from this comparison between 
the UK and France. However, some general points can be made: 
 
1) The lower price of LLU in France in 2003 – 2005 is correlated with a 
much earlier increase in the LLU:CCA ratio. 
2) However, when France reduced its LLU prices in 2005 there was no 
change in the rate of LLU:CCA diffusion. In fact, a year or so later 
there was a sharp deceleration in the rate of change. 
3) The diffusion of LLU:CCA does not follow the same curve in France 
and the UK. The UK has a classic S shaped diffusion curve, whilst in 
France the proportion increases rapidly and then suddenly slows 
down.  
 
Overall, it appears that two countries have followed different paths and the 
analysis of the diffusion of LLU:CCA in the UK does not make it possible to 
distinguish the separate effects of the price cut and the Undertakings. If one were 
to ask what would have happened in the UK if one or other measure had not 
been introduced, or if the prices in 2003 were similar to those in France, it would 
not be possible to answer from this brief analysis.  
 
5.5 Conclusions from Chapter 5 
This chapter has shown that Undertakings had the effect of moving the marginal 
exchange from the one that covered between the 50th and 75th percentile of 
customer premises to the one that covered the 84th percentile. The price 
reduction moved the marginal exchange to the 93rd percentile. These two 
measures were, therefore, successful in expanding the market that could be 
served by LLU. The perceived discriminatory behaviour of BT that reduced the 
size of the market that could be served by LLU was, therefore, successfully 
corrected. However, the analysis also shows that entrants were unnecessarily 
constrained by their expectation of BT’s discriminatory behaviour and could have 
unbundled many more exchanges than they had before Ofcom’s reforms. 
 
There are two acknowledged issues with the model as presented. The first is that 
the only data available on the costs of unbundling an exchange are those 
included in Opal/CPW (2006). The breakeven model was designed to fit the data 
available and is, therefore, necessarily somewhat stylised. It could be improved if 
more detailed data were available. Even so, the results of the model come close 
to the number of exchanges unbundled by TalkTalk. 
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Secondly, the lack of data before 2005 means that assumptions have to be made 
about the location of the marginal exchange and therefore the amount by which 
rivals’ costs were raised. A valid criticism would be that this allows the marginal 
exchange to be located wherever the author wishes it to be. The use of standard 
statistical measures (the standard deviation and the 10th percentile) are designed 
to minimise this effect, though their arbitrariness is recognised.  
 
Since 2005 technology has evolved and fibre-based Next Generation Access 
(NGA) has moved up both the commercial and political agenda. BT has begun to 
roll-out fibre more deeply into its network to offer higher broadband access 
speeds to consumers. The next Chapter of this thesis will explore whether there 
is a connection between the regulatory reforms of 2005 and the geographic 




6 Empirical Analysis 2: Next Generation Access 
 
This section analyses the long-term effects of the Undertakings on BT’s decision 
determining where to install NGA, principally via fibre to the cabinet (FTTC). The 
effect of the presence of the two unbundlers (Sky and TalkTalk) is compared with 
the effect of the presence of VirginMedia, the cable operator, along with other 
variables that may affect BT’s choice. A probit model is used to determine the 
relative effects. The analysis shows that the presence of unbundlers has a 
stronger marginal effect on BT’s choice than cable, but that even stronger still are 
direct policy measures such as the government’s pressure to promote fibre in 
Northern Ireland. 
6.1 Definition of Next Generation Access 
Next Generation Access (NGA) is a general term, with no specific definition, that 
refers to higher bandwidth access to the Internet than current generation access. 
As a working definition, the highest speed available on copper from the local 
exchange is about 24 Mbps using ADSL2+. Access methods that provide higher 
speeds, in particular using fibre for at least part of the connection between the 
customer premises and the exchange, are considered to be NGA. 
 
Fibre access networks can run between the exchange building and several points 
before the premises, as illustrated in Figure 8. The four principal places are: 
 
• Fibre to the Node (FTTN): Fibre is terminated in a street cabinet, possibly 
several kilometres away from the customer premises, with the final 
connections being copper.  
• Fibre to the Cabinet (FTTC): This is very similar to FTTN, but the street 
cabinet or pole is closer to the user's premises, typically within 300m, 
meaning that the distance the signal has to travel over copper is shorter, 
thereby offering higher speeds to the user. 
• Fibre to the Building/Premises (FTTB/P): Fibre reaches the boundary of 
the building, such as the basement in a multi-dwelling unit, with the final 
connection to the individual living space being made via alternative 
means, potentially an internal wired or wireless network. 
• Fibre to the home (FTTH): Fibre reaches the boundary of the living space, 
such as a box on the outside wall of a home. 
Collectively these different approaches are referred to as FTTX. The main 
approach taken by BT is FTTC. 
The speeds available over the options vary from around 50Mbps to almost no 
upper bound for FTTH. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the exact form 
of FTTX or the bandwidth offered are not important, only the fact that BT decides 
to install FTTX in a particular exchange area. 
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An alternative form of NGA takes place on cable networks (in the UK, Virgin 
Media) and is known as DOCSIS377. This technology allows for speeds of around 
150 Mbps to be offered to end users of cable networks. 
6.2 Policies to promote Next Generation Access 
There is a general belief in policy-making circles that widespread availability of 
NGA is essential to economic growth. The UK government, for example, set out 
its broadband policy in 2010 stating: 
 
“A world-class communications network will help the economy grow as we 
recover from the recession. As consumers we will have even greater 
choice and costs will be reduced. The delivery of public services will be 
more efficient and cost effective, as well as more inclusive. The way we 
access entertainment will alter, with greater options for consumers. 
Demand for better connectivity is growing as services and applications 
that take advantage of the greater bandwidth emerge.” (BIS/DCMS, 2010) 
 
The UK government set aside some £1,000 million to support “superfast 
broadband” initiatives such as the roll-out of fibre in rural areas where the market 
would be unlikely to supply broadband by itself. It has set up a programme, 
Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK), within the Department of Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS) that has the following objectives:  
 
• Provide basic broadband (2Mbps) for all by 2016. 
• Provide superfast broadband coverage to 90% of the UK by 2016, 95% by 
2017 and explore options to get near universal superfast broadband 
coverage across the UK by 2018. 
• Create 22 “SuperConnected Cities” across the UK by 2015. 
• Improve mobile coverage in remote areas by 2016. 
 
BDUK has three programmes to achieve this: 
Superfast Broadband Programme 
To provide superfast broadband (speeds of 24Mbps or more) for at least 
95% of UK premises and universal access to basic broadband (speeds of 
at least 2Mbps). 
 
SuperConnected Cities Programme 
To support UK cities to develop the digital infrastructure capability that the 
government hopes will ensure that UK cities are “internationally 





                                                
77 Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification. 
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Mobile Infrastructure Project 
An investment of up to £150 million in mobile infrastructure to improve 
coverage for voice calls and text messages for the final 0.3-0.4% of UK 
premises that don’t currently have it. (DCMS, 2014)78 
 
Nevertheless, by far the largest investment in NGA is coming from the private 
sector. There are a number of networks being installed by smaller providers, as 
set out in Table 19, but the largest investor in NGA is BT, which is upgrading 
many of its exchanges to FTTX to deliver higher speed broadband. This section 
explores whether the policy changes of 2005 have had long-term effects on the 
development of the broadband market.  
 
Type of deployment Examples (not exhaustive) 
Commercial NGA 
networks 
Cityfibre: wholesale provider of fibre infrastructure 
including joint venture announced with Sky and 
TalkTalk to roll-out FTTP in York. Cityfibre targets what 
it calls “second tier cities” and claims to have the UK’s 
largest FTTH network in Bournemouth, covering 
21,000 homes. 
Hyperoptic: Fibre to the Building to blocks of flats in 
cities including London, Cardiff, Reading, Bristol, 
Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. 
Gigaclear: FTTP to rural villages. It claims to have 25 
live projects and 50 being installed. The villages tend to 
be clustered in Leicestershire and Oxfordshire.  
Commercial Satellite 
Networks 
Satellite broadband: commercial satellite service 
providing up to 20 Mbit/s broadband. The leading 




There are several local wireless networks. For 
example: 
• Call Flow (Hampshire) 
• Thinking Wisp (Norfolk) 
• WiSpire (Norfolk) 
Community NGA 
networks 
Cybermoor and fibre broadband in Alston Moor, 
Cumbria. 
B4RN: FTTP in the rural north west of England. 
Shetland Telecom: wireless broadband around 
Lerwick. 
(Ofcom, 2014B, supplemented by own research) 
Table 19: Non-BT Deployment of Fibre Access Networks 
 
                                                
78 https://www.gov.uk/broadband-delivery-uk#overview  
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6.3 The Effect of Unbundling on BT’s Choice of Fibre Exchanges 
The analysis above showed how the Undertakings moved the marginal exchange 
for LLU and therefore increased the proportion of premises in the UK that could 
be economically served by LLU and in which ISPs could offer their own service 
package within the technical confines of current generation broadband. This 
section examines whether that has had a longer term effect on BT’s decision as 
to where to install FTTX for NGA. BT faces competition from both LLU-based 
ISPs (Sky and TalkTalk) and from Virgin Media and there is no reason to expect 
BT to respond more against one type of competitor than another. This section 
therefore examines BT’s choice of where it invests in FTTX against the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: BT has responded to increased competition by investing in FTTX 
and has not distinguished between competition from LLU-based ISPs and Virgin 
Media. 
 
As at December 31st 2012, BT had installed FTTX in 1,305 exchanges covering 
16.3 million premises, approximately 59% of the population. The location of the 
exchanges where BT has installed FTTC are shown in Figure 30. The 
demographic characteristics of the FTTX exchanges compared with LLU and 
Cable exchanges are set out in Table 20 below. 
 















(persons per km2) 
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FTTC 2,634 12,482 5.4 27.6 30,177 29,996 1,305 
LLU 1,227 11,424 2.2 25.2 30,318 29,813 2,030 
Cable 2,343 12,963 3.7 31.7 29,761 31,288 1,363 
 
Table 20: Characteristics of Exchanges by Technology 
 
Given the larger number of exchanges where LLU has been installed, it is not 
surprising that these exchanges are, on average, both smaller and less densely 
populated than the FTTX exchanges.  
 
The key interest here is the extent to which FTTX overlaps with other 
networks, i.e. has the presence of other technologies affected BT’s 
decision to invest in FTTX? A simple way to answer this question is by 
counting the number of exchanges by FTTC where one or both of LLU and 
Cable are present. The results are shown in  
Table 21. 
 
Presence of other 
technologies on FTTX 
exchanges 
Number (Percentage) 
LLU 1,081 (83%) 
Cable 746 (57%) 
 
Table 21: Presence of Other Technologies in FTTX Exchanges 
 
LLU is present in 83% of FTTX exchanges and Cable in 57%, which superficially 
suggests that BT is more concerned to use FTTX to compete against LLU than it 
is against Virgin Media. 
 
The strength of the effect of LLU and cable on the likelihood that BT would 
choose to invest in FTTX is assessed econometrically using a binary choice 
model. This form of model assesses the effect that a range of variables may have 
on an individual’s or firm’s decision to choose between two options. In this case 
the model will assess the strength of the effect on BT’s choice to invest or 
otherwise in FTTX at each exchange i. The two most popular forms of binary 
choice mode are the logistic function (a logit estimation) and the cumulative 
normal distribution (probit estimation). Both model forms have been developed 
and are reported here although there is very little difference between them. The 
generalised form of a binary choice model is  
 






 𝐺 𝑥𝛽 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝐵!𝑥! 
 
What the model estimates, therefore, is the strength of the effect of each 
independent variable on the probability that y=1, that is that BT has invested in 
FTTX.  
 
The factors that might affect where BT decides to invest in FTTX can be divided 
into three categories: demographic, competition and policy.  
 
• Demographic variables refer to the number of premises and the population 
density of an exchange area, which in turn affect market size and cost of 
deployment. 
• Competition refers to the presence of LLU-based competitors and the cable 
operator, Virgin Media, in an exchange area. 
• Policy refers to specific public policy interventions to promote FTTX in 
certain regions, in particular Northern Ireland. 
 
The decision to invest in FTTX has followed the expansion of LLU 
operators after the 2005 reforms. As has been shown above, these 
operators themselves tended to unbundle exchanges with a higher number 
of premises and in more densely populated areas first. Table 20 shows that 
the FTTX exchanges, like the LLU and Virgin Media exchange areas, have a 
significantly higher number of premises and population density than those 
without FTTX. Including both demographic and competition variables in the 
model may therefore lead to problems with the results due to 
multicollinearity. However, tests for multicollinearity in the data reveal that 




The model is cross-sectional at 31st December 2012. The equation, excluding the 
UK nation variables, is shown below: 
 
 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑋 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑈 + 𝛽!𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 +   𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝜀 ( 14 ) 
 
Where: 
LLU is a dummy variable indicating whether one or both of Sky and/or 
TalkTalk is present in the exchange. 
VirginMedia is a dummy variable indicating whether Virgin Media is 
available in at least 60% of the exchange area. 
TotPrem is the total number of business and residential premises in the 
exchange area. 
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PopDensity is the population density measured in persons per km2 of the 
local authority ward of the telephone exchange building. 
Med_Inc is the median income of the post code of the exchange location. 
 
The results of equation ( 14 ) have been calculated using both probit and logit 
models and the results are reported below for the average marginal effects 
(AME) for each variable. The average marginal effect (AME) calculates the 
response of individuals in the sample to a change in the value of an explanatory 
variable from any data point in the sample, rather than from a specific data point 
such as the mean. The marginal effects at the means (MEM) have also been 
calculated and there are no substantial differences in the results. The MEM 
results are reported in Annex C. P values are shown in brackets underneath the 
coefficients. The full Stata output of the logit and probit regressions before 
calculation of the AME are also shown in Annex C.  
 
 
































   
0.0000006 
(0.19) 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%. 
Table 22: Results of Logit Models, Average Marginal Effects 
 
































   
0.0000001 
(0.76) 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Table 23: Results of Probit Models, Average Marginal Effects 
 
The models show the increased (decreased) probability that BT will have 
invested in FTTX given the presence, or otherwise, of LLU operators and 
VirginMedia; the increased (decreased) probability of investment with one unit 
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increase in the total number of premises; and the population density of the 
exchange area. Thus, in model 1 for both the logit and probit calculations, there 
is a 29% increase in the average probability that BT will have invested in FTTX in 
the event that LLU is present. Whereas the increase in probability is only around 
12% greater if Virgin Media is present. 
 
Consistent throughout all the models is the finding that the presence of LLU 
operators has a much stronger effect on the likelihood that BT will invest in FTTX 
than the presence of VirginMedia. Where other factors are not included in the 
model, the likelihood is almost three times greater. In the other logit models the 
average marginal effect of Virgin Media is not significant and in probit model 4 
the effect of LLU is about nine times greater than Virgin Media. 
 
Demographic factors have only very weak effects on BT’s investment decisions 
and the median income is not significant. 
 
The results suggest that BT’s decision to invest in NGA appears to be more 
influenced by the two LLU operators than by Virgin Media and so hypothesis 3 is 
rejected. This raises a question of whether BT regards Virgin Media as a strong 
competitor and so has entered the market to compete with LLU operators to 
avoid the strong competitor or, conversely, it competes with LLU operators 
because they are regarded as strong competitors that must be challenged. This 
question is addressed below. 
 
Data for BT’s market share at each exchange area are not available. However, 
Figure 31 plots the national retail market shares of BT, cable and the LLU 
operators over the period since the implementation of the Undertakings. It can 
clearly be seen from this chart that cable’s market share has declined 
substantially over the period. In part this is because the cable network has not 
expanded beyond the approx. 55% of households it passed at the time the 
Undertakings were signed, whereas BT and LLU operators have extended their 
broadband network reach.  
 
The chart also shows that LLU operators have, from a standing start in 2005, 
acquired a combined market share of over 40%, some nine percentage points 
greater than BT’s. The market share of the cable operator continues to decline, 
albeit slowly. 
 
The implication of this is that LLU operators present a much greater competitive 
threat to BT than Virgin Media. BT’s investment in FTTC may therefore be a 
response to this threat by giving BT a superior product with which to compete 








However, BT is under an obligation to provide wholesale access to its fibre 
service to rivals such as Sky and TalkTalk who can then offer equivalent services 
to those that BT Retail can offer. It might be thought that BT cannot therefore 
gain a competitive advantage over its rivals through its fibre investment, which 
raises the question: why would BT invest in fibre if it can gain no advantage? 
 
To answer this it is necessary to review how competition in the electronic 
communications markets has evolved over recent years and, in particular, how 
consumers’ purchasing behaviour has changed from buying single products to 
bundles. A “bundle” consists of two or more electronic communications services 
and consist of three main types: 
 
• Dual play: Fixed voice and Internet (until 2007 Internet was accessed by 
either broadband or dial-up, but the latter has since ended completely). 
• Triple play: Fixed voice, Internet and TV. 
• Quad play: Fixed voice, mobile voice, Internet and TV. 
 
Ofcom has tracked the purchasing behaviour of consumers with regard to 
bundles since 2005 through an annual consumer survey. Their data show how 
the proportion of consumers buying a bundle including TV has increased 
substantially over the period. In 2005, some 84% of consumers buying dual or 
triple play bundles (quad play bundles were not available at the time) bought dual 
play bundles and either bought TV outside the bundle or relied on “free to air” TV. 
At the time, 29% of households bought a bundle. By 2012, 57% of households 
bought a bundle and, of those, 41% bought bundles including PayTV. By 2014, 
this last figure had increased to 45% (Ofcom 2014). Ofcom’s data is obtained 












however, the trend is clear. It is interesting to see that the rapid increase in the 
proportion buying triple play bundles coincides with the period when Sky and 
TalkTalk were rolling out LLU and thus increasingly able to control the service 
they provided.  
 
The largest provider of PayTV in the UK is Sky, which provides TV over satellite. 
At the end of 2012 its share of the PayTV market was 68%, at which it had 
remained consistently since 201079. Over the same time, Sky’s share of the 
broadband market had increased from 13% to 19% to become the second largest 




Figure 32: Evolution of Consumer Bundle Buying Behaviour 
 
 
Without an FTTX offering, BT would not be able to provide TV to the same quality 
as Sky, as the maximum speeds available on copper-based broadband do not 
allow for a viewing experience equivalent to either Sky’s satellite or Virgin 
Media’s cable offering. BT therefore needed to invest in an infrastructure that 
could allow it to compete with Sky. As BT itself said: 
 
“Triple-play bundles of TV, broadband and fixed-voice continue to grow in 
importance for customers. We have developed our TV and content offers 
– 2013/14 was a watershed year for us. We launched the award-winning 
BT Sport channels and acquired UEFA Champions League and UEFA 
Europa League football rights for three years from summer 2015. We also 
added 38 channels to our TV service… The number of homes taking two 
or more services in a bundle from a single provider continues to grow. 
Fibre broadband and BT Sport help us to compete better in this market.” 
                                                
79 If the market is extended to include free-to-air digital TV (Freeview and Freesat) then Sky’s 
market share falls to 39%. 
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(BT, 2014)81  
 
BT is refusing to sell its new BT Sport channel to Sky on a wholesale basis, as 
this would mean sharing subscription revenues and allowing Sky to price and 
package the channel in ways that could undermine the appeal of BT’s own 
sports-centric TV-and-broadband packages. BT will instead sell BT Sport to 
satellite customers itself and bill them directly. It acquired two Electronic 
Programme Guide (EPG) slots on the Sky platform in November, a move that 
could not be resisted by Sky, given that open access to its EPG is enforced as 
part of the operator’s broadcast license82. 
 
In November 2014, the Financial Times listed the various acquisitions of content 
providers by telecoms operators and explained: 
 
“The backdrop for these moves is a shift towards ‘quadplay’, bundled 
offerings which include landline and mobile contracts as well as 
broadband and TV. If one company can offer all the aspects of 
communications and TV, it can produce a domino effect.” (Thomas et al., 
2014). 
 
The article also showed how the activities of leading telecoms operators 
overlapped in the four parts of the quad play offer, reproduced below. Since the 
article was published BT has purchased the mobile network operator EE, a move 
that would place it in the same areas as AT&T, Orange and Telefonica.  
 
                                                
81 In January 2015 Ofcom launched a Competition Act inquiry into the sale of audio-visual rights to 
English Premier League matches following a complaint by Virgin Media. 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/competition-bulletins/open-cases/all-open-
cases/cw_01138/?utm_source=updates&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cw_01138. 
82 Source: Ovum Knowledge Centre. 
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Figure 33: Telecom Operator Competitive Positioning 
 
 
(Thomas et al., 2014) 
 
Figure 34 illustrates the importance of TV in broadband offering. It shows 
selections from the websites of each of the four main broadband operators and 
how multi-play packages, including TV, are central to their product offerings. 
 
Figure 34: Selection of Multi-Play Web Pages 
 
 
So, whilst BT has to provide wholesale access to its fibre access network to both 
Sky and TalkTalk, BT is able to use that platform to compete aggressively with 
Sky in the PayTV and bundle market which, in turn, allows BT to maintain its 
leading position in the broadband access market.  
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6.4 Direct Public Policy Intervention 
The number of FTTX-enabled exchanges is not constant across the UK. Figure 
35 shows the actual number of FTTX exchanges per region compared to the 
number of exchanges that would be fibred if all regions had fibred exchanges at 
the national average. The region with by far the highest number of enabled 
exchanges in comparison to the expected amount if all regions had the national 
average is Northern Ireland (NI), where 180 of the 191 exchanges (94%) were 
FTTX enabled at the end of 2012. The expected number would have been just 
45. The other areas with an above average number of enabled exchanges were 
mainly in London (LS, LN and LW) and Manchester (MR). At the other end of the 
scale, the regions with the fewest FTTX-enabled exchanges were in Scotland 
(ES, NS, WS) and Wales (SW, WN). 
 
The data presented in Figure 35 are confirmed in logit and probit models, 
including dummy variables for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The 









Figure 35: FTTX Exchanges: Actual vs. Average 
 
















































































*** significant at 1% 
Table 24: Logit and Probit AME, including UK Nations Dummy Variables 
 
The results differ from Table 22 and Table 23 for the continuous variables as 
Med_Inc becomes significant at the 1% level. However, as with the models 
without the UK nation dummies, these models show a stronger effect of LLU than 
Virgin Media (the coefficient on VirginMedia is not significant). The results also 
show a strong and significant positive effect for Northern Ireland (NI) and weaker, 
but significant effects for Scotland (SC) and Wales (WA). The results indicate that 
given like for like exchanges, there would be a 48% increase in the likelihood of 
FTTX in Northern Ireland, There would be 14% and 7% decrease in the likelihood 
of FTTX in Scotland and Wales respectively. 
 
The increased probability of investment in fibre in NI is a result of direct public 
policy intervention by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) 
of the Northern Irish government. 
 
In 2009 the UK government launched a process to upgrade the quality of 
broadband services in NI on the basis that the market, left to itself, would not do 
so. It intended to make available £18m, which would be awarded to the winning 
tenderer. The terms under which the support would be made available meant that 
this support counted as State Aid within the meaning of TFEU and therefore had 
to be assessed by the European Commission to ensure that it complied with the 
rules as they applied to broadband projects. The Commission informed the UK 
government in a letter dated 5/11/2009 that the proposed scheme was 
compatible with the treaty conditions and therefore the UK government could 
fund broadband development in NI. 
 
The project involved BT investing in Fibre to the Cabinet to 1,265 street cabinets 
across NI, and BT later added a further 768 cabinets without further State Aid. NI 
 133 
now has the highest density of exchanges with FTTC and above average 
connections to NGA.  
 
NI is not the only area of the UK to receive support for broadband development. 
The government has been running a programme known as Broadband UK 
(BDUK) to support local projects in less populated rural areas. Figure 36 shows 
the extent of BDUK projects. A typical example is Better Broadband For Norfolk 
(BBFN)83. The county council and UK government have each allocated £15 
million to support broadband in rural areas of the county using FTTX to ensure 
access speeds above 24Mbps. Without this support, Norfolk County Council 
estimated that 34,000 premises across the county would not be able to receive 
basic broadband by the end of 2015. The BBFN project is designed to ensure 
that 80% of premises will receive NGA by that time.  
 
The data available does not allow support from BBFN and other BDUK schemes 
to be included in the model, and many schemes came into being after the end 
2012. However, the NI data does show that BT’s choice of where to invest in 
FTTX was not only driven by commercial criteria but in some areas the decision 
was also driven by direct policy intervention.  
 
Figure 36: BDUK Local Broadband Projects 
 
            (DCMS, 201484) 
                                                
83 http://www.betterbroadbandnorfolk.co.uk/default.aspx  
84 https://www.gov.uk/broadband-delivery-uk Downloaded 29/10/2014 
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6.5 Conclusions from Chapter 6 
The analysis in this section suggests that up to December 2010 BT invested in 
FTTX primarily in response to the competitive threat from LLU operators rather 
than from Virgin Media. Hypothesis 3, which expected BT to be indifferent 
between the sources of competition, is therefore rejected. Direct public 
intervention, as happened in Northern Ireland, also had a strong effect on the 
introduction of FTTX.   
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7 Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The UK broadband market started in 2000 with the cable operators and BT 
offering commercial broadband products to consumers. At the same time, BT 
offered two wholesale access products on its network that its competitors could 
use to offer retail broadband services: bitstream access and local loop 
unbundling. Bitstream allows the retailer little opportunity to differentiate its 
products from BT’s whereas LLU does provide such an opportunity and can 
therefore be considered a superior product. 
 
However, by mid-2005 there were very few broadband connections provided by 
LLU: just 85,000 of eight million total subscriptions, or less than 2% of all 
customer connections, by competitors using BT’s access network. In 2004 the 
new sector regulator, Ofcom, launched its strategic review of telecommunications 
and appears to have been strongly influenced by BT’s competitors to believe  
that non-price discrimination, or the fear of non-price discrimination, was a 
significant block for firms investing in market entry via LLU. It concluded from the 
review that the “no undue discrimination” obligation placed on BT was not 
sufficient to prevent at least the perception of discriminatory behaviour.  
 
Ofcom and BT agreed a set of Undertakings, in lieu of a referral to the 
Competition Commission under the Enterprise Act, under which BT agreed to a 
set of behavioural and organisational changes with the aim of deterring 
discrimination. The behavioural commitment was a new, specifically ex ante, 
form of non-discrimination called Equivalence of Input (EoI). Under EoI, BT had 
to provide the same product to wholesale customers as it used itself, under the 
same terms, at the same price, on the same time scales, using the same 
systems and processes and providing the same commercial information. It was 
not sufficient for the outcomes to be same, the inputs had also to be the same.  
 
The organisational change was that BT would establish a functionally separate 
Access Services Division (later branded Openreach) that would operate at arm’s 
length from the rest of BT and would provide key access products to BT and 
external communications providers under EoI terms.  
 
At the same time, Ofcom cut the regulated price of LLU by 85% and established 
a independent industry body, the Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator 
(OTA), to establish a “fit for purpose” process under which communications 
providers purchased LLU.  
 
This thesis has examined whether these regulatory changes had the desired 
effect in the short run: a reduction in the perceived level of discrimination; and 
whether they could also be credited with longer-term effects on the UK 
broadband market, in particular BT’s location decisions on where to invest in 
Next Generation Access. 
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Two measures of non-price discrimination have been proposed: the ratio of LLU 
to all forms of competitive copper access (CCA) and the location of the marginal 
exchange.  
 
The thesis finds that there is an intuitive causal relationship between the 
introduction of the regulatory changes and the LLU:CCA ratio, which was slightly 
declining before the changes but immediately starting growing following the 
changes. However, the data do not allow a formal testing of the relationship. It is 
also not possible to distinguish between the effect of the Undertakings and of the 
price cut. 
 
The alternative analysis, the location of the marginal exchange, yields better 
results. The marginal exchange is located where the communications provider is 
indifferent between entry via LLU and entry via bitstream and its location is 
calculated using a breakeven analysis. The results indicate that before the 
Undertakings the marginal exchange was between numbers 4,272 and 4,942  of 
5,581 and these exchanges covered 50% - 75% of the population. The 
Undertakings then moved the marginal exchange to number 3,793 and covered a 
further 9 - 34 percentage points of the population. Finally, the price cut moved the 
marginal exchange to number 2,946 and a further nine percentage points of the 
population.  
 
From this analysis the thesis concludes that: 
 
1) Communications providers could have invested beyond the 321 
exchanges they entered before the Undertakings were introduced. 
2) However, the Undertakings did have a positive effect on relocating the 
marginal exchange that was complemented by the price cut. 
 
The second empirical analysis examines the way in which BT’s choice of 
exchanges to upgrade to fibre was related to the presence of LLU operators 
(principally Sky and TalkTalk) versus the presence of Virgin Media, the cable 
operator. All competitors were assumed to be equal threats to BT and therefore 
BT’s choice of where to invest in fibre would not be affected by which competitor 
was present. 
 
Using a discrete choice model, however, the thesis establishes that BT was 
substantially more likely to invest in fibre in local exchange areas where LLU 
operators were present than where Virgin Media was present. The presence of 
Virgin Media was only significant when demographic factors were excluded from 
the model, and then LLU operators were found to have an effect three times 
stronger than that of Virgin Media.  
 
This may be considered a perverse result given that BT is required to allow 
access to its fibre network to other operators such as Sky and TalkTalk and so 
may not be able to gain a competitive advantage. However, the broadband 
market is highly dynamic and the locus of competition has shifted from 
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broadband access speed to content. For BT to remain competitive it needed to 
be able to offer a TV package and for this it needed a fibre access network.  
 
The thesis has also examined the effect of public policy on BT’s location choice, 
especially in Northern Ireland, which has been the recipient of substantial state 
aid to support the roll out of NGA. Extending the discrete choice model to include 
dummy variables for the UK nations, except England, the analysis finds that an 
exchange in Northern Ireland is 50% more likely to fibred than an equivalent 
English exchange. Exchanges in Scotland and Wales are 14% and 7%, 
respectively, less likely to be fibred, as of the end of 2012. 
 
Overall this thesis concludes that Ofcom’s actions in 2005 were successful in 
removing the perceived level of non-price discrimination, and this can be seen in 
how the marginal exchange shifted in response to Ofcom’s actions. However, it 
also finds discrimination was less of a threat than was perceived at the time and 
that, even without Ofcom’s actions, 50% of UK customer premises could have 
been profitably served by LLU. BT’s profit margins on its wholesale products 
suggest that it had only a weak incentive to discriminate. 
 
In the longer term, the market dynamics resulting from increased competition led 
to BT responding to the threat from LLU operators by first investing in fibre 
access networks where Sky and TalkTalk were present.  
 
Much of the debate about the Undertakings has concentrated on functional 
separation and has confused functional with structural separation. Opponents 
have been concerned that the separation of BT would reduce its investment 
incentives, in part because upstream and downstream operations could not co-
ordinate requirements. BT’s investment strategy following the Undertakings 
suggests that these concerns were misplaced. 
 
This thesis has concentrated on wholesale markets and has not investigated the 
effects of the regulatory changes on consumers, which would be a fruitful area for 
further independent research. The thesis is also only concerned with the UK and 
does not compare outcomes in the UK with other countries and this would also 




Annex A: Results of Diffusion Equation 
 
85% Saturation 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      31 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    29) =   20.97 
       Model |  .096577641     1  .096577641           Prob > F      =  0.0001 
    Residual |  .133542646    29  .004604919           R-squared     =  0.4197 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3997 
       Total |  .230120287    30  .007670676           Root MSE      =  .06786 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   switch_85 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LLUCCA |   .2008934    .043867     4.58   0.000     .1111752    .2906116 




      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      31 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    29) =   20.86 
       Model |  .055034948     1  .055034948           Prob > F      =  0.0001 
    Residual |  .076510129    29   .00263828           R-squared     =  0.4184 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3983 
       Total |  .131545078    30  .004384836           Root MSE      =  .05136 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Switch 90  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      P      |   .1516515   .0332038     4.57   0.000     .0837421    .2195609 





    Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      31 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    29) =   19.32 
       Model |  .035507305     1  .035507305           Prob > F      =  0.0001 
    Residual |  .053304897    29    .0018381           R-squared     =  0.3998 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3791 
       Total |  .088812202    30  .002960407           Root MSE      =  .04287 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   switch_95 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LLUCCA |   .1218109   .0277148     4.40   0.000     .0651278    .1784941 







Annex B: Multicollinearity Tests 
 
Table 25 below shows the correlation coefficients for the demographic and 
competition variables and Table 26 shows the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
Tolerance (which is the reciprocal of the VIF) for the same variables. The VIF 
quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. It provides an index that measures how 
much the variance (the square of the estimate's standard deviation) of an 
estimated regression coefficient is increased because of collinearity. Whilst there 
is no hard and fast rule as to the level of correlation of VIF that is acceptable, an 
acceptable rule of thumb is that a correlation less then 0.8 or a VIF less than 10 
would suggest that there is unlikely to be a problem with multicollinearity 
(Williams, 2014). The values shown below suggest that there are no problems of 
multicollinearity. 
 
 LLU VirginMedia TotPrem PopDensity Med_Inc  
LLU 1.0000     
VirginMedia 0.5699 1.0000    
TotPrem 0.6808 0.6330 1.0000   
PopDensity 0.5066 0.5519 0.6514 1.0000  
Med_Inc -0.0252 0.0675 -0.0390 0.0279 1.0000 
 
Table 25: Correlation Table 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
TotPrem 2.67 0.375 
LLU 1.99 0.502 
VirginMedia 1.89 0.530 
PopDensity 1.85 0.540 
Med_Inc 1.02 0.981 
Mean VIF 1.88  
 





Annex C: MEM Results 
































   
0.0000007 
(0.19) 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%. 
Table 27: Results of Logit Models, Average Marginal Effects 
 
































   
0.0000002 
(0.76) 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Table 28: Results of Probit Models, Average Marginal Effects 
 
Results of Logit and Probit Regressions 
 
. logit FTTC LLU VirginMedia 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3035.0264   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2276.3355   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2209.9593   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2208.7615   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2208.7612   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5580 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =    1652.53 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2208.7612                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2722 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   2.343633   .0900892    26.01   0.000     2.167061    2.520205 
 VirginMedia |    .885861   .0843243    10.51   0.000     .7205885    1.051134 








. logit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3035.0264   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2089.4754   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2036.6209   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2036.0249   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2036.0246   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -2036.0246   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5580 
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =    1998.00 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2036.0246                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3292 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   1.496439   .1052949    14.21   0.000     1.290065    1.702813 
 VirginMedia |   .1209414   .1006365     1.20   0.229    -.0763025    .3181852 
     TotPrem |   .0001335   8.22e-06    16.24   0.000     .0001173    .0001496 




. logit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem  PopDensity 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3018.3484   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2065.6454   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2010.8232   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2010.1082   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2010.1079   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -2010.1079   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5562 
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =    2016.48 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2010.1079                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3340 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   1.520583   .1059651    14.35   0.000     1.312895     1.72827 
 VirginMedia |   .0828958   .1035408     0.80   0.423    -.1200404    .2858321 
     TotPrem |   .0001249   8.85e-06    14.12   0.000     .0001076    .0001423 
  PopDensity |   .0048295   .0021689     2.23   0.026     .0005785    .0090804 




. logit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem  PopDensity  Median_Income 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3018.3484   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2065.0004   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2009.9517   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2009.2312   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2009.2308   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -2009.2308   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       5562 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =    2018.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2009.2308                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3343 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LLU |   1.526319    .106068    14.39   0.000      1.31843    1.734209 
  VirginMedia |   .0653616    .104373     0.63   0.531    -.1392056    .2699288 
      TotPrem |   .0001261   8.91e-06    14.16   0.000     .0001087    .0001436 
   PopDensity |   .0046729   .0021749     2.15   0.032     .0004102    .0089355 
Median_Income |   5.50e-06   4.15e-06     1.33   0.185    -2.63e-06    .0000136 






. probit FTTC LLU VirginMedia 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3035.0264   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2221.4389   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2209.0497   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2209.0383   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2209.0383   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5580 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =    1651.98 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2209.0383                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2722 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   1.322752   .0493094    26.83   0.000     1.226108    1.419397 
 VirginMedia |    .532027   .0506591    10.50   0.000      .432737     .631317 




. probit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3035.0264   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2050.3434   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2038.2775   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2038.2531   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2038.2531   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5580 
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =    1993.55 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2038.2531                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3284 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   .8419382   .0576673    14.60   0.000     .7289124     .954964 
 VirginMedia |   .0954485   .0586845     1.63   0.104     -.019571     .210468 
     TotPrem |   .0000739   4.24e-06    17.42   0.000     .0000656    .0000822 




. probit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem  PopDensity 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3018.3484   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -2023.611   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2010.8482   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2010.8189   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2010.8189   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5562 
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =    2015.06 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2010.8189                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3338 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         LLU |   .8463818   .0580869    14.57   0.000     .7325337      .96023 
 VirginMedia |   .0650537   .0604722     1.08   0.282    -.0534697    .1835771 
     TotPrem |   .0000689   4.55e-06    15.14   0.000     .0000599    .0000778 
  PopDensity |   .0034075    .001213     2.81   0.005       .00103    .0057849 












. probit FTTC LLU VirginMedia  TotPrem  PopDensity  Median_Income 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3018.3484   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -2023.597   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2010.8031   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -2010.774   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -2010.774   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5562 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =    2015.15 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -2010.774                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3338 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         FTTC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LLU |   .8466772   .0580919    14.57   0.000     .7328191    .9605353 
  VirginMedia |   .0626898   .0609877     1.03   0.304    -.0568439    .1822234 
      TotPrem |    .000069   4.58e-06    15.08   0.000       .00006     .000078 
   PopDensity |   .0033877   .0012149     2.79   0.005     .0010065    .0057689 
Median_Income |   6.91e-07   2.30e-06     0.30   0.764    -3.82e-06    5.21e-06 







Annex D: BT Exchange Region Codes 
 
Code	   Region	  
CL	   London	  Central	  
CM	   Midlands	  Central	  
EA	   East	  Anglia	  
EM	   East	  Midlands	  
ES	   Scotland	  East	  
LC	   Lancashire	  
LN	   London	  North	  
LS	   London	  South	  
LV	   Liverpool	  
LW	   London	  West	  
MR	   Manchester	  
MY	   Yorkshire	  Mid	  
ND	   North	  Downs	  
NE	   North	  East	  
NI	   Northern	  Ireland	  
NS	   Scotland	  North	  
SD	   South	  Downs	  
SL	   Yorkshire	  South	  and	  Lincolnshire	  
SM	   Midlands	  South	  
SS	   Somerset	  and	  Avon	  
ST	   South	  Coast	  
SW	   Wales	  South	  
TH	   Thames	  
WE	   London	  West	  End	  
WM	   West	  Midlands	  
WN	   Wales	  North	  
WR	   Westminster	  	  
WS	   Scotland	  West	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Access Services Division 
The Undertakings refer to Access Services as they were written 
prior to the launch by BT of Openreach to fulfil the undertakings 
related to Access Services. 
BSA 
Bitstream Access 
A high-speed access link from the telephone exchange to the 
customer's premises, which is then made available to third parties, 
to enable them to provide high speed services to customers. 
CP 
Communications Provider 
Generic term for a legal person providing a Public Electronic 
Communications Service or a Public Electronic Communications 
Network. This includes BT where relevant and includes Internet 
Service Providers. 
EoI 
Equivalence of Inputs 
The concept established by the undertakings in which BT provides, 
in respect of a particular product or service, the same product or 
service to all CPs (including BT) on the same timescales, terms 
and conditions (including price and service levels) by means of the 
same systems and processes, and includes the provision to all 
CPs (including BT) of the same commercial information about such 
products, services, systems and processes. 
EoO 
Equivalence of Outcomes 
The concept in which, in respect of a particular product or service, 
the wholesale input supplied to BT's own downstream division(s) is 
equivalent to the comparable product or service supplied to other 
CPs but not necessarily supplied in an identical manner. 
FTTX 
Fibre to the X 
A generic term for any broadband network architecture using 
optical fibre to provide all or part of the local loop used for last mile 
telecommunications. The term is a generalisation for several 
configurations of fibre deployment, ranging from FTTN (fibre to the 
node) to FTTH (fibre to the home). 
HFC 
Hybrid fibre-coax 
A broadband network that combines optical fibre and coaxial cable. 
It has been commonly employed globally by cable television 
operators since the early 1990s. 
KPI 
Key Performance Indicator 
Something which is measured and used as an indicator of 
performance against a defined target. 
LLU 
Local Loop Unbundling 
The mechanism by which CPs other than the incumbent can gain 
wholesale access to the incumbent's metallic local access network. 
Local The physical link or circuit that connects the customer premises to 
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Loop the local telephone exchange. It is sometimes also referred to as 
the “last mile”. 
MPF 
Metallic Path Facility 
A circuit comprising a pair of twisted metal wires between an end 
user's premise and a main distribution frame that employs electric, 
magnetic, electromagnetic, electrochemical or electromechanical 
energy to convey signals when connected to an electronic 
communications network. 
MSAN 
Multi-Service Access Node 
An integrated broadband system delivering voice, video and data 
services to business and residential users. MSAN line cards 
provide connectivity to broadband customer premises equipment 
(CPE), seamlessly aggregating xDSL and PON traffic in a single 
design. 
NGA 
Next Generation Access 
A significant upgrade to the Broadband available by making a step 
change in speed and quality of the service. This is typically thought 
of as asymmetrical with a download speed of 24Mb plus and a fast 
upload speed. 
NGN 
Next Generation Network 
A packet-based electronic communications network which is able 
to provide electronic communications services and to make use of 
multiple broadband and quality of service-enabled transport 
technologies, and in which service-related functions are 
independent of underlying transport-related technologies. 
Openreach 
The division created by BT to fulfil the undertakings related to 
Access Services. 
See: http://www.openreach.co.uk for more information. 
WLR 
Wholesale Line Rental 
Service offered by BT Wholesale to other service providers 
allowing them to offer their own branded telephony service. 
See: http://www.btwholesale.com for more information. 
xDSL 
Digital Subscriber Line 
The predominant technology for the provision of broadband 
services on BT's access network of which there are a number of 
varieties. The most prevalent variety is Asynchronous DSL, which 
allows speeds of up to 24 Mbps.  
 
This glossary is adapted from Ofcom 2005.  
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